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“Posthumanists, new materialists, neovitalists, cosmopoliticians, accelerationists, xenofeminists, 
post-poststructuralists, and speculative realists will have much to argue with here. But this is an 
argument they—we—would be well advised to have at this historical moment—a decade or two 
into the broader ‘nonhuman turn’—given the often-baroque claims, naïve enthusiasms, and ex-
travagant contradictions performed in its name. In Peterson’s meticulous and elliptical critique 
we encounter a forceful Counter-Reformation against the more heretical proclamations of post-
humanism, along with a nuanced insistence that—when all is said and done—we are human, all too 
human, after all.” DOMINIC PET TMAN, THE N E W S C HOOL  F OR  S OC IAL  R E S E AR C H
A ccording to scholars of the nonhuman turn, the scandal of theory lies in its failure to decenter the human. The real scandal, however, is that we keep trying.The human has become a con-
spicuous blind spot for many theorists seeking to extend hospitality to animals, plants, and even 
insentient things. The displacement of the human is essential and urgent, yet given the humanist 
presumption that animals lack a number of allegedly unique human capacities, such as language, 
reason, and awareness of mortality, we ought to remain cautious about laying claim to any power to 
eradicate anthropocentrism altogether. Such a power risks becoming yet another self-accredited 
capacity thanks to which the human reaffirms its sovereignty through its supposed erasure.
Monkey Trouble argues that the turn toward immanence in contemporary posthumanism promotes 
a cosmocracy that absolves one from engaging in those discriminatory decisions that condition 
hospitality as such. Engaging with recent theoretical developments in speculative realism and ob-
ject-oriented ontology, as well as ape and parrot language studies, the book offers close readings of 
literary works by J. M. Coetzee, Charles Chesnutt, and Walt Whitman and films by Alfonso Cuarón 
and Lars von Trier.
Anthropocentrism, Peterson argues, cannot be displaced through a logic of reversal that elevates 
immanence above transcendence, horizontality over verticality. This decentering must cultivate 
instead a human/nonhuman relationality that affirms the immanent transcendency spawned by 
our phantasmatic humanness.
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Shh! You’ll wake up that monkey.
—JOE GILLIS in Sunset Boulevard (1950)
18955-Peterson_MonkeyTrouble.indd   vii 7/24/17   5:22 PM
18955-Peterson_MonkeyTrouble.indd   viii 7/24/17   5:22 PM
1
The human is a source of trouble for posthumanism. Committed to dis-
turbing the opposition between human and nonhuman, posthumanist 
theory has tended to sideline the human from the scene of its theoretical 
engagements with otherness. The human has become akin to the “Invisible 
Gorilla” made famous by psychologists Christopher Chabris and Daniel 
Simons. Seeking to establish the phenomenon of inattentional blindness, 
Chabris and Simons instructed participants in a psychological study to 
watch a video of people passing around a basketball. Many participants 
failed to notice a chest- pounding, ape- suited human walking through the 
middle of the scene.2 For those keen to demonstrate their fi delity to non-
humans, the human has likewise become a conspicuous blind spot.
To be sure, the nonhuman turn has yielded a wealth of critical interven-
tions that have profi tably altered the landscape of the humanities. Fostered 
by loosely federated areas of inquiry such as animal studies, systems theory, 
actor- network theory, object- oriented ontology, and speculative realism, 
this turn does not so much name a singular doctrine or movement as it 
does a broad theoretical reorientation that aims to shift our attention 
toward a concern for nonhuman alterity. Thanks largely to the insights of 
Introduction
No, it was not freedom I wanted. Just a way out; to the right, 
to the left, wherever; I made no other demands; even if the way out 
should only be a delusion; my demand was small, the delusion 
would not be greater. To move, to move on!
—FRANZ KAFKA, “A Report to an Academy”1
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2 Introduction
contemporary theory, “humanism” designates not only an investment in 
the human as the locus of rationality and agency, or a rejection of religion 
and the supernatural as guides for ethical and moral action, or a humani-
tarian appeal to universal worth and dignity. Humanism also implies an 
ethico- political hierarchy analogous to other forms of discrimination and 
exclusion, such as racism and sexism. Humanism qua taxonomic hierarchy 
is thus roughly synonymous with anthropocentrism and “speciesism,” a 
term popularized by Peter Singer in the 1970s.3 Presaging contemporary 
critiques of human hubris by several decades, Singer called for the political 
inclusion of nonhuman animals on the basis of the same liberal- pluralist 
principles that fostered the civil rights and feminist movements. More 
recent efforts to include plants and things have sought to expand the sphere 
of inclusivity even further. Humanism has thus acquired as one of its con-
temporary connotations a speciesist insistence on the exceptionality of the 
human at the expense not only of nonhuman animals, but also of countless 
insensate and inorganic entities.
Human hubris undeniably spawns a general indifference to the myriad 
of nonhuman beings and entities that share “our” world. This insouciance 
in turn fosters a number of contemporary ills: factor farming and other 
forms of animal abuse, global warming, depletion of natural resources, 
species extinction, and so on. Although we have known since Darwin that 
we are also apes, and more recent research shows that we share the major-
ity of our DNA with chimpanzees, our “narcissism of minor differences” 
endures.4 Could it be that humans need to believe in their exceptionality 
despite all evidence to the contrary? Consider, for instance, the double 
valence that the term Anthropocene affords. To what extent does embracing 
this vocabulary concede the deleterious effects that humans have wrought 
on the environment as well as provide a form of ironic consolation? Per-
haps we have utterly screwed up the planet, we tell ourselves, but at least 
we can take credit for it! The human thus reasserts its power in the same 
stroke as it reproves itself.
Does what we call the human retain any sense outside the discourse of 
anthropocentrism? Or is the human indistinguishable from what Giorgio 
Agamben calls the “anthropological machine,” which distinguishes human 
and animal within the human itself ? According to Agamben, the modern 
post- Darwinian version of this machine operates “by animalizing the 
human.”5 This animalization is but the precursor to our humanization 
insofar as the machine seeks to isolate our specifi cally animal attributes as 
a means of defi ning what is “essential” to the human. The demarcation of 
human from animal is far from neutral, bearing all the traces of a sovereign 
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decision that operates according to human self- interest. As Agamben 
observes, “homo sapiens . . . is neither a clearly defi ned species nor a sub-
stance.”6 Drawing from an analysis of Linnaean taxonomy, he observes 
that Linnaeus initially identifi ed homo by appending the ancient adage, 
nosce te ipsum, “know thyself.” This expression was later shortened to homo 
sapiens: from the Latin verb sapere, “to be sensible or wise.” The circularity 
of this formulation leads Agamben to deduce that “man has no specifi c 
identity other than the ability to recognize himself. . . . Man is the animal 
that must recognize itself as human to be human.”7 The human is irreduc-
ible to biology because it is overlain with countless discursive mechanisms 
through which it reproduces its own image.
Broadly speaking, posthumanist critiques of exceptionalism challenge 
the presumption that animals lack a number of allegedly unique human 
capacities, such as language, tool- use, reason, imagination, a temporal 
sense, and awareness of mortality. Posthumanism has also alerted our 
attention to how species difference does not exclusively function as a fi gure 
for some other category, such as gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and 
class.8 While the category of species often supplies the metaphorics through 
which racism and other sociopolitical hierarchies are constituted, species 
has come to be viewed as worthy of critical analysis in its own right. In the 
nascent years of animal studies, this attention to species led Steve Baker to 
ask why animal representations—whether literary, pictorial, or fi lmic—
almost always generate interpretations that reduce the animal to its func-
tion as a “transparent signifi er” of the human.9 Baker argued persuasively 
that the “denial of the animal” has the unfortunate consequence of “ruling 
out one whole area of potential meanings by assuming that whatever else 
they may have to do with, the meanings prompted by these representations 
are not to do with animals.”10 More recently Jonathan Burt has argued that 
animal studies must “bring the animal center stage as the main focus of 
study, sidestepping the issue of the human- animal boundary, and set this 
study within the overarching context of human- animal relations—not the 
overarching context of theorizing about humans.”11 Baker and Burt both 
recall Walter Benjamin’s often- cited remark regarding Kafka: “It is possible 
to read Kafka’s animal stories for quite a while without realising that they 
are not about human beings at all.”12 Benjamin might be taken here to be 
expressing a certain posthumanist standpoint avant la lettre, urging us to 
resist allegorical interpretations of Kafka in favor of engaging with animal 
alterity as such. Yet can and do we ever engage with animals as such (literary 
or real)? Can we utterly dispense with the as if, the speculative projections, 
that we as humans bring along with us? Do we not risk denying the human—
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or rather the persistence of its phantasm—in our enthusiasm to mark a 
decisive “turn” toward the nonhuman?
Edmund Husserl observes that the earth does not move insofar as it 
functions as the ground body for our perception of other astronomical 
bodies. The earth may not be the center of the universe as such, but we 
experience it as if it were.13 This book argues that the human is likewise 
quasi- immobile insofar as it conditions all attempts to think what is other 
to it. An originary “detour” through the human—an irreducible antehu-
manism—renders possible any ethical and political reorientation toward 
the nonhuman. To claim that the nonhuman turn is irreducibly humanist is 
not to say that it is exclusively human, as if animals, plants, and things are 
simply passive objects to whom we are giving a voice. Antehumanism is not 
the antehuman, or even worse, the archehuman: it does not name an essen-
tial humanness that emerges prior to our co- constitution in relation to 
nonhumans. Antehumanism thus differs from human exceptionalism, 
which rests on a dialectic of possession and dispossession that jealousy 
guards human ownership of various self- certifi ed abilities.
Antehumanism also contrasts with anthropomorphism, which is often 
disparaged for uncritically projecting “human” qualities onto nonhumans. 
The objection to anthropomorphism presupposes that the characteristics 
one attributes to nonhumans are proper to the human. The accusation thus 
fails to recognize how the human self- anthropomorphizes by giving itself 
this or that capacity whose declared absence among nonhumans performa-
tively delineates the contours of the human. In response to the charge of 
anthropomorphism, some theorists have eagerly embraced it. Jane Ben-
nett, for instance, sings anthropomorphism’s “virtues,” while Brian Mas-
sumi describes the allegation of anthropomorphism as a “risk” that must be 
assumed.14 Massumi is no doubt correct that we can productively identify 
similarities between human and nonhuman in a manner that avoids the 
“goo of undifferentiation,” yet to promise “not a human politics of the ani-
mal, but an integrally animal politics,” an “animo- centrism” in which the 
human “loses its a priori dominance,” is to sidestep the phantasm of the 
human.15 Massumi concedes that starting from the animal point of view is 
“somewhat arbitrary . . . because the poles of tendential movements are 
ideal: movements from a starting point that was never occupied, because in 
point of actual fact there has never been anything other than mixtures in 
nature.”16 Yet whether we call our departure point human or animal, we 
experience it as a starting point, no matter how arbitrary or false. For her 
part, Bennett affi rms anthropomorphism in a manner that too closely 
refl ects the values of traditional humanism. Her efforts “to give voice to a 
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thing- power,” for instance, may seek to deprive humans of our exceptional 
claim to agency, but the ascription of vitality to nonhuman actants is all- 
too reminiscent of the self- presencing fi ction of human sovereignty, the 
vigorous self- determination of an “I can” that seeks to stave off the ultimate 
powerlessness: our vulnerability to fi nitude.17 Jeremy Bentham famously 
asserted that philosophers have been asking the wrong question about 
nonhumans: at issue is not so much whether animals can speak or reason 
but whether they can suffer.18 Homing in on the intransitivity that Ben-
tham’s question implies, Jacques Derrida observes that “ ‘Can they suffer?’ 
amounts to asking ‘can they not be able?’ ”19 Suffering does not belong to 
the realm of the volitional subject presupposed by the discourse of reason 
and speech: “Being able to suffer is no longer a power; it is a possibility 
without power, a possibility of the impossible. Mortality resides there, as 
the most radical means of thinking the fi nitude that we share with ani-
mals.”20 Suffering involves a condition of exposure and vulnerability, an 
“impouvoir” that interrogates the principle of agency itself rather than 
simply extend it to nonhumans.21 Anthropomorphism can impute “human” 
power to nonhumans only by fi rst crediting this power to humans as such. 
To defend oneself against the charge of anthropomorphism by insisting 
that nonhumans and humans alike bear a capacity for agency thus does 
nothing to weaken the exceptionalist, sovereign fantasies through which 
our conception of the human is irremediably fi ltered.
Posthuman Error
Human exceptionalism is no doubt a phantasm, but phantasms have a way 
of persisting. However indefi nite and empty, the human attracts a weak 
univocity as soon as we assert its equivocity. How else can we declare the 
human’s fi ctionality except by presupposing some degree of intelligibility 
to the identity whose error we have just pronounced? Only on the condi-
tion of insinuating this fragile sense to the human is the determination of 
its indetermination possible.22 As Michael Naas observes: “the phantasm is 
not an error to be measured in relation to truth. . . . [It is] not a representa-
tion or misrepresentation of the way things are but a projection on the part 
of a subject . . . of the way one would wish them to be—and, thus, in some 
sense, the way they become, with all their real, attendant effects.”23 This 
displacement of the truth/error opposition resonates to some degree with 
the argument advanced by Dominic Pettman in Human Error, where he 
writes that the human is a case of “mistaken identity— or better yet, the 
mistake of identity.”24 He clarifi es that the point is “not to avoid mistakes, 
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since this is impossible, but to consciously cultivate more interesting ones: 
mistakes not based on the us- and- them principle of the anthropological 
machine,” errors that are “not structured and limited by fi xed taxonomy, 
by defensive or aggressive sovereignty.”25 Pettman wants to reconceive the 
relation between human, animal, and machine in terms of a “cybernetic 
triangle,” a “humanimalchine” in which all three points of this triad interact 
equally and thereby deprive the anthropological machine of its privilege in 
“framing and determining the other two.”26 The cybernetic triangle is no 
doubt a more interesting error than the most rigid forms of anthropocen-
trism. Similar to Massumi, however, Pettman fails to appreciate that the 
human—however misrecognized and misnamed—remains the zero point 
of our relation to alterity. The phantasm of human exceptionalism cannot 
be so easily vanquished because its error is also its “truth.” The human that 
declares the fallacy of its own exceptionality can do so only from the posi-
tion of its phantasmatic centeredness. We turn back even as we turn away; 
or rather, we never turn away from ourselves precisely so that we can turn 
away from ourselves.
Pettman’s assertion that “we are the anthro- machine, and our error is to 
disavow the machinic part of ourselves as well as the animal aspect” builds 
on Agamben’s claim that the human occupies “a space of exception” that is 
“perfectly empty.”27 Given this fragility of the human, Agamben draws the 
lesson that the anthropological machine can be stopped: “To render inop-
erative the machine that governs our conception of man will therefore 
mean no longer to seek new—more effective or more authentic—articula-
tions, but rather to show the central emptiness, the hiatus that—within 
man—separates man and animal, and to risk ourselves in this emptiness: 
the suspension of the suspension, Shabbat of both animal and man.”28 
Does it follow from the recognition of this essential vacuity that the phan-
tasm of human sovereignty can be overcome? How can it be arrested if the 
power and responsibility for its cessation rests with the human? Given how 
the human has historically defi ned itself against animal lack, we ought to 
remain cautious about laying claim to any power to outright jam the 
anthropological machine. This force risks becoming yet another self- 
accredited capacity thanks to which the human redraws the human /non-
human distinction through the very movement of its alleged erasure. We 
fi nd a particularly “strong” version of this line of thinking in the recently 
consecrated philosophical movement of speculative realism, which revels 
in stressing that “the world can do without humanity.”29 How does the 
apparent modesty involved in underscoring our relative insignifi cance 
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ironically betray its own immodesty insofar as the human grants itself the 
power to overcome itself ?
Speculative realism’s anticipated liberation from the human contrasts 
with the “way out” that Kafka’s ape, Red Peter, seeks in “A Report to an 
Academy.” He knows that he cannot free himself entirely from humans, so 
he chooses vaudeville over the zoo, which he views as “only a new cage with 
bars.”30 Even if his egress “should only be a delusion,” he suggests that the 
“delusion would not be greater” because his demand is “small.”31 His “way 
out” is concrete and physical, yet the distinction it marks from total free-
dom also evokes the philosophical dilemma posed by correlationism: Quen-
tin Meillassoux’s term for the Kantian position that things- in- themselves 
are unknowable. Meillassoux wants to escape this “ ‘argument from the 
circle,’ ” the claim that there can be no X without its givenness for us 
humans.32 As he sees it, “correlationists” (an epithet that encompasses vir-
tually all continental philosophers since Kant) hold that “we are locked up 
in our representations—conscious, linguistic, historical ones—without 
any sure means of access to an eternal reality independent of our specifi c 
point of view.”33 While the Benjaminian reading of Kafka shares with 
Meil lassoux the aim of displacing the human, the former does not call on 
us to relinquish the human altogether; rather, Benjamin invites us to abide 
and stay with animals rather than swiftly seek shelter in the comfortable 
familiarity of the human. He is certainly correct that Kafka’s animal stories 
are not necessarily about humans, but they are also, for that matter, not 
necessarily always and only about animals. Red Peter’s report, for instance, 
assumes the form of a testimony that recounts his hominization before an 
ostensibly human audience. And yet, as the fi ctional Elizabeth Costello 
remarks in Coetzee’s eponymous collection of short stories, Kafka’s fi rst- 
person monologic narration precludes any external perspective that could 
verify the speaker’s identity.34 Mirroring the human’s own specular self- 
recognition, Red Peter calls himself an ape. Yet is he really an ape speaking 
to humans? A human speaking to apes? A human speaking to other humans? 
Absent any corroborating witnesses, we can only take him at his word.
A similar ambiguity troubles Gabriel von Max’s painting Affen als Kunst-
kritiker (1889; Monkeys as Art Critics) (Figure 1). Originally titled The 
Ladies’ Club, the work depicts a group of apes viewing a painting that faces 
away from the human spectator.35 We see only one side of the tableau’s 
gold frame, to which is attached a label identifying the image as Tristan und 
Isolde. Some of the animals gaze intently at the painting, others indiffer-
ently look askance. Yet the central, largest monkey stares directly at the 
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spectator, her legs open in a manifestly “unladylike” pose. The contrast 
between her “absent” genitalia and her protruding tongue seems to mock 
both the masculinist conception of female lack as well as the phallogocen-
tric presumption that nonhumans are deprived of language, as if the paint-
ing restores la langue to the ostensibly nonspeaking ape. Yet the tongue also 
mocks the human spectator’s ignorance vis- à- vis the unseen painting. The 
gilded frame constructs a vertical border that reframes the human /animal 
boundary as a site of loss and absence for humans. Shorn of our privileged 
spectatorial position, we cannot know for certain whom or what the paint-
ing depicts. For all we know, the frame may encase a mirror in which the 
monkeys contemplate their own image, much as human spectators of von 
Max’s painting see themselves refl ected in the animal gaze of their nearest 
evolutionary kindred. The label thus testifi es to a human presence that is 
no more verifi able than the identity of either Red Peter or his auditors.
Whomever or whatever Red Peter is, he begins his report by conceding 
defeat: he cannot comply with the gentlemen’s request because the attain-
ment of his humanness has severed him from his former apehood. The 
solipsistic circularity of Red Peter’s report is not far removed from that of 
Agamben’s mechanism for identifying and recognizing the human, as if the 
story dramatizes a sort of anthropotheriological machine through which 
Figure 1. Gabriel von Max, Affen als Kunstkritiker (1889; Monkeys as 
Art Critics). Courtesy of Bayerische Staatsgemäldesammlungen, 
Munich, Germany.
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Red Peter recognizes or misrecognizes himself as . . . well, what exactly? 
Must we choose between an allegorical and an antiallegorical reading of 
Kafka? Or might we rather attend to an originary allegoricity by virtue of 
which the identity of Red Peter remains indeterminable?
This allegoricity is similarly at play in the often- discussed opening of 
The Animal That Therefore I Am. It depicts a scene in which Derrida fi nds 
himself being seen naked by his cat: “I must immediately make it clear, the 
cat I am talking about is a real cat, truly, believe me, a little cat. It isn’t the 
fi gure of a cat. It doesn’t silently enter the bedroom as an allegory for all 
the cats on the earth, the felines that traverse our myths and religions, lit-
erature and fables.”36 Stressing this cat’s singularity, Derrida voices an 
ethical comportment toward an irreducible other: “Believe me,” says Der-
rida. My ears perk up when I hear him commending us to believe because 
I believe his understanding of belief is not nearly as straightforward as its 
invocation here suggests. As he elaborates elsewhere in his work on testi-
mony, belief must not and cannot open onto any absolute certainty:
“You have to believe me” means “believe me because I tell you to, 
because I ask it of you,” or, equally well, “I promise you to tell the 
truth and to be faithful to my promise, and I engage myself to be 
faithful.” In this “you have to believe me,” the “you have to,” which is 
not theoretical but performative- pragmatic, is as determining as the 
“believe.” At bottom, it is perhaps the only rigorous introduction to 
the thought of what “to believe” might mean. . . . “What is believ-
ing?”—what are we doing when we believe (which is to say all the time, 
and as soon as we enter into relationship with the other).37
Derrida suggests that every address to another takes the form of testimony, 
even if we take no formal oath in front of a judge. Even if we lie or hide the 
truth, “every utterance implies ‘I am telling you the truth; I am telling you 
what I think; I bear witness in front of you to that to which I bear witness 
in front of me.’ ”38 We are therefore asked to believe him when he insists on 
his cat’s singularity, her resistance to functioning as a synecdoche for “ani-
mal” or even “cat.” One might believe that this cat’s unrepeatable singular-
ity is a fact regardless of whether we believe (in) it. Yet we need not doubt 
either the existence of this cat or the sincerity of Derrida’s belief for us to 
know (or at least believe) that the assertion of her unrepeatable singularity 
as such cannot arrest her generalizability because “this cat” already begins 
to subsume the singular being under the general, iterable sign. The as such 
of her singularity is not immune to the as if of our specular projections, one 
sign of which is the traction gained by an Internet legend that has chris-
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tened Derrida’s cat Logos, as if some nonhuman, “viral” force ironically 
wanted to return language to an animal historically denied it.39 While Der-
rida does not identify his feline by name, this appellation cannot prevent 
her “misidentifi cation” beyond logocentric truth, beyond human volition. 
In short, I believe that Derrida would not want us to believe him entirely; 
or rather, he wouldn’t want us to convert this belief into a constative truth 
that would seek to tame “Logos.”
As soon as Derrida says “my cat,” then, this mineness, as well as its pur-
ported nonallegorical reality, are riven by an irreducible allegoricity or 
iterability that lends this cat to infi nite reappropriations.40 As a consequence 
of this appropriability, I fi nd myself musing about “my” cat, my cat who 
died this past Saturday. She was also a real cat, believe me. Yet her singular, 
irreplaceable realness does not stop humans from asking me, “do you think 
you will get another one?” For Freud, mourning “resolves” thanks to this 
replaceability of lost love objects, but this means that singularity is always 
threatened by generality, a violent repeatability that deludes us into think-
ing that the loss of this unique being is only one loss among others.
When I talk about my cat, how do I know that the logos is not playing 
with me? How do I know if I am talking about her or me? In general, when 
we talk about animals, even if we forego the general singular “animal” and 
talk about the singularity of this or that absolutely unique, irreplaceable 
being, how do we know that our talk does not ultimately go around them, 
following the circuit of our own narcissistic investments? The mise en 
abyme of the aphorism that Derrida exploits in The Gift of Death captures 
precisely this play of difference and sameness: tout autre est tout autre.41 
Every other is wholly other. Every other is (the same as) every other. That 
otherness appears to and for us means that its alterity is exposed to and 
contaminated from the start by our linguistic, cognitive, and specular regimes 
of intelligibility.
You have to believe me: I am talking about a real cat.
You have to believe me: I was an ape before I became a human.
At stake in both of these injunctions is precisely the leap of faith that we 
are called to undertake. The nonhuman turn must necessarily take the 
form of a testimony in which we bear witness on behalf of those who can-
not speak, or at least do not speak the same language. The turn addresses 
itself to other humans while addressing itself to nonhumans. Which of 
these addresses is primary? Can we even know? I wager that posthumanist 
scholars fi nd themselves in a predicament similar to that of Red Peter, even 
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though it goes largely unacknowledged. That is, we report to the academy 
on the topic of nonhuman alterity in our articles and books without 
knowing to whom and for whom we register our concern for nonhumans. 
To the extent that posthumanism leaps over the human, it leaps over the 
leap of faith on which posthumanist testimony depends. Consider the 
following observation from Coetzee in an article published in the Sydney 
Morning Herald criticizing industrial animal food processing. Rather 
than appeal to our conscience or to our better natures, he concludes with 
this startling observation:
The campaign of human beings for animal rights is curious in one 
respect: the creatures on whose behalf human beings are acting are 
unaware of what their benefactors are up to and, if they succeed, are 
unlikely to thank them. There is even a sense in which animals do not 
know what is wrong—they do certainly not know what is wrong in 
the same way that humans do. Thus, however close the well- meaning 
benefactor may feel to animals, the animal rights campaign remains a 
human project from beginning to end.42
Are we really so certain of our self- proclaimed other- orientedness? The 
human is both present and absent in posthumanism, but so too are those 
nonhuman beings on whose behalf we testify: absent because they withdraw 
from us through their oblique inaccessibility, their irreducible alterity; 
present insofar as we intend them in the phenomenological sense as beings 
for us whose withdrawal never escapes our narcissistic orbit.
Whataboutism
Recent developments in posthumanist theory are undeniably committed 
to upping the pluralist ante without end, as if suffering from an acute bout 
of whataboutism: “You think your ethical obligations terminate with sen-
tient beings? What about plants? What about rocks? Who thinks of them?!” 
We should not presume that the limits of our ethical obligations are fully 
knowable, that we know in advance who and what are worthy of ethical 
consideration, or even that we know for certain how and where to draw the 
distinction between “whom” and “what.” Indeed, the scope of our ethical 
responsibility is infi nitely reassessable and renegotiable. Yet contemporary 
theory is replete with various declarations by fi at of infi nite hospitality or 
infi nite inclusivity that do little to advance ethics or politics. According to 
Timothy Morton:
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Nonhumans are also fi lled with infi nite inner space. Some of us are 
ready to grant this inner infi nity to certain kinds of sentient being. 
Some are willing to grant it to all sentient beings. Some are willing to 
grant it to all lifeforms (this was my position in The Ecological Thought). 
And some still further out are willing to grant it to all nonhumans whatso-
ever, no questions asked [my emphasis]. These are the object- oriented 
ontologists, in whose number I now fi nd myself. I see no inherent rea-
son why what I called the strange stranger in The Ecological Thought 
should not apply to any entity whatsoever: fi replaces, the Oort Cloud 
at the edge of the Solar System, fl amingos and slices of pork rotting in 
a garbage can. Since lifeforms are made of nonlife, and since what 
counts as a lifeform is very much a performative act down to the DNA 
level, I see no big reason not to extend the concept of the strange 
stranger to cover all entities.43
Morton wants to think human and nonhuman coexistence on the basis of a 
kind of burlesque of Levinasian absolute otherness: “Quantum theory 
specifi es that quanta withdraw from one another, including the quanta 
with which we measure them. In other words, quanta really are discrete, 
and one mark of this discreteness is the constant (mis)translation of one 
quantum by another.”44 Here Morton echoes Graham Harman’s claim 
that we ought to include inter- object relations in our conception of the 
inaccessible, Kantian thing- in- itself: quanta remain unknowable to one 
another just as they remain unknowable to humans.
The inclusion of everything may seem like the most ethical gesture pos-
sible, but precisely what ethical work does it perform? Is it not simply an 
empty gesture that leaps over the “ordeal of the undecidable,” thus defer-
ring judgment infi nitely by deciding in advance against any discriminatory 
judgment?45 While deconstruction has often been caricatured as promot-
ing the infi nite suspension of decisions, this accusation confuses indecisive-
ness with undecidability; the latter is the condition of any decision, which 
rests on a calculation of what is ultimately incalculable: absolute knowledge 
of the rightness or wrongness of one’s decision.46 We must act without the 
certitude that our action is just. The declaration of infi nite inclusivity, by 
contrast, does not constitute an ethical or political act. It simply decides 
not to decide. It throws up its hands in frustration, concluding that no 
determination of the value or relevance of nonhuman lives or things should 
guide our politics and ethics. As Derrida remarks in “On Cosmopolitan-
ism,” to affi rm an unconditional hospitality independent of the condi-
tional forms they assume in practice is to reduce hospitality to a “pious 
and irresponsible desire, without form and without potency.”47 To declare 
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the arrival here and now of an all-inclusive cosmocracy is to absolve one from 
engaging in those discriminatory decisions that are the condition of hospi-
tality as such. An invitation to everything is an invitation to nothing. What 
sort of investments are revealed by the apparent injunction to be more 
other- oriented than thou? What narcissistic impulses are exposed by this all- 
too- human desire to outstrip other humans precisely by pledging fi delity 
to the other- than- human?
Toward a “Weak” Posthumanism
The nonhuman turn has too quickly bypassed the question of what we 
believe we can and do accomplish when we declare the demise of anthropo-
centrism. This leap toward nonhuman alterity may only appear to be 
practiced by those “strong” versions of posthumanism that impatiently 
declare the human’s decentering in the present: Morton and Harman’s 
object- oriented ontology, Meillassoux’s speculative realism, or Michael 
Marder’s “phytocentrism to come,” which echoes the Derridean democ-
racy à venir, yet falls prey to the teleology that Derrida resists by suggest-
ing that a plant- centered philosophy might “succeed” where “other 
de- centerings of the human have failed.”48 Yet even among more main-
stream posthumanist theories, those that grasp the diffi culties involved in 
moving “beyond” the human, the decentering of the human is understood 
as an achievable end. As Matthew Calarco writes:
The leap from a humanist, anthropocentric (and falsely empty) uni-
versal to a truly empty, nonanthropocentric one is not to be achieved all 
at once. In order to understand the necessity for this transition and to 
appreciate the stakes involved therein, it is important fi rst to under-
stand how deeply anthropocentric much of our thinking about animals 
and other forms of nonhuman life is. . . . In order for this [presubjective 
and postmetaphysical] thought to be completed, the ‘presubjective’ site of 
relation must be refi gured in radically nonanthropocentric terms.49 
(My emphasis)
The teleological impulse here could not be more evident. It lies within our 
abilities to “complete” our self- posting. Posthumanism just needs to perse-
vere. Calarco patiently awaits posthumanism’s achievement, but its advent 
is no less presentist for all that it is deferred. Its patience is therefore also 
its impatience.
Calarco’s teleological approach is certainly not unique among contem-
porary posthumanists. In Before the Law, for instance, Cary Wolfe justly 
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takes issue with theorists such as Roberto Esposito who efface distinctions 
between different forms of life. Resisting the normative frameworks that 
value some lives more than others, Esposito argues that “every form of 
existence, be it deviant or defective from a more limited point of view, has 
equal legitimacy for living according to its own possibilities as a whole in 
the relations in which it is inserted.”50 Wolfe counters that this “principle 
of unlimited equivalence for every single form of life” amounts to a “cop 
out” that homogenizes disparate life forms.51 How could we defend the 
eradication of viruses and bacteria if all lives should equally be allowed to 
fl ourish? Seeking to fi nd the middle ground between unconditional hospi-
tality and immunitary protection—the latter understood both as literal, 
bodily protection and as the inoculative, exclusionary logics on which all 
communities are based—Wolfe nevertheless implies that absolute inclu-
sivity lies within the scope of human potential: “Immunitary indemnifi ca-
tion is the condition of possibility for any possible affi rmation, thus 
opening the community to its others—potentially, all its others. . . . We 
must choose, and by defi nition we cannot choose everyone and everything 
at once [ my emphasis].”52 A few lines later, the necessity of this deferral is 
reiterated: “All cannot be welcomed, nor all at once.”53 Although he explic-
itly acknowledges that exclusion cannot be excluded, the “at once” none-
theless implies that conditional hospitality is a temporary problem. No 
unconditional hospitality, not now. But if not all at once, then incremen-
tally? On the one hand, Wolfe seems to accede to the Kantian regulative 
idea, stating that “it’s not that we shouldn’t strive for unconditional hospi-
tality and endeavor to be fully responsible.”54 The unconditional thus 
operates as a guiding, aspirational principle whose reach always exceeds 
our grasp.55 On the other hand, Wolfe imagines unconditional hospitality 
as postponed yet ultimately attainable: we cannot include everyone and 
everything at once, but the promise of unconditional hospitality is bequeathed 
to a future present in which “potentially, all its [the community’s] others” 
will be included.
What remains unthought in this analysis is how immunitary indemnifi -
cation is both a condition of possibility and impossibility of unconditional, 
universal inclusivity. The answer to the question that Wolfe earnestly 
poses—“Who knows how many others [warrant ethical consideration]?”—
must permanently withhold itself.56 To be accountable for previously 
unidentifi ed others requires that “their” (whose?) fi nal sum remain uncount-
able. As soon as their totality becomes measurable and knowable, we “know” 
where the lines of ethical consideration are to be drawn. The advent of 
unconditional hospitality would be worse than the autoimmune disease it 
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seeks to cure because it would solidify precisely those borders whose per-
meability and fragility permit us to continually reassess who or what is 
worthy of ethical consideration.57 The inestimable others of the cosmoc-
racy to come guarantee that we will have never been able to guarantee the 
successful inclusion of all others.
Teleology also rears its head in the frequency with which posthumanist 
theorists recount a familiar Freudian fable: the incremental displacement 
of human narcissism consequent to a series of allegedly “wounding 
blow[s]”: the Copernican blow that unseated the human from its privileged 
position at the center of the universe; the Darwinian shock that cast humans 
among the world of animals; and the Freudian one that elevated uncon-
scious mental processes above conscious, intentional, human agency.58 No 
doubt Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud each impacted western thought 
enormously. Yet the rhetorical work performed by Freud’s fable of gradual 
human decentering not only gives us an oversimplifi ed psychohistoriogra-
phy, but in so doing too easily serves the human narcissism it is meant to 
diagnose. Dennis Danielson suggests that the Copernican cliché “func-
tions as a self- congratulatory story that materialist modernism recites to 
itself as a means of displacing its own hubris onto what it likes to call the 
‘Dark Ages.’ ”59 We moderns are special because we know that we are not special. 
As I argue in chapter 3, Meillassoux’s charge that Kant’s Copernican revo-
lution re- centers the human, and therefore ought to be understood instead 
as a kind of Ptolemaic reactionism, is belied by medieval cosmology, which 
held that the earth occupied a position of disgraceful insignifi cance. The 
story of the Darwinian wound is likewise overstated because it does not 
take into account the proto- evolutionist thought of a range of eighteenth- 
century naturalists and philosophers, such as Linnaeus, Buffon, and Rous-
seau, each of whom were both captivated and revolted by the physical 
resemblances they observed between apes and humans.60 Anxiety paired 
with fascination toward human /animal affi nities was pervasive prior to the 
Origin, thus complicating the received view that evolutionary theory ini-
tially attracted only denunciation.61
Donna Haraway adds to the three Freudian wounds a fourth, “the 
informatic or cyborgian, which infolds organic and technological fl esh and 
so melds that Great Divide as well.”62 French ethologist and philosopher 
Dominque Lestel has argued similarly that scientifi c investigations into 
animal language and behavior over the last few decades have infl icted a 
“fourth narcissistic wound” by demonstrating that nonhuman animals are 
endowed with at least a weak form of subjectivity, even if they are not 
necessarily persons or individuals.63 This accrual of wounds leads Pettman 
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to observe that “humanity is far more robust than Freud thought and can 
withstand dozens of ego bruises before it admits to being an ex- centric 
being.”64 Pettman implies here that the affi rmation of our eccentricity lies 
within the horizon of human power, if only humans could resolve their 
confl icted and ambivalent attitudes toward difference. While Freud argued 
that the disavowal of difference is never wholly successful, resulting “in 
two contrary attitudes, of which the defeated weaker one, no less than the 
other, leads to psychical complications,” it seems equally true that no 
avowal could guarantee its success either, unless we believe that the psychic 
forces of affi rmation and negation are subject to human mastery, a doubt-
ful supposition if disavowal names an originary mechanism of psychic 
defense that allays the threat posed by alterity.65 The displacement of the 
human is no doubt essential and urgent, but its decentering does not 
belong to the dialectic of success or failure, a teleology whose outcome 
would be either knowable or attainable. Its necessity is also its impossibil-
ity. The posthuman thus belongs to the order of the promise, the unfore-
seeable arrivant whose advent necessarily escapes determination. Who 
other than the utmost humanist human will have been in a position to 
determine that anthropocentrism’s traces have been successfully effaced? 
By what measure will we have calculated that we have become thoroughly 
posthuman?
The human who shoulders accumulative narcissistic wounds can pat 
himself or herself on the back for becoming progressively more other- 
oriented (self- congratulation in this regard is not all that different from 
self- fl agellation). No doubt the most histrionic versions of this narrative 
belong to object- oriented ontology and speculative realism, which reject 
the human- centered world wholesale in order to access what Meillassoux 
calls “the great outdoors.”66 Yet throughout this book I do not oppose some-
thing like the “truth” of correlationism to the “delusion,” as Red Peter 
might call it, of the great outdoors. On the contrary, the distinction that 
we draw between truth on the one hand and fi ction, belief, and error on 
the other will come under pressure by insisting that anthropocentrism 
constitutes an irreducible belief. The exposure of its falsity can thus only 
lead to the installation of another belief or set of beliefs: the “truth” of 
anthropocentrism’s fi ction.
The attention that posthumanism devotes to an ever- widening array of 
nonhuman beings and entities seems to have been inspired by Lewis Car-
roll’s Walrus: “The time has come . . . to talk of many things: / Of shoes—
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and ships—and sealing- wax— / Of cabbages—and kings—.”67 Does 
setting the cabbage on the same level as the human not risk reaffi rming our 
sovereignty, an anthropomorphic power inscribed by the name we give to 
this vegetable: “head plant” (from the Latin caput)?68 The critique of 
human hubris is vital and paramount, but anthropocentrism cannot be 
displaced through a logic of reversal that elevates immanence above tran-
scendence, horizontality over verticality. The following chapters draw 
from Husserl’s notion of “immanent transcendency,” a condition of 
belonging to the world by not belonging to it, of experiencing alterity 
from our “exceptional,” zero point of perception.69 Human and nonhuman 
alterity is both of us and for us: ontically independent yet phenomenologi-
cally dependent. As Dan Zahavi notes, “without asymmetry there would 
be no intersubjectivity, but merely an undifferentiated collectivity.”70 Cul-
tivating a theory of human /nonhuman relationality that affi rms rather 
than denies the asymmetries spawned by our phantasmatic humanness, I 
explore literary texts and fi lms that probe the diffi culties involved in turn-
ing toward the nonhuman. This list of textual “objects” is far less exhaus-
tive than the litanies that suffuse the writings of a number of contemporary 
theorists, whose interminable catalogues tirelessly strive to say “yes” to 
everything. Judith Butler once wrote of the “embarrassed ‘etc.’ ” that often 
closes the litanies of contemporary identity politics (“color, sexuality, eth-
nicity, class, and ablebodiedness”).71 Yet perhaps we need not be embar-
rassed by our necessarily partial pluralism, or rather, we ought to bear this 
embarrassment as one sign of the necessary irreconcilability between plu-
ralism’s necessity and its impossibility. I am therefore obliged to include an 
unavoidably limited number of objects to which I fi nd myself especially 
drawn. Their collection is arbitrary in the best sense. They are not random 
Latourian assemblages to which I bear a horizontal relation. Rather, they 
are objects that I have arbitrated as worthy of attention no doubt according 
to personal investments and cathections of which I am not wholly con-
scious and which I cannot wholly justify or explain. If I prefer to give up 
the pretense that these objects and these objects only are uniquely suited to 
the task at hand, then I hope I will be forgiven.
Chapter 1 explores how the human has become something of a scandal 
for posthumanism: an impediment to “horizontality” and “immanence,” 
those watchwords of the nonhuman turn. While theorists have largely 
advocated a nonhierarchical and porous conception of the human /nonhu-
man distinction, I argue that what remains unthought is the a- porosity 
between humans and nonhumans. Our knowledge of both human and 
18955-Peterson_MonkeyTrouble.indd   17 7/24/17   5:22 PM
18 Introduction
nonhuman alterity is fundamentally aporetic: “without passage” in the origi-
nal Greek meaning of this term. A fundamental asymmetry dogs the non-
human turn at every turn. To explore this asymmetry, I consider the 
experiments of Irene Pepperberg (parrots) and Herbert Terrace (apes); 
both set out to trouble the presumption of nonhuman linguistic lack yet 
ultimately reasserted its absence. Pepperberg, for instance, determined 
that parrots produce “vocalizations” rather than language. Yet her conclu-
sion depends on an unspoken metalanguage that does take into account 
the arbitrariness that permits her to fuse the signifi er “language” to its 
allegedly human signifi ed. While both Terrace and Pepperberg remain 
tethered to a profoundly humanist conception of language, however, I 
argue that lending the name language to animal communication belongs 
to the same humanist appropriation it aims to escape. “Language” is not 
simply one signifi er among others. It is privileged both because it is self- 
referential and because humanism defi nes it as what animals lack. Yet 
language also shares with all other signs a phantasmatic univocity that 
interrupts, if only in principle, the sign’s intrinsic equivocity. Thanks to 
this univocity, what we call animal language is always already at least 
minimally human.
Chapter 2 explores Coetzee’s Foe and Charles Chesnutt’s “The Dumb 
Witness” through Husserl’s notion of analogical appresentation, which 
holds that our knowledge of others is always indirect and partial. I argue 
that Susan Barton’s apparently well- intended desire to give voice to Friday 
clings to a familiar political platitude: the presumed value of speech over 
silence, a silence that she understands as rendering him less than human. 
That Susan never examines Friday’s mouth, moreover, means that he may 
not truly lack a tongue (as Cruso claims), in which case his silence could be 
elective rather than violently infl icted. This withheld speech parallels that 
of Chesnutt’s eponymous dumb witness, a slave named Viney who is 
revealed to have been feigning muteness in order not to reveal the location 
of her master’s deceased father’s will. Chesnutt and Coetzee’s narratives 
both stress how the boundary between speech and silence is incessantly 
crossed, as well as how the “gift” of speech always conceals a sovereign, 
auto- affective fantasy to hear oneself speak.
Chapter 3 situates Lars von Trier’s Melancholia (2011) and Alfonso 
Cuarón’s Gravity (2013) in the context of speculative realism and object- 
oriented ontology. Both fi lms foreground the power of nonhuman agen-
cies to frustrate human intentionality. Exploring how the experience of 
loss attracts both buoyancy (Gravity) and ponderance (Melancholia), I argue 
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that the noncorrelationist “defi ance of gravity,” whereby all objects attract 
the same interest and concern, cannot be sustained. Instead of lending sup-
port to OOO’s plane of immanence, these fi lms dramatize an immanent 
transcendency that affi rms the human as the inexorable “origin” of the 
world. I thus develop the notion of an orbital “I” that eschews the false 
choice between Ptolemaic centeredness and Copernican decenteredness.
Chapter 4 turns to Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass, whose catalogues of 
nonhuman things have recently attracted the interest of political theorist 
Jane Bennett. Drawing from a poem in which Whitman instructs us to 
judge “not as the judge judges but as the sun falling round a helpless thing,” 
Bennett reads Whitman’s lists in terms of a magnanimous and capacious 
ethics and politics that she names solarity: an unconditional, indiscriminate 
hospitality that echoes the cosmocratic plane of immanency endorsed by 
object- oriented ontology.72 Despite its purported spaciousness, this hospi-
tality nevertheless depends on an explicit bracketing of the poetic “I,” a 
voice that a number of critics (most infamously D. H. Lawrence) have 
rebuked for its voracious incorporation and erasure of difference. Bennett’s 
desire to exclude exclusion, moreover, fails to take into account the irre-
solvable tension between unconditional and conditional hospitality. As 
Derrida argues in Rogues, the borders of democracy are unconditionally 
traversable in principle, yet subject to all sorts of conditions, decisions, and 
determinations in practice. This opens democracy up to the dead as well as 
the living, the inanimate as well as the animate, the insentient as well as the 
sentient, yet it does not proclaim the full and fi nal advent of absolute inclu-
sivity. While Whitman’s “ship of democracy” steers us toward the safe 
shores of a democracy absolved of its internal confl ict between uncondi-
tional freedom and conditional equality, I conclude that an all- inclusive 
cosmocracy always remains to come.
Unlike Red Peter’s testimonial, this book reports to the academy in 
response to no explicit request, under no compulsion, and certainly with-
out any intent to make a monkey out of posthumanism. Peter Gratton 
observes that the development of speculative realism and object- oriented 
ontology has spawned a number of impassioned scholarly exchanges, some 
of which have degenerated into Internet “trolling” as people choose differ-
ent sides in the debate. As Gratton sees it, “the internet’s promise of some 
vaunted exchange of ideas has given way in too many cases to the exchange 
of put- downs and pile- ons.”73 Whatever one concludes about the merits of 
speculative realist theory, a number of major academic presses are publish-
ing it.74 We would be unwise to ignore its impact, for better or worse. 
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Moreover, if these theories largely employ a rhetoric that too eagerly dis-
misses the insights of the last two- hundred years of philosophy, a rhetoric 
that gleefully throws the correlationist baby out with the humanist bath-
water, then we would do well not to replicate its hurried impatience. The 
blanket rejection of the Kantian critical turn comes from somewhere, ironi-
cally despite its pretentions to pure immanence, of “subjectless objects,” as 
Levi Bryant puts it.75 To what extent does the philosophical appeal of 
subjectless objects emerge—at least in part—in response to contemporary 
threats to the humanities as a discipline? The conditions that have moti-
vated so many scholars to turn toward nonhuman alterity are no doubt 
varied and overlapping. Beyond the exigency of resisting human narcis-
sism, a problem that, as I argue throughout this book, cannot be addressed 
by seeking to inhabit a space of apparent nonnarcissism; beyond post-
humanism’s sincere ethical commitment to recognizing nonhuman lives as 
lives, we might consider how the nonhuman turn also permits scholars to 
“manage” or “act out” fears in response to diminishing job prospects and 
precarious employment. As Gratton observes:
The loss of numerous teaching jobs in philosophy has happened at the 
same time as scholars have had easier access to publishing options 
online, which has meant a heavier burden to identify oneself quickly, 
to make a name before one even has a name on a regular paycheck. . . . 
To make it for real these days, the cynical will claim, you must have a 
system. . . . Better, too, to have that system as soon as possible: Plato 
gave his philosopher kings some 50 years to develop their chops; he 
obviously never had to upload his CV to Interfolio. You’ll need bona 
fi des for applications for jobs that no longer exist in a discipline funded 
off, it seems, bake sales and whatever change falls out of the pockets of 
the Dean of Business.76
Susan Sontag once observed that disaster fi lms allow the spectator to “par-
ticipate in the fantasy of living through one’s own death.”77 Has the pos-
sibility of human extinction augured by the Anthropocene coalesced in the 
academic psyche with the changing climate of the humanities (more cold 
than hot), as if to imagine our foretold death from a position of irreducible 
survival, irreducible because we cannot imagine the annihilation of the 
humanities except through a fantasy of survival that permits us to outlive 
our destruction? As Gratton rightly observes, philosophy has spouted a 
wave of “self- branding academics pumping out articles and books and 
pushing new systems of thought.”78 Richard Grusin argues similarly that 
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the propagation of various theoretical “turns” recycles the promise of 
transformation “as a form of academic branding.”79 Self- branding and 
obsession with novelty permit the entrepreneurial academic the fantasy of 
escaping extinction precisely by occupying a central role in the human’s 
decentering. The nonhuman turn is certainly not solely entrepreneurial, 
yet its various guises form an ineluctable Anthroposcene— one that no 
monkey costume can hide.
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According to scholars of the nonhuman turn, the scandal of theory lies in 
its failure to decenter the human.
The real scandal, however, is that we keep trying.
We can no longer presume our privileged and exceptional status above 
all other beings, animate or inanimate, sentient or insentient. Neverthe-
less, our phantasmatic humanness engenders an aporetic relation between 
us and nonhumans. Theorists who focus on nonhuman entities and agen-
cies are surely not entirely unaware of this aporia. In Vibrant Matter, for 
instance, Jane Bennett worries that her theory of object agency risks “the 
charge of performative self- contradiction” because it emerges from a human 
subject.2 This allegation, she observes, “is not so easy to resist, defl ect, or 
redirect.”3 Yet are resistance, defl ection, and redirection our only options? 
Why should we impatiently “bracket the question of the human,” as if it 
were merely an obstacle on the path toward an ever- greater nonhumanist 
world?4 If the elision of the human disavows the fundamental aporia that 
conditions our “access” to the nonhuman, then should we not abide this 
scandal rather than attempt to step around it?
c h a p t e r  1
The Scandal of the Human
Immanent Transcendency and the 
Question of Animal Language
Man has always been the animal who has no end other than that 
which he offers to himself; he has always been the being who 
liberates himself—through decision—from determination or 
essence. The very concept of man yields, and has always yielded, 
a post- humanism. What might be more radical is not a celebration 
of the overcoming of man, but a focus on the perpetual, insistent 
and demonic return of anthropocentricism.
— CLAIRE COLEBROOK, “Not Symbiosis, Not Now”1
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That the human is a scandal for the nonhuman humanities must be 
understood in precise etymological terms. The term scandal stems from 
the Greek skándalon: a stumbling block or a trap laid for an enemy.5 In The 
Beast and the Sovereign, volume 2, Derrida offers a fable of sorts that turns 
on such an obstacle. Focused on the relation between solitude and world in 
Robinson Crusoe and Martin Heidegger, Derrida begins by pondering 
what it means to hear the statement “I am alone” all on its own: that is, in 
absolute terms, as an expression of an “I” who is “absolved, detached or 
delivered from all bond, absolutus, safe from any bond, exceptional, even 
sovereign.”6 He observes that “I am alone” always implies alterity “because 
we’re always talking about the world, when we talk about solitude.”7 We 
are always “alone” together, together alone. From these preliminary 
refl ections, Derrida then invites the reader to imagine strolling along the 
shore of an island, perhaps similar to the one on which Robinson Crusoe 
becomes shipwrecked. Suddenly we happen upon a stone, “abandoned or 
placed deliberately,” a rock that we have “tripped over . . . as though it were 
a stumbling block.”8 Inscribed on this skándalon is the following sentence: 
“The beasts are not alone.”9 From “among ten thousand” possible inter-
pretations of this inscription, which Derrida also asks us to read alone, as an 
aphorism enisled from any larger context, he offers two.10 The fi rst: “I am 
a friend of the beasts, there are all over the world friends of the beasts, the 
beasts are not alone. The beasts must not be alone, long live the struggle 
for the beasts, the struggle goes on.”11 This initial reading is consonant 
with the nonhuman turn, posthumanism, animal rights, or any other of the 
myriad contemporary discourses that declare their concern for nonhuman 
animals. Yet this affi rmation of animal affi nity and amity is immediately 
stymied by an alterative reading that blocks our passage from human to 
beast: “The beasts are not alone, they do not need us, or else they do not 
need friends.”12 These textual islands offer entirely divergent conceptions 
of the abyss between human and nonhuman: one bridgeable, the other 
unbridgeable. What might it mean to declare that animals do not need our 
friendship? One can imagine the cynical conclusions to which such a state-
ment might lead. To wit: animals are doing just fi ne by themselves! Their 
abandonment to abuse and extermination does not call for human inter-
vention and protection, as if to pervert for the purposes of justifying animal 
abuse Coetzee’s claim discussed in the introduction that they are not aware 
of our benevolence, that they do not understand the wrongness of our 
misdeeds committed against them. Of course, Coetzee explicitly rebukes 
animal slaughter, remarking that the treatment of “any living being like a 
unit in an industrial process” is “a crime against nature.”13 Clearly what 
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interests him is the claim of proximity and affi nity that empathy for non-
humans implies: “However close the well- meaning benefactor may feel to 
animals, the animal rights campaign remains a human project from 
beginning to end.”14 Something frustrates the claim of empathic identifi -
cation with animals. That “beasts are not alone” thus means that what 
humans and animals share with one another is precisely the impossibility 
of sharing the same world. We turn toward this isolated, “worldless” 
stone (as Heidegger famously put it) only to see refl ected back to us our 
own worldlessness.15
The nonhuman turn has advanced largely by eschewing this skándalon in 
favor of affi rming a shared world. Asserting that “we have never been 
human,” for instance, Donna Haraway stresses the “multispecies crowd” 
through which humans and nonhumans are co- constituted: “Partners do 
not preexist their relating; the partners are precisely what come out of the 
inter- and intra- relating of fl eshly, signifi cant, semiotic- material being.”16 
This conception of “worldliness and touch across difference,” of “species 
coshaping one another in layers of reciprocating complexity,” explicitly 
acknowledges human /animal power asymmetries—especially in the con-
text of the dog agility training in which she and her Australian Shepherd 
dog participate.17 Yet to claim that “we have never been human” is to 
downplay the seductive power of human exceptionalism, which cannot be 
exorcised simply by asserting an immersive companionship with animals.18 
Husserl’s notion of “analogical appresentation” is particularly salient to the 
oblique relationship between human and nonhuman. In the Cartesian 
Meditations, Husserl asserts that “neither the other Ego himself, nor his 
subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else 
belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally. 
If it were, if what belongs to the other’s own essence were directly acces-
sible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence and ultimately he 
himself and I myself would be the same.”19 Echoing Husserl, Derrida 
remarks that, “if the other were not recognized as a transcendental alter 
ego, it would be entirely in the world and not, as ego, the origin of the 
world.”20 That the ego originates the world does not mean that alterity is 
simply a product of consciousness in any literal sense; rather, it means 
that every other with whom I come into contact constitutes another 
point of origin whose perspective I can never fully inhabit. As Derrida 
asks, “is not intentionality respect itself ?”21 That intentionality never 
fully grasps the other means that analogical appresentation names the 
condition of any ethics of alterity. While Husserl developed his theory to 
account for intersubjectivity between humans, it is perhaps even more 
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relevant to interspecies relations. Our relation to nonhumans is intentional 
in the phenomenological sense: a directedness toward alterity that emerges 
from the human’s “sphere of ownness.”22 This sphere is not an absolutely 
self- enclosed, solipsistic space; rather, self and other inhabit a chiasmic space 
of intersubjective, “immanent transcendency.”23 Intersubjectivity requires 
at least a minimal exceptionality by virtue of which my sphere of ownness is 
never fully accessible to others, and vice versa. Being- with presupposes a 
quasi- transcendence whereby every subject, human or animal, is “taken 
outside,” as the etymology of exception (excipere) implies. We belong to 
the world by not belonging to it. Haraway’s conception of “becoming 
with” nonhuman others thus ironically risks erasing this alterity precisely 
by refusing the phantasmatic exceptionality that conditions human/animal 
becoming.24
This asymmetry comes into focus if we follow the logic of Husserl’s 
famous transcendental reduction, which asks us to imagine the possibility 
of a worldless subject in order to inaugurate a phenomenological attitude 
toward the world (as opposed to the “natural” attitude that views the world 
as entirely independent of us). Husserl is not encouraging solipsistic doubt, 
but is interested rather in how the attempt to doubt alters our attitude 
toward the world. We suspend the world, we put it in parentheses, yet it 
nevertheless remains.25 The transcendental reduction thus requires a pro-
visional rather than permanent suspension of the world. Only by imagining 
the possibility of a worldless subject can we come to have an intentional 
relation to the world. If we merely belonged to the world, if we were 
entirely in the world, then we would have absolutely no relation to it.
Derrida extrapolates from this world- forming characteristic of subjec-
tivity to account for how the world is irredeemably altered by the loss of 
the other, a deprivation that he links to a line from a poem by Paul Celan: 
“The world is gone, I must carry you” (“Die Welt ist fort”). Crucially, 
however, Derrida insists that this loss of the world does not commence 
with the other’s death. As he asks later in this same essay,
Isn’t this retreat of the world, this distancing by which the world 
retreats to the point of the possibility of its annihilation, the most nec-
essary, the most logical, but also the most insane experience of a tran-
scendental phenomenology? In the famous paragraph 49 of Ideas I, 
doesn’t Husserl explain to us . . . that access to the absolute egological 
consciousness, in its purest phenomenological sense, requires that the 
existence of the transcendent world be suspended in a radical epokhe? 
. . . In this absolute solitude of the pure ego, when the world has 
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retreated, when “Die Welt ist fort,” the alter ego that is constituted in 
the ego is no longer accessible in an originary and purely phenomeno-
logical intuition. . . . The alter ego is constituted only by analogy, by 
appresentation, indirectly, inside of me, who then carries it there where 
there is no longer a transcendent world.26
Far from lapsing into an unqualifi ed solipsism, the Husserlian transcen-
dental reduction suspends the external world precisely in order to give the 
ego over to an alterity that it can no longer know in an immediate way. I 
can access the other only “indirectly, inside of me.” Counter- intuitively, 
the “annihilation” of the world facilitates a nonoriginary relation to the 
world, which is to say a relation to an otherness that escapes my grasp. 
Hence, I transcend the world, but the world also transcends me.
Rather than parenthesize the human, should posthumanism not instead 
take the “insane” yet necessary step of parenthesizing the nonhuman? 
Nothing perhaps would seem more politically and ethically indecent in the 
context of the alleged nonhuman turn than to call for the “annihilation” of 
nonhumans. Dominic Pettman, for instance, has argued that immanent 
transcendency amounts to a “double gesture” that cultivates human narcis-
sism.27 Yet if intentionality as such requires the suspension of alterity, if 
relating to the world compels us to “doubt” its existence, and thus to carry 
others in the wake of the world’s disappearance, then the “exclusion” of 
alterity is precisely what the nonhuman turn already performs in its own 
inchoate fashion. To grasp what it means to say that we should stop trying 
to decenter the human requires that we hear “try” less as “to attempt” than 
as “to sort” or “to cull,” latent meanings derived from the French root trier. 
To try is also to discriminate. We should not try to decenter the human as 
if its full and fi nal accomplishment were attainable, but we should try to 
decenter the human from the viewpoint of countless trials to come. Their 
verdicts will always remain subject to appeal because they will always be 
vulnerable to the accusation of having overlooked someone or something. 
Hence, the phantasm of anthropocentrism cannot simply be replaced with 
the truth of its excentricity. We will have never been posthuman. The nonhu-
man turn turns out to have been revolutionary in a way that its advocates 
likely never intended. As with Husserl’s transcendental reduction, we can 
turn toward the nonhuman world only by fi rst having turned back toward 
ourselves. The nonhuman turn would thereby name a movement of trans-
formation and return according to the double meaning of “revolution” as 
both change and restoration (as in the premodern defi nition of revolution 
as astronomical orbit).
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That every turn is always revolutionary in this dual sense is precisely 
why we should remain skeptical of the rhetoric of “the turn” as such. 
Despite admitting that academia suffers from “turn fatigue,” Richard 
Grusin attempts to “defend and reclaim” the turn for the nonhumanities.28 
As he sees it, the nonhuman turn is more auspicious than previous shifts in 
“academic fashion” because it bears the potential to “provoke a fundamen-
tal change of circumstances in the humanities in the twenty- fi rst century. 
. . . A turn is invariably oriented toward the future. Even a turn back is an 
attempt to turn the future around, to prevent a future that lies ahead.”29 
Every academic turn promises change, so what makes the nonhuman turn 
any more propitious? The answer seems to lie in the twofold temporal and 
spatial sense of the turn. For Grusin, the spatial shift from verticality to 
horizontality pledges:
to lose the traditional way of the human, to move aside so that other 
nonhumans—animate and less animate—can make their way, turn 
toward movement themselves. I hope that . . . the nonhuman turn . . . 
might in some small way mark the occasion for a turn of fortune, an 
intensifi ed concern for the nonhuman that might catalyze a change in 
our circumstances, a turn for the better not for the worse, in which 
everyone who wants to participate, human and nonhuman alike, will 
get their turn.30
The nonhuman turn corresponds to a temporal and spatial shift that marks 
the moment when the human steps away from itself in the hopes of affi rm-
ing an immanent, nonhierarchical relation to nonhuman others. Yet the 
conventional, humanist pluralism of this hope could not be more patent. 
Do we know that nonhumans want to participate? What form might this 
participation assume? Grusin claims that “affectivity belongs to nonhuman 
animals as well as to nonhuman plants or inanimate objects, technical or 
natural,” but how exactly will extending our concern to plants and things 
be “politically liberatory” in the same way that previous “turns toward a 
concern for gender, race, ethnicity, or class were politically liberatory for 
groups of humans”?31 In whose political interest do we extend our concern 
to rocks? Perhaps if we were to turn over the stone that Derrida “discov-
ers” on Crusoe’s island we might fi nd inscribed another message: rocks are 
not alone. As with the writing on its obverse, this engraving would comprise 
both a claim of affi nity, even affection, and a claim of solitude, perhaps 
even a rebuke to all those object- oriented theorists who believe rocks need 
us to speak on their behalf (can the sub- basaltic speak, anyone?). Perhaps 
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the rock “speaks” only to say “I have no desire to speak, thank you very 
much. Leave me to my solitary, petrifi ed life.”
While it may be in the interest of animals not to be tortured and killed, 
the same cannot be said of this stone for which political liberation would 
seem entirely indirect and vicarious: a rebranded version of Kant’s claim 
that “all duties relating to animals, other beings and things have an indirect 
reference to our duties towards mankind.”32 The Kantian view on animals 
is notorious, but less often discussed is the place of “inanimate objects” in 
his conception of indirect duties: “The human impulse to destroy things 
that can still be used is very immoral. No man ought to damage the beauty 
of nature; even though he cannot use it, other people may yet be able to do 
so, and though he has no need to observe such a duty in regard to the thing 
itself, he does in regard to others. Thus all duties relating to animals, other 
beings and things have an indirect reference to our duties towards man-
kind.”33 Theorists of vital materialities, however, often imply that we do 
bear direct responsibilities toward nonliving agencies. Bennett suggests 
that the conception of politics as exclusively human amounts to “a preju-
dice against a (nonhuman) multitude.”34 She is no doubt correct that things 
bear a capacity “not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans 
but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or 
tendencies of their own.”35 Yet how precisely does this force of things bear 
on the problem of political discrimination? Discussing Darwin’s treatise on 
worms, she asks, “can worms be considered members of a public. . . . Are 
there nonhuman members of a public? What, in sum, are the implications 
of a (meta)physics of vibrant materiality for political theory?” Bennett 
draws upon Dewey’s conception of a public as an alliance formed in 
response to “a shared experience of harm.”36 That this formation is not 
necessarily voluntary or intentional leads her to conceive it as a virtually 
boundless network of actants, including “dead rats, bottle caps, gadgets, 
fi re, electricity, berries, [and] metal.”37 No doubt a myriad of nonhuman 
entities bear a capacity to “catalyze a public,” but does it follow that they 
all experience the harm around which this public coalesces, in which case we 
could justifi ably call their exclusion prejudicial? Is it “wrong to deny vitality 
to nonhuman bodies, forces, and forms” because they have a “face” in the 
Levinasian sense, in which case we have a direct responsibility not to harm 
them?38 Bennett does not directly address this question. Instead, the 
political exclusion of worms, dead rats, and bottle caps remains a prejudice 
in search of a harm. Indeed, she seems to backpedal on the suggestion that 
these things ought to count as members of a public, conceding that she 
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does not wish to “ ‘horizontalize’ the world completely,” but rather “to 
inspire a greater sense of the extent to which all bodies are kin in the sense 
of inextricably enmeshed in a dense network of relations. And in a knotted 
world of vibrant matter, to harm one section of the web may very well be 
to harm oneself.”39 For all the talk of expanding the sphere of politics to 
include innumerable nonhuman entities, it seems that their “inclusion” 
ultimately answers to a set of ethical duties that return to the human, as if 
by doing “harm” to anything other one harms oneself. The ethical and 
political responsiveness that Bennett champions is therefore no less oblique 
than Kant’s insofar as her alleged concern for the vitality of everything is 
performed on behalf of the human.
Grusin likewise reinscribes the centrality of the human when he sug-
gests that the nonhuman turn must also turn toward “the nonhumanness 
that is in all of us,” by which he means the animal embodiment that human-
ism has historically disavowed. This turn away from the human thus also 
turns back to it precisely at the place of the nonhuman within the human. 
While the turn as historical shift may be “invariably oriented” toward the 
future, the turn as spatial metaphor invariably bears within itself an intrin-
sic variability whereby the project of radical immanence turns on itself 
precisely by turning back to the self. The turn as hope—which Emily 
Dickinson calls “the thing with feathers,” swoops down toward immanence 
from the human’s “transcendent” perch above the nonhuman.40 The point 
is not to catch Grusin in a posthumanist “gotcha moment,” but rather to 
ask why theorists remain invested in the rhetoric of “the turn” despite its 
manifest theoretical inadequacy. If we are unable to abandon the fi ction of 
transcendence, then the nonhuman turn amounts to a teleological circle 
whose goal of absolute inclusivity always pivots around the human, no 
matter how other- oriented it wants to be. In the fi nal analysis, Grusin’s 
concern for the nonhuman answers to an all- too- human ethico- political 
imperative. Is it not time to turn away from the turn, to concede that 
responsiveness to others conceived as a turn always seeks to mask an origi-
nary turn toward the self that is the condition of possibility for any ethics 
of alterity?
The As If As Such
We may genuinely believe that we desire to do without the humanist fi c-
tions of exceptionalism and transcendence. Haraway is no doubt sincere in 
this regard when she declares that “human exceptionalism is what compan-
ion species cannot abide.”41 Yet what happens to the exceptionalist phan-
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tasm once its intolerability is proclaimed? As Michael Naas argues, all 
phantasms involve an as if that attempts to pass as an as such: a “speculative 
fi ction” that poses as an “infl exible law.”42 Discussing the centrality of the 
phantasm in Derrida, Naas writes that “the phenomenon of the phantasm 
cannot fail to be sustained by the desire, by the temptation, to believe.”43 
We must therefore come to terms with:
the force and tenacity of a phantasm that, metaphysically speaking, 
does not exist but that we believe exists, a phantasm that would be 
nothing other than our belief in a phenomenon that transcends itself, 
that spontaneously gives rise to itself—like an Immaculate Concep-
tion. For in any consideration of the phantasm one must emphasize 
less the ontological status of the phantasm than its staying power, its 
returning power, I would be tempted to say its regenerative power. In a 
word, one must emphasize the fact that the phantasm lives on, the fact 
that, to cite an English idiom, it seems always to have “legs.”44
The specifi c phantasm to which Naas is referring in this passage is the 
fi ction of auto- affection that Derrida put into question in Voice and Phe-
nomenon. Whereas Husserl maintains that the closed space of interior 
monologue constitutes a realm of pure expression in which sign and mean-
ing are aligned insofar as “speaker” and “listener” are identical, Derrida 
argues that this ostensibly interior world is always exposed to the exterior 
world of representation, iterability, and difference.45 The phantasm of 
auto- affection permits me to believe that my language and meaning is 
absolutely tied to myself. This phantasm thus denies the “truth” of hetero- 
affection. Yet Derrida also stresses that auto- affection names “what our 
desire cannot not be tempted to believe.”46 The French expression vouloir 
dire, “wanting to say,” links this desire to meaning. To mean is always to 
desire an impossible coincidence between sign and meaning, a desire to 
remain unexposed and inured against all threats to one’s integrity and self- 
presence.47 The irreducibility of this auto- affective phantasm is precisely 
what Naas captures by suggesting that it “has legs.”
The scandal of human exceptionalism similarly has legs insofar as its 
staying power belies any simple curative. Absolved of its relation to the 
human as center, the nonhuman turn wants to reveal decenteredness as 
the human’s “truth.” If historically the human has presented itself as if it 
were the center, then the posthumanities aim to show us (humans) that we 
are not truly the center as such. Anthropocentrism is no doubt a specula-
tive fi ction, but it is also what our desire cannot fail to be tempted into 
believing. While Derrida does not discuss auto- affection in terms of the 
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human /animal relation in Voice and Phenomenon, anthropocentrism depends 
precisely on the auto- affective fantasy of pure self- coincidence, of an abso-
lutely porous self- relation that nourishes human narcissism: nosce te ipsum. 
Yet this narcissism cannot simply be evaded. As Pleshette DeArmitt argues, 
“one cannot simply dispense with narcissism, and to attempt to occupy 
such a position would even be perilous.”48 Indeed, Derrida maintains that 
absolute non- narcissism extinguishes alterity and thus equates with the 
worst narcissism possible:
There is not narcissism and non- narcissism; there are narcissisms that 
are more or less comprehensive, generous, open, extended. What is 
called non- narcissism is in general but the economy of a much more 
welcoming, hospitable narcissism, one that is much more open to the 
experience of the other. I believe that without a movement of narcissis-
tic reappropriation, the relation to the other would be absolutely 
destroyed, it would be destroyed in advance. The relation to the 
other—even if it remains asymmetrical, open, without possible reap-
propriation—must trace a movement of reappropriation in the image 
of oneself for love to be possible, for example. Love is narcissistic.49
Narcissism is both necessary and impossible. It corresponds to a desire 
for oneness and sameness whose seductive power is both illusory and 
unrealizable.
This power underscores a crucial ethical implication of Husserlian ana-
logical appresentation. Husserl employs the term empathy (Einfühlung) 
only sparingly, preferring instead to talk about “the experience of the other” 
(Fremderfahrung).50 However directly inaccessible and foreign, the other is 
experienced as other rather than merely logically inferred or imaginarily 
projected. If this experience is always incomplete and indirect, then it fol-
lows that ethical duties as such are always mediated as well. For Kant, one 
should not harm nonhumans because “a person who already displays such 
cruelty to animals is also no less hardened towards men.”51 The prototype 
for other humans, however, is oneself. I should be concerned with animal 
cruelty because it engenders cruelty toward humans, and by extension (or 
contraction), toward myself. Aside from my ethical concern for animals, 
my allegedly direct duties to other humans satisfy a narcissistic, self- 
protective desire to escape harm. That the ethical relation to others—
whether human or nonhuman—is always mediated through the self means 
that the elision of the human commits oneself to an unsustainable, “self-
less” ethics of alterity.
18955-Peterson_MonkeyTrouble.indd   32 7/24/17   5:22 PM
The Scandal of the Human 33
What Naas says of phantasms in general is therefore also true of human 
narcissism. It is not merely an error in need of correction. The “truth” of 
the human is not only its decenteredness and horizontality in relation to 
the nonhuman. Its centeredness and verticality do not evaporate simply by 
wishing it so. These phantasms are also its “truth.” If anthropocentrism 
lives under the illusion that it represents the way things truly are, then the 
posthumanist desire to efface anthropocentrism altogether, to erase any 
and all of its last vestiges, betrays its own phantasmatic logic, its own as if 
masquerading as an as such.52 Massumi’s point discussed in the introduction 
that both human and animal perspectives are arbitrary starting points 
because in “actual fact [ my emphasis] there has never been anything other 
than mixtures in nature” invokes the as such of immanence as if its factual-
ity trumped the as if as such.53 Yet the speculative fi ction of the as if and the 
infl exible law of the as such are not balanced between mutually exclusive, 
dueling imperatives. The law of the as if, as it were, insinuates itself into the 
as such, and vice versa.
The “Effanineffable” Name of Language
We can further trace this co- insinuation of the as if and the as such in rela-
tion to what is perhaps anthropocentrism’s most jealously guarded terri-
tory: language. A number of language studies have been conducted with 
parrots and apes since the 1960s (the latter involving the acquisition of 
American Sign Language [ASL]). The question of whether or not apes 
possess language has often been reduced to a psycholinguistic problem 
that measures their communicative capacities against a human defi nition 
of what counts as language. Hence, the stabilization of the meaning of lan-
guage is presumed and the phantasm of language’s exemplary humanness 
persists. As Derrida observes in “Eating Well”:
The idea according to which man is the only speaking being, in its tra-
ditional form, or in its Heideggerian form, seems to me at once undis-
placeable and highly problematic. Of course, if one defi nes language in 
such a way that it is reserved for what we call man, then what is there 
to say? But if one re- inscribes language in a network of possibilities 
that do not merely encompass it but mark it irreducibly from the 
inside, everything changes. I am thinking in particular of the mark in 
general, of the trace, of iterability, of différance. These possibilities or 
necessities, without which there would be no language, are themselves 
not only human.54
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The exclusion of nonhuman language is “at once undisplaceable and highly 
problematic” insofar as its displacement would require a movement beyond 
the dialectic of “having” and “not- having” language. As soon as humans fi x 
the meaning of language, however, the exclusion of the animal is assured.
Philosopher and ethologist Dominique Lestel has observed that the 
anthropological dimension of ape language experiments is often treated as 
if it were merely a form of contamination that interferes with the experi-
mental results. Rather than “subtract” the human element in order to 
arrive at some kind of “truth” of nonhuman linguistic capacities, Lestel 
reconceives nonhuman language as precisely what emerges from a process 
of mutual domestication: a hybrid community that produces the talking apes 
it purports to recognize.55 Lestel’s research marks an important advance 
insofar as it refuses to bracket the human in hopes of retrieving an inacces-
sible pure animal language. Yet it remains indebted to a conventional 
humanist logic that presumes the absence of language among animals prior 
to what he calls its human accréditation.56 Lestel writes that “it is true that 
these animals are without language. . . . If they do not talk like human 
beings do, ‘one’ speaks for them. The ‘talking ape’ is acculturated in a spe-
cial way, because it is integrated into a human community.”57 Lestel does 
not comment on nonhuman languages outside the context of hybrid, 
human /animal communities. Primatologists such as Amy S. Pollick and 
Frans B. M. de Waal have theorized that apes are especially disposed to the 
acquisition of ASL because gestural communication occurs naturally 
among them.58 That humans share with bonobos and chimpanzees (our 
closest primate relatives) a proclivity for gestures has led scientists to iden-
tify this communicative style as the likely foundation of human language 
evolution. Apes who learn ASL are effectively engaged in an act of second 
language acquisition, in which case it is dubious to claim that they are 
formerly “without language.”
The logic of accréditation is also problematic insofar as it reinscribes the 
human’s possessive investment in language. Lestel suggests that the lan-
guage of apes belongs to “the order of the gift.” He continues: “Monkeys 
do not speak, but researchers can design specifi c mechanisms through 
which some great apes can manipulate a kind of symbolic language in their 
interactions with humans. No chimpanzee has ever spoken like man, but 
some of them can appropriate segments of symbolic communication with 
indisputable effi cacy. What can one give and to whom? Who can give what 
to whom? Who can give what to what? And above all: who can give who 
what?”59 This law of accreditation not only retains language as what is 
proper to man, but in so doing ascribes to animals a linguistic poverty that 
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disavows our own inherent linguistic dispossession. As Derrida puts it in 
The Monolingualism of the Other, “I have only one language, yet it is not 
mine.”60 One inhabits a language that one never fully owns. It comes from 
the other in the form of an originary “colonial” gesture. Language consti-
tutes a “structure of alienation without alienation,” an “inalienable alien-
ation” because its loss does not befall an original possession.61 Rather, 
every speech act cites a language that precedes us and therefore attests to 
an originary linguistic dispersion.
That humans remain divided when it comes to the question of whether 
animals have language is altogether dependent on an arbitrary decision 
that fuses the signifi er “language” to an identifi able and stable signifi ed. 
Lacan, for instance, contested Karl von Frisch’s discovery of the language 
of honey bees (for which von Frisch won the Nobel in 1973), claiming that 
bees rely on a fi xed code rather than fully developed signifi ers.62 Apparently lost 
on Lacan was the irony of fi xing the signifi er “signifi er” to a meaning that 
distinguishes it from the fi xity of animal codes. Indeed, he sought to draw 
a border around language in the hopes of escaping what Paul de Man once 
described as the vertigo of undecidability: “As anyone who has ever been 
caught in a revolving door or on a revolving wheel can testify, it is certainly 
most uncomfortable.”63 The dismissal of undecidability always betrays an 
effort to extricate oneself from the uncomfortable feeling of remaining 
within a revolving wheel, of continuously turning around on oneself. We 
can attempt to exit this revolving door at any time, yet our “decision” 
regarding the defi nition of language will not really have decided anything 
once and for all.
This disavowal of undecidability explains why even the most apparently 
radical ethological explorations into nonhuman communication prefer to 
exchange this vertigo for a false stability. In the Alex Studies, for instance, 
ethologist Irene Pepperberg gives an account of her investigations into the 
linguistic capabilities of an eponymous grey parrot. Pepperberg conducted 
several experiments with Alex in which he demonstrated an ability to rec-
ognize difference and sameness, presence and absence, as well as a capacity 
to communicate intentionally rather than engage in mere mimicry. For 
instance, he learned to apply the word key to keys of varying color, thus 
demonstrating an advanced cognitive ability to transfer skills from familiar 
to novel situations. He also learned to say “I’m sorry” in appropriate con-
texts: once after he chewed up a grant proposal, another in response to 
Pepperberg’s visible frustration when he refused to cooperate with a rou-
tine skills test, and yet another after he knocked a plastic cup onto the 
fl oor. Pepperberg acknowledges that she cannot prove that “I’m sorry” 
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constitutes an expression of true remorse (of course, the presence of genu-
ine contrition is equally immeasurable in humans!), but she nevertheless 
interprets his words as an effective means to defuse a tense situation. Pep-
perberg designates such communication “peri- referentiality,” which she 
distinguishes from “fully referential” language.64 An ability that parrots 
share with the great apes, peri- referentiality employs a symbol as a “mental 
representation of an item,” but it stops short of “full abstract use of a sym-
bol” in which one is able “to talk about qualities of the item, to talk about 
how you think about the item—the referent—in its absence, to talk about 
it in future and past tense—but not simply in the sense of a request for 
something not yet present.”65
In her memoir, Alex and Me, which Pepperberg wrote in the wake of the 
parrot’s death in 2007, she reveals that the name Alex was originally 
intended as an acronym for Avian Language Experiment, but due to resis-
tance within the scientifi c community, she revised the acronym to denote 
Avian Learning Experiment. Pepperberg began her research in the late 
1970s at a time when ape language studies were under attack.66 In 1979, 
Herbert Terrace, who had previously been a staunch advocate of such stud-
ies, published a paper called “Can an Ape Create a Sentence?” in which he 
claimed that his experiments with an ape named Nim Chimpsky (after the 
famous linguist) had failed to demonstrate linguistic capabilities in apes. 
According to Terrace, “the function of the symbols of an ape’s vocabulary 
appears to be not so much to identify things or to convey information . . . 
as it is to satisfy a demand that it use that symbol in order to obtain some 
reward.”67 Nim may have signed “banana” when he wanted one, but he did 
not demonstrate any conception of grammar. Of course, Terrace begs the 
question as to why grammatical ability ought to mark the gateway to lan-
guage. If Nim could sign “banana,” then he no doubt demonstrated a basic 
grasp of referentiality. Terrace’s article helped fuel an openly hostile atti-
tude toward studies of nonhuman communication, and thus Pepperberg 
felt compelled to cease claiming that parrots employ language or words, 
and stated instead that they use “labels” and “vocalizations.” As Pepperberg 
remarked in an interview in 1999: “I avoid the language issue. . . . What 
little syntax he [Alex] has is very simplistic. Language is what you and I are 
doing, an incredibly complex form of communication.”68 We should cer-
tainly sympathize with the plight of a young scholar trying to gain a foot-
hold in academic research and publishing—which, for all its professed 
obsession with innovation, is often ironically unreceptive to work that 
refuses to parrot the status quo—yet we must nevertheless ask how far 
ethological research into nonhuman languages has actually progressed if a 
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well- established scholar still feels induced to such caginess some thirty 
years later.
Rather than avoid the question of language altogether, should we not 
insist instead that the question of where we draw the line between human 
language and nonhuman “vocalizations” is among the most pressing ques-
tions, a question that calls on us with considerable urgency, but that can 
only remain unanswerable, a question that must be posed and reposed 
precisely so that it remain open, so that no fi nal defi nition of language can 
be imposed? It seems commonsensical for Pepperberg to believe that sci-
entifi c investigations into the question of nonhuman communication must 
fi rst come to a decision about what constitutes language itself: how can we 
determine if animals have “it” if we do not fi rst defi ne what “it” is? Yet any 
language that seeks to limit the meaning of language can do so only by 
posing as a metalanguage, which is to say a language that masquerades as 
not language, a language that has much to say about what language is and 
how animals do not have it but has nothing to say about the language that 
authorizes itself to assert this lack. The human thus presumes that it can 
stand above and beyond language, that it bears the power to delimit the 
meaning of “language.” As loquacious as it is when it denies animals a 
capacity for speech, the language of science suddenly becomes dumbstruck 
when it comes to justifying the human’s exceptional claim to language. 
When Pepperberg claims that “language is what you and I are doing,” the 
circularity of her assertion is unmistakable: she gives herself the sovereign 
power to decide what does and does not count as language, a power that 
depends on nothing more than what Derrida calls (drawing from La Fon-
taine) “the reason of the strongest,” a power that exempts one from the 
duty to provide rationales.69 Parrots thus always fall short of some imagi-
nary threshold. Animals that connect a particular sign with a particular 
object may display a capacity for association, she suggests, but this is 
“merely the fi rst step toward referential labeling [ my emphasis],” which 
requires “communicative intent.”70 Likewise, the conceptual understand-
ings inherent in peri- referential labeling are “defi ning characteristics lead-
ing up to referential communication [ my emphasis].”71 Animal “vocalization” 
is in the vicinity or neighborhood of language, but is not quite there yet; 
it is always on the way toward language, but never fully arrives there. 
Although she suggests that “lack of evidence for truly referential commu-
nication in animals is most likely a consequence of our own incompe-
tence,” implying that “true” referentiality in nonhuman animals may yet 
be discovered, this statement is diffi cult to square with her equation of 
language with what she deems “truly” complex forms of communication.72 
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Pepperberg may openly reject the view espoused by some ethologists that 
language “will continue to be redefi ned by linguists as whatever animals 
cannot be shown to do,” but by employing a “human standard for the 
term ‘referential’ ” has she not already imposed an untraversable boundary 
between human language and animal vocalization?73 Lestel remarks that 
the criterion employed by ape researchers closely resembles that of the 
Turing test, which the latter proposed to determine whether a computer 
can be regarded as intelligent. Just as a computer passes the test if it can 
deceive humans into mistaking it for another human, “the ape will be rec-
ognized as speaking when it makes impossible, for a human being, the 
distinction between a human being and a chimpanzee, with regard to lan-
guage.”74 According to such standards, animals would be forever excluded 
from language. Only if we reduce human language to a code of natural or 
naturalized signs can it be understood as fully referential. Yet even were we 
to concede that animal symbolization is less developed than that of humans, 
this concession would still not justify restricting the term language to 
human forms of communication. That the peri- referentiality of parrots is 
prescriptive rather than descriptive means that they are effectively barred 
from language by an infi nitely receding horizon that they have no hope of 
transcending.
It would be all too easy and expedient to brand as “humanist” any argu-
ment that reserves language exclusively for humans. If antehumanism is 
irreducible, however, then any inquiry into animal languages presupposes 
at least a provisional defi nition of language that limits our capacity to grasp 
nonhuman language “on its own terms.” Is it even meaningful to suggest 
that the as such of nonhuman language is accessible to us beyond the as if of 
our imaginary projections? On the one hand, we can and should challenge 
human exceptionalism by showing that language is not the sole province of 
the human. On the other hand, what we name language presupposes what 
Derrida characterized as early as his Introduction to Husserl’s “Origin of 
Geometry” as a “minimal linguistic transparency.”75 We can expand our 
conception of language to embrace innumerable forms of nonhuman com-
munication, to include the general structure of the trace, and so on, but 
this expansion requires that we proceed as if language qua signifi er is mini-
mally univocal. Derrida illustrates the interdependency of the univocal and 
the equivocal in a well- known passage from the Introduction that discusses 
Joyce. Although Joyce sought to unearth “the greatest potential for buried, 
accumulated, and interwoven intentions within each linguistic atom,” this 
excavation “could only succeed by allotting its share to univocity, whether 
it might draw from a given univocity or try to produce another. Otherwise, 
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the very text of its repetition would have been unintelligible; at least it 
would have remained so forever and for everyone.”76 For all its equivoca-
tion, Joyce’s Ulysses is no less exempt from a sort of transitory interruption 
of the sign’s intrinsic heterogeneity.
Even if we accept that signifi cation is subject to an enduring undecid-
ability, this absence of determinable meaning is no more tolerable than 
fi nding oneself trapped in a revolving door. We thus “decide” meaning in 
a number of interpretative contexts in order to mitigate temporarily this 
vertigo. The signifi ed of “language” may never present itself; it is always to 
come, but we proceed here and now as if its meaning has already arrived. 
And this as if is no less evident than when we reject the humanist exclusion 
of the animal from the domain of language. As soon as we say “language 
cannot be defi ned,” or “language is not exclusively human,” we have already 
taken a step toward defi ning language; the intelligibility of these assertions 
posits some degree of reference, some provisional defi nition of language, 
no matter how fallible and precarious, no matter how open to revision and 
contestation.
The rejection of exceptionalism cannot extricate itself from this tension 
between univocity and equivocity, between absolute translatability and 
absolute untranslatability. Language is equivocal as such but we cannot 
avoid believing as if it were minimally univocal. The human who wields the 
Adamic power to name what the nonhuman can no longer be said to lack—
in a word, language—thus reinscribes exceptionalism precisely through the 
inclusive gesture that “gives” language to nonhumans. The “gift” of lan-
guage to animals imposes a univocity that recalls Derrida’s animot: a hom-
onym with animaux that stresses how the catchall “animal” captures the 
plurality of animals in its linguistic cage.77 Are we not reinscribing the 
general singular “animal” despite all the different languages that may exist 
among nonhuman animals, languages that nonhumans would certainly not 
call language, but which might go by other names? Does language not 
constitute a humanimot that bespeaks the human’s monolingualism? Per-
haps my cat has a secret name for her purrs and meows, an “Effanineffable/
Deep and inscrutable singular Name.”78 Hence, the most generous, post-
humanist gesture that would lend the name language to her voice must 
reckon with the antehumanist phantasm that this gesture evokes.
This humanimot of language is precisely what Massumi disavows when 
he claims that “human language is essentially animal.”79 Massumi reads 
animal play as a prototypical form of “metacommunication,” a “simple 
code” that “produces the conditions of human language.”80 Focused on the 
ludic gestures of wolf cubs whose play fi ghting communicates “this is not a 
18955-Peterson_MonkeyTrouble.indd   39 7/24/17   5:22 PM
40 The Scandal of the Human
bite”—thus marking a distinction between real and fi gurative combat that 
is inherently communicative—he asks why, if animal play is protolinguis-
tic, then do we “not consider human language a reprise of animal play, 
raised to a higher power? Or say that it is actually in language that the 
human reaches its highest degree of animality?”81 While he is critical of the 
“monopoly” that humans claim over language, his own language maintains 
a hierarchical distinction between human and nonhuman by describing 
animal play as “metacommunicative” and the human capacity for fi gura-
tion as “metalinguistic.”82 Similar to Pepperberg, Massumi describes ani-
mal communication as “language- like,” “language avant la lettre.”83 Rather 
than “give” animals language, he takes language away from the human, or 
rather, “demotes” language to the level of the animal. Yet this demotion is 
only apparent insofar as human language sublates its essential animality 
and raises it up to another level. Indeed, this approach seems even more 
conventionally humanist than that of Pepperberg because it remains silent 
on the sovereign decision that distinguishes animal communication from 
human language. As I will show in chapter 2, sovereignty in its purest 
(impossible) form requires silence, lest sovereignty undermine itself by 
speaking, by providing reasons—in this case, by supplying a rationale for 
deciding on the distinction between animal communication and human 
language, as if this decision were not dependent precisely on the fi ction of 
transcendence whose perpendicular distance abstracts the subject from the 
scene. Massumi wants to claim that human and animal difference can be 
affi rmed only in “absolute survey,” that is, “without attributing any foun-
dational status” to such distinctions.84 Absolute survey, which Massumi 
also calls “immanent survey,” describes a perspective that claims not to 
stand apart from or above what it perceives, as if from a bird’s- eye view.85 
Such a transcendent perspective is no doubt a phantasm, but Massumi 
proceeds as if its error can simply be opposed to the truth of immanence. 
Absolute survey wants to absolve itself from complicity with the phantasm 
of transcendence. Seeking to distance itself from this phantasm, however, 
it maintains its own bird’s- eye view “above” the knotty aporia of immanent 
transcendence.
The march toward immanence that claims to relinquish “our inveterate 
vanity,” to renounce and thereby move beyond our auto- affective, narcis-
sistic fantasies, can only disavow what Derrida calls “the law of the island 
and the law of the wheel” by virtue of which “my last footstep always might 
coincide with my fi rst.”86 Discussing the anxiety that Robinson Crusoe 
experiences when he cannot determine if a footprint he discovers in the 
sand belongs to a “cannibal,” another castaway, or to himself, Derrida sug-
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gests that the uncanniness engendered by the footprint’s uncertain origin 
resonates with the unease that Robinson also experiences when he hears his 
parrot, Poll, say “Robin, Robin, Robin Crusoe, poor Robin Crusoe, where 
are you, Robin Crusoe? Where are you? Where have you been?”87 Having 
found himself temporarily stranded at sea when he explores the opposite 
side of the island, Crusoe fi nds Poll’s words uncanny because they seem to 
be an expression of longing and mourning, as if Poll has fl own in search of 
his lost human companion. Robinson believes that Poll has merely learned 
these words by rote when the former apparently uttered them in an expres-
sion of profound isolation and disorientation. Yet the question of who 
owns Poll’s linguistic traces is no more answerable than the question of 
who left the footprint in the sand. Who’s to say that Poll has not reappro-
priated his master’s words for his own purposes? Robinson’s linguistic dis-
orientation thus mimes his geographical disorientation: “These are always 
the two risks of a proceeding [démarche]: wander and get lost, or get closed 
in by retracing one’s steps. And that is the Robinsonian trouble with the 
island. Not get lost and not get closed into the aporia, not get paralyzed.”88 
As with de Man’s revolving door of undecidability or the uncertainty that 
Robinson faces when he is unable to determine if the footprint he discovers 
belongs to him or to another, the apparently straightforward path that 
would lead us to nonhuman language always poses the risk of going in 
circles and retracing our steps. In this sense, Lestel is both absolutely 
correct and absolutely incorrect to say that apes do not have language. 
Ethologists such as de Waal do not teach apes to learn ASL, but they never-
theless “give” them language precisely by certifying their gestures as lan-
guage. Accréditation therefore takes place as soon as one asserts that 
nonhumans possess language, even if the language that one “gives” them is 
already “their” own.
Whence the following paradox emerges: language is only and always 
human; language is never solely human. Humans have only one language, 
yet it is not our own.
The full and fi nal displacement of the humanist orientation in and of 
language does not fall within the scope of human potentiality, within the 
horizon of what the human can achieve or accomplish. This failure attests 
to a certain nonpower, a not- being- able, a vulnerability and subjection to 
language that undermines any effort to secure and delineate the scope of its 
signifi cation. The most obstinate humanists among us will no doubt con-
tinue to insist that language is the inalienable property of the human, 
notwithstanding scientifi c and ethological efforts to demonstrate the con-
trary. Yet only those who would thereby assert with equal confi dence that 
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they know what language is could claim to know that animals possess it. 
One would never be able to prove that animals have language, except by 
summoning forth the same metalanguage that will have authorized their 
silencing.
Lestel relates an anecdote about an exasperated linguist who asserted at 
a colloquium on the topic of language among bonobo apes that “there will 
always be a fundamental difference between bonobos and humans; it will 
always be humans who organize symposiums on bonobos and not the 
reverse.”89 The unlikelihood of an ape presenting a scholarly paper to his 
or her peers on the question of human language does not demonstrate that 
apes lack symbolic language, but it does underscore a fundamental asym-
metry between human and nonhuman animals. Openness to animal alter-
ity cannot neutralize the quasi- solipsism by virtue of which access to the 
other must be given indirectly precisely in order that the other remain 
other. That the “gift” of animal language cannot escape the monological 
sovereignty that it opposes means that we cannot fi nally distinguish the 
return of language from its imposition, the gift of language from its theft. 
If animal language always betrays the stain of the human, then we can 
vainly attempt to escape this trace (as Crusoe fl ees the footprint) or endure 
its uncertain origins. This monolanguage that is not of the human, this 
singular print that does not belong to us, nevertheless leaves its mark on 
those animals whom we summon forth to speak from the margins of an 
enforced mutism.
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J. M. Coetzee’s Foe revolves around an alleged absence. According to 
Cruso, Friday cannot speak by force of a cruel slave master having cut out 
his tongue. Its loss recalls von Max’s painting Monkeys as Art Critics that I 
analyzed in the introduction. Whereas the tongue of the painting’s central 
female monkey pokes out at the viewer as if to satirize the humanist and 
masculinist presuppositions of feminine and animal lack, this deprivation is 
thoroughly racialized in the case of Friday. Von Max’s painting is not, by 
itself, racially suggestive, but one cannot read it alongside Foe without 
recalling the long racist history of associating black people with apes.2
Foe retells Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe from the perspective of a woman 
named Susan Barton who fi nds herself shipwrecked on the same island 
with Friday and Cruso (spelled sans “e”). They are eventually rescued, but 
Cruso dies en route to England, where Susan tracks down the novelist 
Daniel Foe in hopes that he will help her write a manuscript recounting her 
adventures. In addition to chronicling her experiences on the island, Susan 
attempts to restore language to Friday. After initially trying to teach him 
the names of everyday objects, and later engaging in a failed musical duet 
using two of Foe’s fl utes, she fi nally settles on the idea of teaching him to 
c h a p t e r  2
Sovereign Silence
The Desire for Answering Speech
The Sirens . . . have an even more terrible weapon 
than their song—namely, their silence.
—FRANZ KAFKA, “The Silence of the Sirens”1
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write. She quickly becomes frustrated with her pupil’s lack of progress, as 
he only seems capable of threading together an incoherent string of let-
ters as well as fi gures that resemble “row upon row of eyes upon feet: walk-
ing eyes.”3
Susan’s motivation to communicate with Friday is not as straightfor-
ward as it might fi rst appear. Her apparently other- oriented gift of lan-
guage both conceals and reveals what she elsewhere terms her “desire for 
answering speech,” which she likens to “the desire for the embrace of, the 
embrace by, another being.”4 In other words, her ostensibly altruistic rea-
sons for restoring Friday’s voice obscure her own desire for language and 
its promise of intersubjective immediacy. Would Friday want to speak even 
if he could? Moreover, how can we be absolutely certain that he is physi-
cally incapable of speech? As Lewis MacLeod observes, the novel provides 
no defi nitive evidence that Friday is lacking a tongue.5 As with Susan, we 
can only take Cruso’s word for it. Derek Attridge also remarks upon the 
lack of conclusive evidence that Friday’s tongue is absent. Even so, he 
focuses almost exclusively on silence as a product of dominant discourses. 
Aligning the colonial violence of Friday’s silencing, the struggles over 
authorial voice that arise from Susan’s desire to have her story told, and the 
larger historical processes of literary canonization, Attridge writes, “all 
canons rest on exclusion; the voice they give to some can be heard by virtue 
of the silence they impose on others.”6 Yet literary texts do not “speak” 
precisely in the same manner as living subjects. The legitimation of certain 
texts at the expense of others is not strictly analogous to Friday’s silence, 
and not only because we cannot rule out the possibility that it is willfully 
performed rather than repressively imposed. Unlike the metaphorically 
silenced literary text, a speechless living subject does not necessarily dwell 
in silence.
The penultimate chapter of the novel resolves on the weakly optimistic 
note that Susan’s efforts might fi nally pay off. After taking a brief respite 
from their lessons, she returns to discover Friday seated at a table wearing 
Foe’s robes and wig, busily smudging the papers with sequences of the 
letter o. “It is a beginning,” says Foe. “Tomorrow you must teach him a.”7 
The fourth and fi nal section of the novel immediately follows, consisting 
of two short fragments narrated by a fi rst- person voice whose identity 
remains undisclosed. The narration begins by repeating the opening line of 
section three, which was originally told in the past tense from Susan’s per-
spective but is now given in the present tense: “The staircase is dark and 
mean.”8 As if to foster the impression that Susan and this voice bear a 
common perspective, the narrator eventually descends into the water in 
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the same area where Susan observed Friday casting fl ower petals, a myste-
rious ritual that she had earlier speculated marked the watery grave of a 
friend or family member who drowned in the wreck. That this “I” describes 
Susan, Friday, and Foe as now dead means, however, that none of them can 
inhabit the grammatical position of narrator.
This unidentifi ed “I” thus fl oats among the wreckage of the sunken 
ship, never anchoring itself to any referential ground, as if conforming to 
the dream logic of Freudian “condensation” whereby more than one expe-
rience and identity are combined and manifest in a single dream image.9 
Yet we are nevertheless bidden to loosely tether this voice to Friday insofar 
as his linguistic abilities and the identity of the fi nal section’s narrator are 
equally the novel’s most conspicuous and most unfathomable unknowns. 
Although the source of the narration is not fi nally knowable, the impene-
trability of Friday that preoccupies Susan invites us to associate this voice 
with him as much as with her. Whereas Friday is a body without a voice, 
the narrator is a voice without an identifi able body. Not by accident does 
the fi nal section of the novel follow immediately after Friday learns to 
write “rows and rows of the letter o tightly packed together.”10 The letter 
o visually marks a hole or opening through which emerges a new voice that 
is not strictly identifi ed with Friday, but which nevertheless draws us 
inward, giving us to think that the novel might fi nally fasten the button-
hole that Susan invoked earlier as a fi gure for Friday’s nonexistent tongue.
If Friday’s o inscribes both an opening and an absence, it also graphically 
closes in on itself. Like the buttonhole that fi gures the tongueless mouth, 
the o inscribes an aporia that both opens and closes, reveals and conceals. 
The reader thus slips through this orifi cial o into a series of enclosed 
spaces, beginning with the narrator’s ascent along a dark staircase in Foe’s 
house that leads to a dim, oxygen- deprived room (“my matches will not 
strike”). Here we fi nd the dead bodies of Susan and Foe exhibiting signs of 
advanced decay, and a supine Friday harboring only a faint pulse.11 The 
second half of the section abruptly shifts location to the submerged wreck 
of Cruso’s ship, where the narrator fi nds Friday half buried in the sand and 
seemingly deceased, and the dead bodies of Susan and Foe appear bloated 
from prolonged submersion. “What is this ship?” the narrator asks Friday. 
Grasping the futility of eliciting a response, the voice continues: “But this 
is not a place of words. Each syllable, as it comes out, is caught and fi lled 
with water and diffused. This is a place where bodies are their own signs. It 
is the home of Friday.”12 What does it mean that we have arrived at the 
home of Friday? And what is the status of this narrative voice that leads us 
to the humanly uninhabitable bottom of the ocean fl oor, a place where 
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language is thoroughly inoperable, a place that cannot properly be nar-
rated by any living, breathing human “I”?
Susan’s preoccupation with giving voice to Friday is consistently framed 
in terms of a language of penetration that would access his hidden interior-
ity: through the eye, mouth, or ear. When Susan recounts having witnessed 
Friday scattering the fl ower petals, Foe surmises that it may in fact have 
been a slave ship rather than a merchantman (despite Cruso’s claim to the 
contrary), in which case the boat would have marked the burial place of 
“hundreds of his fellow- slaves— or their skeletons—still chained in the 
wreck, the gay little fi sh (that you spoke of ) fl itting through their eye- 
sockets.” Foe continues: “Friday rows his log of wood across the surface of 
the dark pupil— or the dead socket— of an eye staring up at him from the 
fl oor of the sea. He rows across it and is safe. To us he leaves the task of 
descending into that eye.”13 Whereas Foe employs the image of an empty 
eye socket in order to fi gure his descent into the mind of Friday, Susan 
invokes a different orifi ce: “It is for us to open Friday’s mouth and hear 
what it holds: silence, perhaps, or a roar, like the roar of a seashell held to 
the ear.”14 When Susan hears that Friday’s tongue has been removed, she 
develops an absolute aversion to Friday’s mouth, refusing to examine its 
dark recesses when Cruso commands her to do so. Yet the mouth as both 
an anatomical and fi gurative void is cited frequently throughout the novel, 
culminating in the fi nal two paragraphs:
He turns and turns till he lies at full length, his face to my face. The 
skin is tight across his bones, his lips are drawn back. I pass a fi nger-
nail across his teeth, trying to fi nd a way in.
His mouth opens. From inside him comes a slow stream, without 
breath, without interruption. It fl ows up through his body and out 
upon me; it passes through the cabin, through the wreck; washing the 
cliffs and shores of the island, it runs northward and southward to the 
ends of the earth. Soft and cold, dark and unending, it beats against 
my eyelids, against the skin of my face.15
Eye sockets, mouths, ears, dark suffocating rooms, deep- sea shipwrecks—
these spaces are all aligned with the hidden depths of Friday that Susan 
longs to plumb. To access this interiority, she must give Friday a voice. Yet 
her many speeches on the value of speech read like a litany of metaphysical, 
humanist, and political platitudes—all centered on the indubitable value of 
speech over silence:
If the company of brutes had been enough for me, I might have lived 
most happily on my island. But who, accustomed to the fullness of 
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human speech, can be content with caws and chirps and screeches, and 
the barking of seals, and the moan of the wind?16
To live in silence is to live like the whales, great castles of fl esh 
fl oating leagues apart one from another, or like the spiders, sitting 
each alone at the heart of his web, which to him is the entire world.17
Many stories can be told of Friday’s tongue, but the true story is 
buried within Friday, who is mute. The true story will not be heard till 
by art we have found a means of giving voice to Friday.18
According to Susan, language is essentially human; hence, to be bereft of 
speech is to dwell within an alienating silence that renders one less than 
human, notwithstanding the fact that Friday is not also deaf, and therefore 
cannot be likened to an animal existing in absolute isolation from others, 
such as a whale or a spider (both species of which are capable of communi-
cating with other living beings, notwithstanding Susan’s simile). Figuring 
Friday as living in silence, Susan thus projects onto him her experience of his 
absent voice, her experience of his silence.
In his analysis of Coetzee’s The Life and Times of Michael K, Ato Quayson 
suggests that the eponymous character’s elective silence “might be taken as 
an illustration of the autistic spectrum.”19 Although he briefl y compares 
the “scrupulous silence” that Michael and Friday both “enjoin upon them-
selves,” the possibility that the latter’s silence is volitional is nevertheless 
discarded when Quayson asserts that Friday “is certainly mutilated and 
without a tongue.”20 Whether Friday does or does not possess a tongue, 
and whether he intentionally withholds speech from Susan or is physically 
incapable of it, it seems crucial to counter her assumption that he inhabits 
a self- enclosed world utterly cut off from language. Nowhere in Foe does 
Friday “speak” to the reader in the manner of interior monologue. Yet the 
sequence of interior spaces described in the novel’s fi nal section gives us to 
believe that we might fi nally puncture the bubble that surrounds him. On 
the brink of giving us his story only to take it away, Foe interrogates the 
political platitude of giving voice, which is to say the devotion to speech 
(whether literal or metaphorical) as evidence of the plenitude of political 
recognition and presence, a view that rests on an uninterrogated concep-
tion of language as property.21 As I argued in chapter 1, we do not own 
language. Language is leased from language itself. Lessees without lessors, 
we have no choice but to sign a “contract” that gives access to the language 
in which we dwell but do not fully inhabit.
If language is originarily alien to each and every speaking human, even 
to the vast majority of those whose tongues have not been violently severed, 
then any claim of property or proximity that would permit language to 
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inhabit us, and vice versa, is undermined by an irremediable ex- habitation. 
Our mother “tongue” is inherently excised, cut off from ourselves. To 
speak of the loss of language in such general terms is undoubtedly to invite 
the de rigueur accusation of “eliding the specifi city” of colonial violence, 
especially the physical brutality that results in the actual loss of one’s 
tongue. Yet I wager that we must risk this allegation in order to demon-
strate how the investment in language as property fails to recognize its own 
colonializing imperatives. As Derrida argues, “the master does not possess 
exclusively, and naturally, what he calls his language.”22 On the contrary, 
the master employs “force or cunning” through discursive, educational, 
and military means in order to reinforce the fi ction of his linguistic posses-
sion.23 He maintains:
[We should not] efface the arrogant specifi city or the traumatizing 
brutality of what is called modern colonial war in the “strictest defi ni-
tion” of the expression. . . . But what if, while being attentive to the 
most rigorous distinctions and respecting the respect of the respect-
able, we cannot and must not lose sight of this obscure common 
power, this colonial impulse which will have begun by insinuating 
itself into, overrunning without delay, what they call, by an expression 
worn enough to give up the ghost, “the relationship to the other”! or 
“openness to the other.”24
Although Derrida is commonly interpreted as a thinker of difference and 
alterity, his emphasis here on the monolingual and the monological compli-
cates this received view. Slogans such as “openness to the other” permeate 
scholarship on race, gender, class, sexuality, and postcoloniality. Many read-
ers have often associated Derrida with a similar imperative to respect alter-
ity, especially given the Levinasian echoes that resound throughout his 
work. Yet the alliterative, repetitive language of “respecting the respect of 
the respectable” clearly satirizes various discourses of alterity that piously 
call for a wholly nonviolent, nonappropriative relation to others.
In The Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida stresses the sovereignty that 
“tends, repressively and irrepressibly, to reduce language to the One,” an 
“impassable, indisputable . . . inexhaustible solipsism,” a drift toward the 
solitary self whose gravity he feels as strongly as does anyone else: “I am 
monolingual. My monolingualism dwells, and I call it my dwelling; it feels 
like one to me, and I remain in it and inhabit it. It inhabits me. The mono-
lingualism in which I draw my very breath is, for me, my element.”25 That 
he freely admits his own complicity in this solipsism will seem anomalous 
to readers inclined to view him simply as an advocate of difference. Yet a 
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preoccupation with an insuperable solipsism can be traced all the way back 
to Voice and Phenomenon (1967). When Derrida fl eetingly remarks in The 
Monolingualism of the Other that our originary linguistic alienation intro-
duces the phantasm of “hearing- oneself- speak in order to mean- to- say 
[pour vouloir- dire],” he is alluding to Husserl’s discussion of interior mono-
logue in the Logical Investigations, which is the central focus of Voice and 
Phenomenon.26 For Husserl, interior monologue promises a realm of pure 
expression without communicative intent (when I “speak” to myself silently 
I do not indicate anything existent in the exterior world). Silent soliloquy 
involves “no function of indicating the existence of mental acts . . . for the 
acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment.”27 
Since communicative speech is both expressive and indicative for Hus-
serl—since it requires the exteriorization of inner mental life in relation to 
an auditor who perceives such speech as indications or signs of the speaker’s 
thoughts—silent speech has no need for indication because speaker and 
hearer are identical. Derrida’s crucial contribution in Voice and Phenomenon, 
however, is to call into question the possibility of this space of pure interi-
ority, utterly closed in on itself, a place of pure auto- affection: “A sign is 
never an event if event means an empirical singularity that is irreplaceable 
and irreversible. A sign that would take place only ‘once’ would not be a 
sign. A purely idiomatic sign would not be a sign.”28 Far from functioning 
as a sign beyond signs—which is to say a sign whose ownness restricts it 
to referring only to itself, to the idios or the ipse from which a sign would 
emerge and never leave itself—Friday’s body as sign must lend itself to an 
ideality, or formal identity, that permits its repetition across innumerable 
empirical events and thereby exposes it to a temporal and spatial alterity 
that deprives it of any pure idiomaticity. In other words, a body could be a 
sign of something other than itself, as is the case with those gestures com-
monly referred to as “body language,” but no body could be a sign simply 
and only for itself.29
Whereas Husserl believes that silent speech involves no hiatus between 
sign and meaning given that the latter is immediately present to the speaker 
as an intentional subject who says what he means because he means to say 
it, Derrida argues that “a voice without différance, a voice without writing is at 
once absolutely alive and absolutely dead.”30 The voice of pure auto- affection 
whose meaning would be absolutely present to itself would dispense with 
writing (understood not merely as empirical inscription but as iterability in 
general). A silent utterance that could not be repeated—that was so idio-
matic as to bear no relation to the past or to the future, an utterance abso-
lutely tied to the singular life of the ipse—is absolutely dead. If the phantasm 
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of auto- affection is produced in and through the reduction of an originary 
hetero- affection, then ironically the plenitude of a living speech that would 
remain absolutely close to me can only be achieved at the expense of deny-
ing language its life, its capacity to signify above and beyond my breath. 
This accounts for why the “truth” of Friday can only emerge in the form 
of a speech whose promise of transparent meaning opens onto an apoca-
lypse that reveals nothing. The “words” that issue from the submerged 
Friday are literally breathless, as if to imply an utterly unique language that 
inspires no life beyond the instant of its emission.
In addition to the phenomenon of auto- affection, Derrida refers to 
another Husserlian concept in The Monolingualism of the Other when he 
asserts that, “far from sealing off anything, this solipsism conditions the 
address to the other, it gives its word, or rather it gives the possibility of 
giving its word.”31 Here the reference point is the principle of analogical 
appresentation. As I discussed in chapter 1, analogical appresentation 
names our elusive experience of others. This experience is not a matter of 
logical inference, but rather constitutes a spontaneous analogical transfer 
based on the perception of the other’s similarity to myself. I experience 
others as inaccessible, but this does not render them absolutely unknow-
able. The quasi- monadic self is the condition of possibility for my indirect 
perception of alter egos.
Throughout his extensive body of work, Derrida frequently drew upon 
the twin Husserlian insights of auto- affection and analogical appresenta-
tion.32 Yet, whereas the principle of appresentation survives more or less 
intact, auto- affection is submitted to a thorough dismantling by virtue of 
Derrida bringing the former to bear on the latter. Although Husserl main-
tains that interior monologue constitutes a closed sphere of pure expres-
sion in which the indicative function of language disappears, Derrida 
argues that this absence of indication is illusory: “[It only appears that] the 
subject does not have to pass outside of himself in order to be immediately 
affected by its activity of expression. My words are ‘alive’ because they seem 
[ my emphasis] not to leave me, seem not to fall outside of me, outside of 
my breath, into a visible distance; they do not stop belonging to me.”33 
So- called internal soliloquy occurs across time in relation to indicative 
signs whose capacity for repetition always bears the possibility that these 
signs will be severed from me. This severing is both spatial and temporal 
insofar as the signs that I employ in silent speech can be repeated to infi nity 
(audibly or inaudibly) in other times and spaces. While repetition implies 
future externalization, a possible or eventual becoming nonproper and non-
present, this a- proximity occurs anterior to my silent utterance given that 
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it constitutes a “citational” act, a trace of prior linguistic utterances that do 
not have their origin in me.34 Auto- affection is thus always already hetero- 
affection because my own self- relation is appresentive, that is, mediated 
through representational traces that precede and exceed me.
Such traces haunt Foe’s fi nal chapter, which seems to hold out the pos-
sibility that the signifi er can become “perfectly diaphanous by reason of 
the absolute proximity of the signifi ed.”35 When Friday’s mouth issues a 
stream of water rather than speech, this current washes over the unnamed 
narrator’s face and then travels “northward and southward to the ends of 
the earth,” as if having escaped its containment, the hitherto hidden inte-
rior of Friday now exposed to an infi nitely expanding outside.36 Yet we can 
no more access the truth of his interior life than we can anyone else’s. The 
novel thus stages this incomplete, appresentational contact when it wel-
comes us into his home, only to be immediately borne away by the stream 
emanating from his mouth. The home of Friday thus designates an impos-
sible place where absolute interiority coincides with absolute exteriority. 
An “inside” that appears entirely enclosed on itself, an inside without any 
outside, paradoxically equates to an infi nity without borders. When Friday 
fi nally “speaks” to us, he does so from the oceanic depths where “words” 
fl ow outward toward infi nity, toward an ostensibly boundless outside that 
nevertheless envelops itself by virtue of having no borders. “Bodies are 
their own signs” only in this breathless place of pure interiority without 
verbal or written language.
Coetzee’s depiction of a body that signs in and for itself thus implies a 
pure materiality absolutely liberated from the representational domains of 
speech and writing for which Susan has doggedly sought Friday’s inclu-
sion, as if Friday fi nally responds to Susan’s demand for answering speech 
by mouthing, “I have no need for speech or writing, thank you very much.” 
In an often- cited interview with David Attwell, Coetzee remarks: “Friday 
is mute, but Friday does not disappear, because Friday is body. If I look 
back over my fi ction, I see a simple (simple- minded?) standard erected. 
That standard is the body. Whatever else, the body is not ‘that which is 
not,’ and the proof that it is is the pain that it feels. The body with its pain 
becomes a counter to the endless trials of doubt (One can get away with 
such crudeness in fi ction; one can’t in philosophy, I’m sure).”37 For Coet-
zee, the conclusion of his novel attempts to achieve closure by putting a 
stop to ceaseless skepticism: “Is representation to be so robbed of power by 
the endlessly skeptical processes of textualization that those represented 
in /by the text—the feminine subject, the colonial subject—are to have no 
power either?”38 Too much skepticism is said to weaken representation on 
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the one hand, yet nevertheless invest it with an ironic power to deprive 
Susan and Friday of power on the other. Coetzee goes on to suggest that 
the novel’s “preemptory ending . . . close[s] the text by force” rather than 
accept “the prospect of endlessness.”39 Taken together, the question of 
oppositional power and that of the mandated conclusion imply that the 
ending aims to force open an absolute extra- textual outside (or absolute 
inside, which amounts to the same thing) that would allow the previously 
muted power of the female and colonial subjects to speak. Yet if the resto-
ration of the other’s power is predicated on ceasing with textuality alto-
gether—as if Friday could only speak once Coetzee stops writing—then 
this absence of representation would amount precisely to the annulment of 
any oppositional power. What force could an unrepresented or unrepre-
sentable power wield?
Whereas Benita Parry reproaches Coetzee for allegedly straying from 
his critique of political oppression by promoting a “non- linguistic intuitive 
consciousness,” an “ineffable” language that credits Friday with “mystical 
properties and prestige,” Coetzee’s response to Attwell attempts to situate 
the ending of the novel squarely with the framework of postcolonial cri-
tique by lifting the hitherto suspended access to Friday’s body.40 Is Coetzee 
guilty of the crudeness or simple- mindedness that worries him by endlessly 
deferring the presence of Friday’s voice only to supplant it with the body? 
Or should we avoid the temptation to exploit his self- deprecating com-
ments and ask instead whether a novel otherwise so keenly attuned to the 
interplay of multiple linguistic stratums ultimately signifi es, in a strictly 
serious, wholly nonironic fashion, a corporeality utterly removed from 
speech and writing? Suffi ce it to say that Friday’s body is necessarily 
inscribed within a text that produces the fi ction of speaking through the 
voice of a disembodied narrator, which means that the home of Friday can 
only represent a realm ulterior to inscription, an impossible territory of 
nonlanguage that nevertheless takes place within language.
This pure interiority toward which the conclusion of Foe gestures, a 
sphere that dispenses with linguistic signs, thus bears a striking resem-
blance to what Derrida characterizes as the “prior- to- the- fi rst time of 
pre- originary language,” the invention of an absolute idiom, a pure mono-
language that would thoroughly align with the self, that would require no 
detour through alterity.41 Of course, this utterly solipsistic language does 
not and cannot exist. A language without alterity is no language at all. Yet 
it survives as the memory of what never was: the absolute possession of 
“my” language. That we do not possess language so much as we are pos-
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sessed by it means that its spectrality constitutes the “degree zero- minus- 
one of memory.”42 One does not start with one native language onto which 
are grafted additional foreign tongues. One starts with zero, a buttonhole 
of sorts, an abiding absence and dispossession that the acquisition of a 
native language cannot fi ll. The zero- minus- one of this language before 
language names the empty placeholder of a purely idiomatic language 
where bodies would have no need of signs.
Wanting to Say
Just as interior monologue’s would- be transparency of meaning is undone 
by the mundanity of indicative signs against which no soliloquy can isolate 
itself, the home of Friday names precisely an unhomely (unheimlich) space 
submerged in a cloud of murky water that occludes access to Friday’s “true 
story.” The question that the unidentifi ed narrator asks Friday—“what is 
this ship?”—echoes Foe’s speculation that the ship was a slave vessel not a 
merchantman.43 Friday’s lack of response, however, means that we can 
neither confi rm nor deny Foe’s conjecture.44 In addition to withholding 
the ship’s identity (merchant or slave vessel), the novel also does not resolve 
the question of whether Friday’s tongue is indeed absent, and if so, who 
removed it. Susan comes to distrust Cruso’s account that slavers commit-
ted the mutilation, and tries unsuccessfully to extract the truth from Friday 
in order to confi rm her suspicion that Cruso himself executed the cruel 
act. If Susan doubts Cruso regarding the perpetrator of Friday’s maiming, 
however, she nevertheless takes him at his word that Friday has been 
deprived of the word due to his mutilation. Yet on what basis ought Susan 
to accept that Friday has no tongue? Given that she refuses to examine his 
mouth, his verbal silence—save for saying “ha- ha- ha” when Cruso com-
mands him to say “la- la- la”—provides the only evidence to support her 
conviction.45 Susan speculates wildly as to the cause of Friday’s absent 
tongue. While she steadily maintains that the culprit is either Cruso or a 
slave trader, she briefl y ponders whether his tongue was removed in infancy, 
“at the age when boy- children among the Jews are cut. . . . Who was to say 
there do not exist entire tribes in Africa among whom the men are mute 
and speech is reserved to women? Why should it not be so? The world is 
more various than we ever give it credit for.”46 This analogy with circum-
cision morphs into a parallel with castration later in the novel when Susan 
likens Friday to a “gelding” and she wonders whether Cruso may have 
spoken about Friday’s absent tongue metaphorically to indicate “a more 
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atrocious mutilation . . . a slave unmanned.”47 However, as with the ques-
tion of whether his tongue has indeed been excised, the novel does not 
provide defi nitive proof that Friday has been castrated.
Despite the curiosity that Susan’s imaginative ruminations display, they 
nonetheless presume the presence of some absence, as it were, a lack whose 
location and cause may be uncertain but whose existence is undeniable. 
Susan takes it as a given that Friday lacks either a tongue or a penis or both. 
Moreover, her revulsion toward his ostensible mutilation is not solely an 
expression of moral outrage against the cruelties of slavery. For even when 
she speculates that the amputation might belong to an African custom that 
deprives men of speech— or later when, making little headway in teaching 
Friday to write, she muses that perhaps Friday is silently laughing at and 
mocking her “efforts to bring him nearer to a state of speech”—Susan 
never questions the value of speech over silence, nor does she consider that 
the latter does not equate with the absence of the former.48 That she sus-
pects Friday may be mocking her is the closest she comes to ascribing him 
any agency, as if to imply that his silence may be volitional. When Susan 
fails to engage Friday in a musical duet that she had hoped would have 
supplemented his verbal defi ciency, she wonders if “it might not be mere 
dullness that kept him shut up in himself, nor the accident of the loss of his 
tongue, nor even an incapacity to distinguish speech from babbling, but a 
disdain for intercourse with me.”49 Her desire for “answering speech,” 
even if it must fi nally take the form of writing, follows the circuit of auto- 
affection: a desire to hear herself speak. To account for this ironic reversal 
whereby the desire for the other’s speech amounts to a desire to hear one-
self speak, we must grasp how Susan conceives of language as a gift to 
bestow upon the other, a conception that discloses a possessive investment 
in language notwithstanding its irremediable dispossession. The specter of 
Friday’s absent tongue thus provides a useful surrogate for her own linguis-
tic buttonhole. Appointing herself as both guardian and teacher of Friday, 
she adopts the role assumed by Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, who expresses 
a desire to “make [ my emphasis]” Friday “speak, and understand me,” a 
desire all but abandoned by Coetzee’s Cruso, who has little interest in 
teaching his companion to understand more than a few simple phrases.50 
Puzzled by Cruso’s indifference to intersubjective communication, Susan 
explains to Foe that “life on the island, before my coming, would have been 
less tedious had he [Cruso] taught Friday to understand his meanings, and 
devised ways by which Friday could express his own meanings, as for 
example by gesturing with his hands or by setting out pebbles in shapes 
standing for words.”51 Who would dare object to the apparently incontro-
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vertible common sense of this affi rmative valuation of language? Who 
would want to champion the almost autistic quality of Cruso’s desire for 
silence and insularity? Yet perhaps we need not choose between Susan’s 
naive quest for intersubjective speech as self- presencing truth or Cruso’s 
solipsistic self- encirclement. If auto- affection is always already riven by 
hetero- affection, if appresentational (spatial) and representational (tempo-
ral) traces expose my monadic self to an exteriority that mediates both my 
self- relation and my relation to others, then neither pure self- containment 
nor pure openness toward alterity is possible.
When Susan says that she wants to give voice to Friday, she means that 
she wants him to want to speak. As Derrida underscores, desire is not 
merely accidental or exterior to signifi cation; rather, meaning and desire 
are indissoluble. To stress this connection, he translates the German term 
bedeutung (meaning) into French as vouloir- dire, literally “wanting- to- say.” 
What Derrida wants to say is that meaning is always bound up with voli-
tion. This will and drive for stability and transparency is manifest particu-
larly in Husserl’s insistence on meaning as intentional, which he argues 
excludes facial expressions and other unconscious, bodily gestures from 
the sphere of signifi cation. Susan’s volition thus warrants translation into 
the following (admittedly nonidiomatic) English: she wants to say that she 
wants Friday to want to say. Yet how are we to separate her wanting to say 
from his wanting to say? How does Susan even know that Friday wants to 
say anything? As Wendy Brown remarks: “[I]f the silences in discourses of 
domination are a site for insurrectionary noise, if they are the corridors we 
must fi ll with explosive counter- tales, it is also possible to make a fetish of 
breaking silence. Even more than a fetish, it is possible that this ostensible 
tool of emancipation carries its own techniques of subjugation—that it 
converges with non- emancipatory tendencies in contemporary culture.”52 
Brown is particularly concerned with a certain “pre- Foucauldian” tendency 
within feminist politics to view speech as either expressive or repressive. 
On this view, speech either expresses freedom and selfhood or leads to 
further oppression through hate speech, pornography, or harassment: 
women’s “truth” or men’s “truth.” Susan clearly employs an expressive/
repressive model of speech, though the gendered opposition between 
female expressivity and male repressivity is inverted and reframed in racial-
ized terms. As a white woman eliciting speech from a black man, Susan is 
not unaware of the power dynamic that subtends their relationship: “I tell 
myself that I talk to Friday to educate him out of darkness and silence. But 
is that the truth? There are times when benevolence deserts me and I use 
words only as the shortest way to subject him to my will. At such times I 
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understand why Cruso preferred not to disturb his muteness. I understand, 
that is to say, why a man will choose to be a slaveowner. Do you think less 
of me for this confession?”53 Confessing to Foe her desire to dominate 
Friday, Susan ironically inserts herself into the regulatory discourse of con-
fessional truth by assuming the subjugated role of the confessee. In fact, 
this passage is doubly ironic: she expresses an awareness of the potentially 
coercive function behind her demand for Friday’s expression, yet she 
betrays a correlative compliance to discursive power by openly confessing 
her desire to a white man.
Whereas Susan conceives speech as divided between expressive and 
repressive forms of power, she views silence as unfailingly repressive. Her 
fl eeting cognizance of discursive and confessional power thus fails to dis-
lodge the equation of silence with oppression to which she largely sub-
scribes. However, as Foucault argues in The History of Sexuality:
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up 
against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowance for the 
complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an 
instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling- 
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strat-
egy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to 
thwart it. In like manner, silence and secrecy are a shelter for power, 
anchoring its prohibitions; but they also loosen its holds and provide 
for relatively obscure areas of tolerance.54
In her reading of this passage, Brown clarifi es that silence may resist regu-
latory discourses, but “practices of silence are hardly unfettered.”55 In this 
regard, we should avoid the naive temptation to view Friday’s silence as 
occupying an apolitical space utterly insulated from colonial power. Not 
only does silence not equate to the absence of speech—as the activity of 
internal monologue demonstrates—but this ostensibly pure expressivity 
cannot separate itself from the indicative world, which is to say that it can-
not withdraw from alterity tout court. Although Brown identifi es as poten-
tially fetishistic the compulsion to speak in the name of an emancipatory 
politics, this characterization is less a nod to Freud than it is a cautionary 
warning to eschew excessive devotion to the promise of liberatory speech. 
Yet, the wanting- to- say of signifying practices is inherently fetishistic inso-
far as the desire to align saying and meaning—whether the meaning of 
internal soliloquy or of spoken utterance (my own or that of the other)—
always strives for an unachievable plenitude.
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The Dumb Sovereign
The resemblance that Susan identifi es between her demand for responsive 
speech and the master’s subjugation of the slave recalls Charles Chesnutt’s 
short story, “The Dumb Witness” (1897).56 Set in the nineteenth- century 
American South, the story centers on a slave named Viney whose tongue 
is maimed by a master named Murchison in retaliation for sharing with his 
betrothed a secret that causes her to call off the wedding. The content of 
the secret is never revealed, though the story strongly indicates that Mur-
chison and Viney are involved in a miscegenous, perhaps even incestuous, 
relationship. She is described as a “young quadroon” with a “dash of Indian 
blood,” and is also said to be “of our blood [ my emphasis],” a phrase that 
ambiguously signifi es both race and family, implying that she is genetically 
kin in addition to being part white.57 Murchison manages the property for 
an absentee uncle who wills it to his nephew shortly before the former’s 
death. The location of the will is known only to Viney, but her mutilated 
condition, combined with her illiteracy and Murchison’s failed efforts to 
teach her to write, prevents her from disclosing its whereabouts.
The story begins in the postbellum South when a white enterprising 
Northerner named John calls on the old Murchison property to inquire 
about purchasing some lumber. John observes Murchison entreating 
Viney to reveal the location of the will, only to receive a response of “dis-
cordant jargon.”58 We learn that this scene has played out for many years 
to no avail and Murchison eventually dies without receiving his inheri-
tance. The following summer when John pays Murchison’s son a visit, he is 
greeted by Viney, who miraculously seems to have recovered the power of 
speech. As John’s coachman Julius reveals, however, she never lost her 
capacity to speak, but had feigned its loss in order not to reveal the location 
of the will, which turns out to have been hidden in the seat of a large oak 
chair where Murchison sat for many years.
What initially appears to depict solely a horrifi c scene of violence and 
linguistic deprivation turns out to have also been a contest of wills whereby 
Viney chooses silence. Beyond the obvious parallels with Coetzee’s novel, 
“The Dumb Witness” shares with Foe a preoccupation with interiority and 
unfathomability: namely, the numerous holes that Murchison burrows in 
the ground in hollow pursuit of his will, holes that metonymically evoke 
the mouth to which Viney woefully points when he asks her to reveal the 
will’s location. When Murchison is not “digging, digging furiously” in the 
ground, like a dog struggling to unearth a bone, he barks orders at Viney 
to reveal the location of his “princely inheritance.”59 That he never looks 
18955-Peterson_MonkeyTrouble.indd   57 7/24/17   5:22 PM
58 Sovereign Silence
under the large oak throne from which his demands vainly issue raises the 
question: who is the real dumb witness of the story?60 Is it not the witless 
master who fails to ascertain that he is sitting on his own will? This power 
reversal speaks to the unexpected symmetry that Derrida captures with the 
phrase la bête et le souverain: the beast and the sovereign.61 Derrida notes 
that the homophony of et and est permits us to hear this phrase as the beast 
is the sovereign. The phrase thus bears witness to a mute distinction that 
can only be “heard” textually. This linguistic coincidence refl ects a larger 
political structure by virtue of which the beast and the sovereign occupy 
parallel positions outside the law: the sovereign is “above” the law insofar 
as he exempts himself from it, the animal is said to be “below” the law, 
ignorant of it and therefore deprived of freedom and agency. Viney is 
similarly below the law because slaves are not considered legal subjects. Yet 
she no doubt derives satisfaction from knowing that the sovereign physi-
cally sits above the law— or at least above the documents that certify his 
legal entitlement— only insofar as he rests ignorant of it.
The story’s tragic- comic irony derives not only from the revelation of 
the will’s proximity to the master, but also from our retrospective realiza-
tion that his repeated pleas to Viney betray fragility rather than strength. 
Viney weakens the master precisely by enjoining him to speak, to engage 
in a “dialogue” that leaves him increasingly exasperated. As discussed in 
chapter 1, the “reason of the strongest” exempts one from the obligation to 
provide explanations. Sovereignty means never having to give reasons. As 
Derrida observes, pure sovereignty “always keeps quiet in the very ipseity 
of the moment proper to it, a moment that is but the stigmatic point of an 
indivisible instant.”62 Sovereignty undermines itself as soon as it speaks, as 
soon it announces itself as such. That sovereignty is absolute as long as it is 
“dumb” is also to say that it is never absolute. Viney weakens the auto- 
affective fantasy of the master by forcing him to beg for assistance. To be 
sure, the would- be sovereign almost always holds the upper hand within 
racist power structures even if he is always almost sovereign, even if the 
purity of his sovereignty is compromised from the beginning.63 By con-
trast, the exceedingly tenuous character of slave sovereignty is registered 
when Viney chooses to remain on the plantation after slavery is abolished, 
as well as when she discloses the will’s location to Murchison’s son, thereby 
ensuring the transfer of inherited white wealth.
The role that Julius plays in the story is equally relevant to the nexus of 
sovereignty and silence. Chesnutt’s stories typically employ a framing 
device in which John temporarily cedes the standard English of his narra-
tive voice to Julius, who relates in black dialect various tales of antebellum 
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slavery. Eric Sundquist suggests that Chesnutt’s anomalous decision to 
withhold Julius’s voice stresses “American culture’s exclusion of the folk-
loric oral world of black culture” as well as implies an analogy between the 
different modes of silencing to which Julius and Viney are subjected.64 The 
dialect that Viney employs when she fi nally speaks bears out this connec-
tion. When John asks Viney if the young Murchison is home, she replies: 
“Yas, suh . . . I’ll call ‘im.”65 As Richard Broadhead notes, an earlier version 
rendered her speech in standard English. Speaking in dialect, Viney resur-
rects the black vernacular that John has suppressed by claiming to retell the 
tale in “orderly sequence,” as if to associate Julius’s dialect with Viney’s 
“meaningless cacophony.”66 Sundquist suggests that Julius “has played 
‘dumb’ all along,” but the intentionality of this play remains ambiguous.67 
Julius is not “playing” in the same way that Viney feigns an inability to 
speak. As Sundquist makes clear, Julius’s silence is imposed through John’s 
act of cultural appropriation. Yet Julius may indeed be intentionally play-
ing dumb in a manner that Sundquist does not consider. John informs us 
early on that Julius was “ignorant” of “some of the facts” of the story, but 
if the former gleaned these facts from “other sources,” then the informa-
tion they provided must not relate to Viney’s linguistic capacity, which 
Julius divulges to John when he returns to the plantation.68 Does Julius 
learn the truth only after Murchison dies, or was the former in on the ruse 
of Viney’s dumb show all along, in which case John turns out to have 
unwittingly played the fool? Julius has held his tongue regarding Viney’s 
true condition, the knowledge of which we might surmise passed freely 
among the black community through what Booker T. Washington called 
the “grape- vine telegraph,” a word- of- mouth network hidden from 
whites.69 According to Washington, during the Civil War “often the slaves 
got knowledge of the results of great battles before the white people 
received it.”70 Viney’s name communicates not only this tangled network 
of speech withheld from whites, but also Chesnutt’s “The Goophered 
Grapevine,” a story in which Julius fails to dissuade John from purchasing 
a vineyard whose grapes had sustained the former’s income for many years. 
Julius attempts to protect his interests by telling John that the grapes have 
been “goophered” (bewitched) by a conjure woman. As Robert Bone sug-
gests, “Julius is a kind of conjurer, who works his roots and plies his magic 
through the art of storytelling.”71 Viney can also be read as a “conjurer” 
who employs silence rather than speech to challenge the authority of the 
master. At bottom, she thrusts him off his “ancestral seat,” leaving him 
only to dig his own hole(s).72 Chesnutt’s editor, Walter Hines Page, report-
edly excluded “The Dumb Witness” from the fi rst edition of the collection 
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of stories published as The Conjure Woman. Claiming that it lacked both the 
supernatural element of conjure and the black vernacular storyteller, Page 
apparently was unable to hear the silent conjure that winds its way through 
Viney’s doleful yarn.73
“There is no world, there are only islands”
Notwithstanding their disproportionate power, the silence of the sover-
eign and the silence of the “beast” disclose a shared impurity, an impossible 
absolution thanks to which silence is never utterly silent, is never simply 
the opposite of speech. The plenitude of an unfettered speech or silence 
would only be achievable in the imaginary space of an absolute solipsism, 
the preoriginary language of an unqualifi ed private idiom, the sovereign 
sphere of a nonshareable, indivisible language. In Foe Cruso’s apathy 
toward being rescued, as well as his general disinterest in verbal communi-
cation, can perhaps be too easily scorned for its apparently solipsistic or 
autistic traits. As Susan remarks, “I used once to think, when I saw Cruso 
in this evening posture, that, like me, he was searching the horizon for a 
sail. But I was mistaken.”74 Later Susan recalls his refl ection that “the world 
is full of islands,” a remark that parallels Derrida’s claim in The Beast and 
the Sovereign, volume 2:
[No one] inhabit[s] the same world, however close and similar these 
living individuals may be. . . . between my world and any other world 
there is fi rst the space and the time of an infi nite difference, an inter-
ruption that is incommensurable with all attempts to make a passage, 
a bridge, an isthmus, all attempts at communication, trope, and trans-
fer that the desire for a world or the want of a world, the being want-
ing a world will try to pose, impose, propose, stabilize. There is no 
world, there are only islands.75
These comments may seem to advance a purely isolationist view of the 
world, yet they can be interpreted thus only by reading them in isolation. 
If we bridge these comments to the sentence that immediately precedes it, 
however, we confront the following paradox: “Incontestably, animals and 
humans inhabit the same world. . . . Incontestably, animals and humans do 
not inhabit the same world.”76 What Derrida says of interspecies relations 
also applies to intraspecies ones. All humans both do and do not inhabit 
the same world. Since I never have direct access to you, to your world, I 
can only ever carry you within “my” world. I can only bear the trace of you 
and your world within the worldless world in which I dwell but to which I 
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only have partial access, this veiled world whose opacity owes precisely to 
the existence of other worlds, spheres whose presence I encounter only 
appresentationally through the traces those worlds imprint on me.
“There is no world, there are only islands” thus amounts to saying: 
there is no one world that we all share, a world without différance, a world 
without the interruptions of time, language, and iterability, however much 
the fl ow of language may appear to connect us from one end of the earth 
to the other. The phantasm of one united world to which all subjects 
belong promotes the worst kind of (quasi)solipsism, a pregiven world that 
fully transcends those living subjects who are thereby reduced to a second-
ary role of participation without intentionality, the latter understood in 
the phenomenological sense as consciousness directed toward an alterity 
that we experience as for us, as in some sense constituted by and dependent 
on us. The principle of one shared world is solipsism by stealth: it promises 
to transcend the apparent enislement of the monadic ego through a lan-
guage of unity that disavows our appresentational relation to alterity. To 
say that “we all inhabit the same world” is really to say, “we all inhabit my 
world.” However I imagine it, the world that I posit as the world in which 
I dwell with others masks the monospheric character of this world—the 
extent to which this world originates in me.
This immanent transcendency that Husserl identifi es in our relations 
with others ironically unsettles his conception of interior monologue, 
which presumes precisely a subject who is proximate and present, here 
and now, to its own meanings. That this view of signifi cation is fundamen-
tally fetishistic does not mean that we can or should abandon the desire to 
mean to say. The absolute coincidence of sign and meaning may be an 
impossibility, yet the abandonment of all signifying practices is neither 
desirable nor achievable. Nevertheless, the desire for the absolute diapha-
neity of the sign can and ought to be curtailed precisely in the name of the 
alterity that no politics or ethics can do without—in the name, that is, of 
a weaker solipsism.
When Husserl writes that the mental acts of interior monologue are 
“experienced by us at that very moment,” his own language undoes its 
aspiration to pure immanence. Husserl employs the German phrase im 
selben Augenblick, “in the blink of an eye,” an expression that Derrida seizes 
upon in order to counter the assertion of an absolute idiom that could 
bracket itself both temporally and spatially. No less so than in spoken lan-
guage, interior monologue requires that I “speak” across temporal moments 
that introduce a hiatus, no matter how minimal or immeasurable, between 
speaking and hearing. “In the blink of an eye,” my words become available 
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to iterability and therefore stop being mine, even though, of course, they 
were never fully mine to begin with. While Husserl maintains that every 
punctual now bears within it a retentional element of the past it has just 
superseded and a protentional (anticipatory) element of an incipient 
future, he wants to distinguish retention from memory by insisting on the 
former’s nonrepresentational status. The retentional phase would open 
onto an immediate relation to the past that is subsequently represented 
through secondary memory. Yet Derrida remains skeptical that the reten-
tional phase can be isolated from representation: “As soon as we admit this 
continuity of the now and the non- now . . . we welcome the other into the 
self- identity of the Augenblick, non- presence and non- evidentness into the 
blink of an eye of the instant. There is a duration to the blink of an eye and 
the duration closes the eye.”77 As a visual trope, “the blink of an eye” 
stresses the spatial, appresentational dimensions of this alterity, whereas 
the temporal interval between the opening and closing of the eye intro-
duces the possibility of repetition in the wake of my absence.
Susan employs a trope identical to Husserl’s when she gives in to Cruso’s 
unwanted sexual advances, even though she believes she could have over-
powered him with her superior physical strength. After their encounter 
she wonders if she should regret what she has allowed to occur before 
quickly settling on acquiescence: “We yield to a stranger’s embrace or give 
ourselves to the waves; for the blink of an eyelid our vigilance relaxes; we 
are asleep; and when we awake, we have lost the direction of our lives. 
What are these blinks of an eyelid, against which the only defence is an 
eternal and inhuman wakefulness? Might they not be the cracks and chinks 
through which another voice, other voices, speak in our lives? By what 
right do we close our ears to them? The questions echoed in my head 
without any answer.”78 Susan presents hospitality as an ethical obligation 
whose passivity is veritably Levinasian in its apparent selfl essness. Given 
the context of male sexual domination in which she voices this passivity, 
her selfl essness is especially troubling. She frames her refusal to resist male 
aggression as a form of hospitality, as if resistance to Cruso would have 
been unethical. In this sense, her thoughts are prescriptive. Yet she also 
hints at the impracticability of an “eternal and inhuman wakefulness.” 
Aligned with the sexual act, this relaxed vigilance implies the possibility of 
additional openings, bodily orifi ces through which the other physically 
enters, thus supplementing the sites of penetration that I enumerated ear-
lier (eye sockets, mouths, ears, rooms, and deep- sea shipwrecks). Is it not 
so much a question of whether we have the right to close our ears to others 
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as it is a question of whether closing ourselves off to the other is fi nally 
possible?
Certainly a woman not only has the right to make her herself unavail-
able sexually, but is also physically able to do so—at least under “normal,” 
noncoercive or nonviolent circumstances. Yet unlike sites of sexual pene-
tration, our ears are completely open and exposed, a vulnerability that 
Husserl’s optical metaphor disavows. We can always close our eyes, but we 
can at best dull or mute the sounds that forever penetrate this most passive 
of our senses. In contrast to Husserl, Coetzee’s synesthetic trope intro-
duces precisely the hiatus that Derrida identifi es: a lapsed awareness that 
allows the voices of others to be seen or heard. Ironically, Susan ruminates 
about such external voices through interior monologue: “The questions 
echoed in my head without any answer.” She hears herself speak, ponder-
ing whether one has the right to shut out other voices entirely. Yet if a 
constant wakefulness is not humanly possible to maintain, then we are fi s-
sured by alterity from the beginning. Prior to the question of our right to 
inhospitality, a certain originary “yes” to alterity conditions the possibility 
of our deciding whether we are ethically authorized to mute our ears to 
others.79 We must have already “said” yes to others in order to be able to 
say no. The o that seems to circumscribe us is always punctured by the 
traces of others whom we can never entirely envelop within us. We thus do 
not live according to Susan’s vision of the whales, fl oating leagues apart 
from one another. We live more like spiders, sitting at the center of our 
webs, the 0° position from where we fall prey to other webs, worlds, or 
islands, an unhomely home insofar as we are drawn out from ourselves, 
exposed—shipwrecked, for better or worse, on one another’s shores.
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Gravity and Melancholia: two forces of attraction that weigh on us, the 
former by tethering us to the ground, the latter by gripping us in perpetual, 
unfi nished mourning. Gravity as a physical force is a necessary condition of 
us. Our survival depends on it. Melancholia as psychological depression, 
by contrast, is a condition for us. It radiates outward from the center of an 
ego impoverished by grief and loss. We might well long to escape this 
attraction that propels us into a fi xed orbit around the love objects that we 
have lost, but who could say the same for the physical laws of the universe? 
Gravity is a force of nature that we not only cannot escape, but that physi-
cally and psychically grounds us, assuring us (no matter how falsely) of our 
centeredness and immovability.
In Lars von Trier’s Melancholia (2011) and Alfonso Cuarón’s Gravity 
(2013), however, the twin forces of gravity and melancholia act unpredict-
ably.2 Melancholia also names a planet that falls out of its orbit and collides 
with Earth. As it approaches, Melancholia weakens the gravitational pull of 
our small planet, producing a weightlessness that is not altogether unwel-
come: Justine (Kirsten Dunst)—whose crippling depression weighs her 
down to the point that others must help her out of bed and assist her in 
c h a p t e r  3
The Gravity of Melancholia
A Critique of Speculative Realism
I have neither up nor down, like the squirrel climbing up 
and down horizontally, the form of my world, a literature that is 
apparently, like the very look of my writing, cosmonautical, 
fl oating in weightlessness.
—JACQUES DERRIDA, “Circumfession”1
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bathing, who characterizes her condition as “trudging through this gray 
woolly yarn”—is notably lifted out of her melancholia the closer the rogue 
planet careens toward Earth. In Gravity, astronaut Ryan Stone (Sandra 
Bullock) experiences a physical weightlessness that becomes utterly terri-
fying when the space shuttle she is attempting to repair is struck by satellite 
debris. Shortly after the collision, Ryan reveals her own melancholic con-
dition when she confi des in the only other survivor of the shuttle’s destruc-
tion, Matt Kowalski (George Clooney), that she lost her daughter Sarah in 
a sudden, accidental death when she fell down and hit her head. Perhaps 
not by accident would a mother whose daughter’s death can be attributed 
to gravity itself seek to diminish its force, if only to fi nd her own life ironi-
cally threatened by the forces of gravity when she fi nds herself in the midst 
of a cosmic collision.
What does it mean that melancholia can attract such diametrically 
opposed forces as gravity and weightlessness? What is the gravity of mel-
ancholia that it can feel at once so heavy and so buoyant? Inversely, what is 
the melancholia of gravity? The grief that Ryan suffers is no less encum-
bering than the “woolly yarn” of Justine’s melancholia, notwithstanding 
the weightlessness in which the former has sought refuge. To experience 
loss is to feel both weighed down and strangely detached from one’s envi-
ronment. Far from being opposed, buoyancy and ponderance express two 
sides of the same melancholic condition.
In Freudian terms, both mourning and melancholia are characterized 
by ambivalence, by a simultaneous attraction and repulsion in relation to 
the lost object. Freud maintains that one must release oneself from the 
orbit of the lost love object in order to complete the grieving process: 
“When the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and 
uninhibited.”3 The end of mourning occurs, according to him, when the 
ego displaces the love for the lost object onto a new one. In this sense, 
Freudian theory endorses a certain zero gravity in relation to lost objects, 
coupled with a regalvanized attraction to new ones.
The question of object attachment is now a central theoretical concern 
due to the emergence of speculative realism, which endorses what Graham 
Harman describes as an utterly “non- relational conception of the reality of 
things.”4 Since Immanuel Kant, continental philosophers have generally 
held that our knowledge of the world is never direct and unmediated. We 
can only ever have access to phenomena (representations) of noumenal 
reality (things- in- themselves). Quentin Meillassoux dubs this view “cor-
relationism” in order to critique its apparent privileging of the human- 
world relation. Notwithstanding Kant’s claim that the counterintuitive 
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thinking that led to Copernicus’s discovery of Earth’s orbit is analogous to 
the counterintuitive notion of our mediated relation to reality, Meillassoux 
charges Kant with unleashing a “Ptolemaic counterrevolution,” reinscrib-
ing the human as the center of knowledge.5 Inspired by this critique of 
correlationism, a group of theorists including Harman, Levi Bryant, Ian 
Bogost, and Timothy Morton have promoted a new philosophical approach 
called object- oriented ontology (OOO) that seeks to fully renounce human 
privilege altogether in order to place all beings (human, animal, plant, and 
thing) on the same ontological footing. OOO maintains that we can posit 
a world that exists entirely independent of us in which things are granted 
their true “ontological dignity.”6
Gravity and Melancholia both direct our attention toward the nonhuman 
things that inhabit our world. Although cinema always depicts things, 
these two fi lms tend to horizontalize the relation between human and thing, 
as well as call into question the privileged position from which the human 
judges the relative signifi cance of things. In the wake of Melancholia’s Wag-
nerian overture, for instance, we witness a certain leveling of the distinction 
between large and small objects when, immediately after depicting Earth’s 
destruction, the scene shifts to a narrow country road where an enormous 
limousine is attempting to navigate an extremely tight curve. Inside are the 
newlyweds, Justine and Michael (Alexander Skarsgård), en route to their 
wedding reception at her sister’s remote estate. While they each take turns 
in the driver’s seat after the chauffeur proves incapable of rounding the 
corner, we observe the car lurch backward and forward as they both 
attempt to guide the unwieldy vehicle. Ultimately Justine steers the car too 
far toward the road’s edge and the car’s bumper hits a stone boundary 
marker. In addition to commenting on the overly lavish rituals of modern 
weddings, this scene derives its farcical value from the contrast it stages 
between interplanetary collision and the apparently trivial impact of a limo 
with a small rock. The limo and the stone thus rehearse in mundane terms 
the previously observed collision of the immense Melancholia with our 
tiny Earth, an impact that we as spectators witness from an extraterrestrial 
perspective, that is, from the standpoint of would- be but impossible survi-
vors. The fi lm’s solemn opening yields to subtle mockery, as if to imply 
either that Melancholia’s collision with Earth is no more signifi cant than 
the limo’s impact with the stone, or that the latter collision is as catastrophic 
as the former.
We witness this force of things in another scene in Melancholia when 
Claire is informed that none of the wedding guests correctly estimated the 
number of beans in a jar. Dismissing the game as “incredibly trivial,” Claire 
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shocks the bean- counting wedding planner by refusing to give any weight 
to these tiny materialities. OOO may insist that these objects are just as 
consequential as any other, but Claire not surprisingly displays more con-
cern with the threat posed by Melancholia later in the fi lm. As the planet 
looms large on the horizon, Claire carries Leo across a golf course and 
suddenly endures a deluge of hail. Confi rming that things act in a manner 
that encumbers human agency, the hail causes her to falter and set him 
down. The hail looks suspiciously like the white beans whose ontologies 
she earlier dismissed, as if they are wreaking revenge on human narcissism. 
Indeed, their agency puts humans and objects on the same footing pre-
cisely by causing Claire to lose her footing on a hill of “beans.” Whether 
tiny or big, nonhuman objects repeatedly display agency in Melancholia in 
a manner that thwarts the humanist disregard for nonhuman action.
Gravity is perhaps even more overtly object oriented, given both the 
sheer variety of different entities with which Ryan collides and the stereo-
scopic representation that lends them their manifest thinginess. The appeal 
of the fi lm partially lies in stereoscopy’s most familiar and illusory effect: 
that of objects projecting into the foreground, beyond the fl at plane of the 
screen, as if beckoning the viewer to reach out and touch these things- in- 
themselves. Ryan, on the other hand, exhibits a persistent nonrelationality 
despite her briefl y coming into contact with various pieces of space debris. 
When she and Matt attempt to attach to the Russian space station, for 
example, her foot is caught in the lines of a Soyuz parachute. While she 
manages to grab hold of the tether to which Matt remains attached, his 
weight pulls him away from the space station. He then unclips himself 
from the rope and fl oats away so that she can survive. “Ryan,” he says, 
“you’re going to have to learn to let go.” Weightlessness provides no more 
protection from death than does gravity. In contrast to the abrupt collision 
of Sarah’s tiny mass with Earth’s much larger one, Matt will drift toward 
his death perhaps without ever coming to rest. His instruction “to let go” 
clearly implies a larger moral allegory; she must learn to accept not only 
his loss but also that of her daughter. This attachment is complicated by its 
apparent obverse. Struggling to correlate with others, both human and 
nonhuman, Ryan is melancholically unable to connect with any object.
In another scene Ryan and Matt return to the space shuttle to search for 
survivors. We see a number of objects emerging from the damaged fuse-
lage, including a baseball hat, Rubik’s Cube, dental retainer, headphones, 
screwdriver, and a fi gurine of the Looney Tunes character Marvin the 
Martian (Figure 2). Similar to the red shoe whose loss Ryan’s daughter 
deeply lamented, but which her mother located after her death, these mate-
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rial traces are all that remain of the astronauts. As with the bolt that Ryan 
drops when she is repairing the satellite or the tears that she sheds once she 
discovers that the Soyuz is depleted of fuel and all hope of returning to 
Earth seems lost—tears that Cuarón’s script likens to “tiny satellites orbit-
ing her face”—these objects of ordinary human life fl oat toward negative 
parallax before drifting off beyond the screen’s borders.7 To feel the effects 
of negative parallax as a spectator of Gravity is to share Ryan’s experience 
of orienting toward objects that repeatedly slip away, like so many inacces-
sible Kantian noumena. The fi gurine of Marvin the Martian in particular 
betrays this tension between appropriation and alienation. Advancing near 
us before receding toward the right side of the screen, this fi gure of alien 
life presumably stimulates the childhood memories of many spectators 
who might fi nd solace in its familiarity or humor in its ironic appearance, 
if only to experience an affective shift when, literally out of left fi eld, the 
upturned face of a dead female astronaut suddenly emerges. Her frozen 
visage collides with the equally solid glass of Ryan’s helmet, as if presaging 
a becoming thingly- in- death that may befall Ryan, too.
The objects that OOO inventories, by comparison, do not so much 
represent lost human life as they do an injunction to lose the human- 
centered world, thereby disavowing the loss of the thing- in- itself bequeathed 
to us by Kantian “correlationism.” OOO’s “fl at ontology,” as Bryant calls 
it, insists on giving equal ontological weight to all objects precisely on 
the grounds of a certain groundlessness, on the basis of a zero gravity 
whereby no object bears any greater mass, any more attractive pull, than 
any other.8
Figure 2. Objects from the space shuttle in Gravity.
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Ryan’s analogous buoyancy is coextensive with her professed habit of 
driving aimlessly around her home town of Lake Zurich, Illinois. As she 
confi des to Matt, she received the news of her daughter’s death when she 
was driving her car: “Ever since that’s what I do. I wake up, I go to work 
and then I just drive.” Driving allows Ryan both to reenact the trauma and 
to imagine through endless repetition the possibility of a different out-
come, one in which her movement would not have been arrested by the 
news of her daughter’s death. Inertia and weightlessness cooperate: driving 
around town or orbiting around Earth, Ryan seeks the twofold suspensions 
of unrestricted momentum and zero gravity.
The storyline stresses the parallels between driving and fl ying when, at 
the end of the fi lm, Ryan leaves the Soyuz for the Chinese space station (in 
whose escape pod she returns to Earth). She declares: “I’m done with just 
driving. Let’s go home.” In addition, the continuous thirteen- minute shot 
that opens the fi lm, together with its breathtaking use of three- dimensional 
cinematography, reinforces the connection between Ryan’s uninterrupted 
driving and space travel. Whereas the experience of zero gravity may 
cause Ryan temporary queasiness, the spectator is presumably meant to 
experience this extended weightlessness as pleasurable in order to mark a 
dramatic contrast with the cinematographic vertigo subsequent to the 
destruction of the Russian satellite, whose debris impact sends both the 
characters and the viewer spinning out of control. The fi lm thus immedi-
ately pulls us as spectators into the scene in order that we might glide 
along with Ryan, adrift between the twin forces of a literal and allegorical 
loss of gravity.
That Ryan exhibits a melancholia of zero gravity—that is, a desire to 
escape both the weight of her daughter’s death and the gravitational pull 
that drew her daughter toward death—is not to say that she consciously 
holds the physical laws of attraction (or more accurately, the pull of space 
curvature) as culpable for her daughter’s death. Yet the senseless circum-
stances that led to the loss are clearly a source of great psychic pain. “Stu-
pidest thing—a school trip to the swimming pool. She was playing tag—she 
slipped, hit her head, and that was it.” There is no agency accountable for 
the death other than the physical laws of the universe, though Ryan likely 
feels a lingering guilt for not having been there to catch her fall, a parental 
“failure” that is reenacted when Matt too is lost to the forces of gravity, 
leaving her to plead “I had you! I had you.”
While zero gravity may provide a means of escape, the aptly named 
Stone must eventually fall to Earth; or rather, she must come to learn that 
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her continued survival depends on her ceasing to defy gravity, thereby 
allowing herself to be drawn back toward the ground “responsible” for her 
daughter’s death. The fi lm concludes when Ryan crash- lands just off the 
coast of an undisclosed location. She struggles to swim to shore and col-
lapses face down in the sand, weakened by the effects of prolonged expo-
sure to weightlessness (Figure 3). Whereas her daughter never rose after 
her fall, Ryan musters enough strength to pull herself up. The fi lm ends 
when she begins to take a few tentative steps forward, like a child learning 
to walk again. Ryan may rediscover her footing, but the fi lm concludes 
without confi rmation of her rescue. Before she leaves the escape pod, we 
hear Houston on the radio asking her to confi rm identity and stating that 
“a rescue mission is on the way,” yet we never see any rescuers arrive. 
Indeed, the fi lm ends where so many other lost- at- sea narratives begin: 
with the lone protagonist crawling onto a deserted beach uncertain of ever 
being found. Presumably she will be saved, but the fi lm portrays her 
reunion with humanity as secondary to the salvation that being grounded 
provides.
The Eclipse of the Subject
Is OOO’s defi ance of gravity any more sustainable than Ryan’s? Rhetori-
cally, OOO advances its indictment of so- called correlationism by pro-
ducing litanies of assorted objects, as if by their sheer repetitive reproduction 
the human might be roused from its “correlationist slumber.”9 As Har-
man argues, the defi nition of “object” must be broadly construed to 
“include those entities that are neither physical nor even real.”10 The 
Figure 3. Ryan grounded in Gravity.
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“stars” of Harman’s three- ring circus include clowns, diamonds, rope, 
neutrons, armies, monsters, square circles, cotton, fi re, pixies, nymphs, 
utopias, sailboats, and atoms—a surfeit of objects whose evident dissimi-
larity provides an opportunity to stress their common thinginess. Similar 
to Harman, Bogost questions the undue value and infl uence afforded to 
select things by virtue of how they “relate to human productivity, culture, 
and politics.”11 He thus promotes a “tiny ontology,” which he likens to a 
black hole’s capacity both for infi nite density and infi nite expansion.12 Just 
as some physicists suggest that the infi nitesimal singularity at the center of 
a black hole might contain an entire universe, “small” objects are no less 
important than large ones. Size apparently doesn’t matter for OOO (unlike 
its XXX counterpart).
OOO’s insistence that “subjects are objects among objects, rather than 
constant points of reference related to all other objects,” marks precisely 
the distance it seeks to take from phenomenology, which also promises to 
return us “to the things themselves,” but does so in a manner that para-
doxically parenthesizes the objective world rather than the subjective 
one.13 As I argued in chapter 1, the Husserlian transcendental reduction 
suspends the world as the condition of our intentional relation to it. Inten-
tionality is utterly impossible without this quasi- worldly transcendence 
whereby we fi nd ourselves at the aporetic threshold between inside and 
outside, as if orbiting along what scientists refer to as the Kármán line: an 
invisible border that separates Earth’s atmosphere from outer space, a 
boundary that can be witnessed only indirectly by the formation of the 
Aurora Borealis. In Gravity, the spectator briefl y views this luminous phe-
nomenon when the camera zooms out from the window of the Soyuz in the 
wake of Ryan’s discovery that the capsule is depleted of fuel, as if dooming 
her to persist in an utterly “transcendental” orbit far beyond Earth. To be 
entirely outside the world, in Husserlian terms, is no better than to be fully 
inside it. Far from eclipsing the world, intentionality requires an intramun-
dane subject who remains forever suspended between an empirical and 
transcendental “altitude.”
Denying the subject any transcendental space, OOO constructs a false 
choice between transcendence and immanence. This philosophy of pure 
immanence thus fails to take into account the subject’s liminality. The 
specter of solipsism is often invoked as a menace to be avoided at all costs, 
a threat to all intersubjectivity, to all social, ethical, and political obliga-
tions. Notwithstanding the truly risible view of the world as merely a 
product of the ego, the ego is always quasi- solipsistic, belonging to what 
Husserl characterizes more or less interchangeably as “transcendental 
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intersubjectivity” or a “community of monads.”14 This space is not to be 
understood in terms of an absolute erasure of the world, but rather as the 
solitude (solus) of a self (ipse) that is never entirely enclosed nor fully open 
to the outside. The other exists both within and without us as precisely 
what will always escape the ego and prohibit its total enislement.
Endorsing a world of subjectless objects, OOO thus commits precisely 
the error that Husserl cautions us to avoid: it disavows the I’s “inde-
clinability” as the zero point of orientation of the world.15 OOO responds 
to phenomenology by reversing its temporary suspension of the world and 
supplanting it with a permanent and total eclipse of the subject. Yet no 
subject can perceive and experience the world except by inhabiting a vir-
tual space of exception, of semi- exteriority and privilege. Far from fully 
enclosing the subject, the transcendental reduction disallows any originary 
relation to the world that would efface the distinction between self and 
other. Whereas the transcendental reduction’s apparent solipsism forestalls 
the reduction of otherness to the same, OOO’s plane of immanence utterly 
fl attens differences, thus depriving the quasi- transcendental subject of 
relating to alterity altogether.
Despite railing against philosophical correlationism, Harman surpris-
ingly claims not to accept Meillassoux’s wholesale rejection of Kant. 
Instead, he maintains that Kantian fi nitude can be “retained but also 
expanded well beyond the realm of human- world interaction.”16 Harman 
accordingly has developed a theory of object withdrawal, which asserts 
that relations between insentient things are themselves “haunted by the 
inaccessibility of the thing- in- itself.”17 While he frames object withdrawal 
as a radicalization of Kant, the more direct antecedent is Husserlian appre-
sentation whereby our adumbrations of objects remain perceptually inex-
haustible. For Harman, “inanimate collisions [between two billiard balls, 
for example] must be treated in exactly the same way as human percep-
tions.”18 Objects interact indirectly and incompletely; they never fully 
“know” one another. He does not deny that “human experience is rather 
different from inanimate contact, and presumably richer and more com-
plex.”19 Yet he nevertheless maintains that the difference between human 
relations with insentient objects and their relations with one another is 
simply “a matter of degree” rather than of kind.20 Nonhuman things clearly 
display agency, at least broadly understood as an inherent capacity for 
action. Spinoza, for instance, argued that a falling stone “is endeavouring, 
as far as in it lies, to continue in its motion.”21 But does a stone have inten-
tions? Does it have perceptions and experiences such that the difference 
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between our relation to objects and their relation to one another is truly a 
matter of degree?
Given that Harman accepts Kantian fi nitude, one can only be puzzled by 
the allegation of correlationism (“a pejorative term deserving of widespread 
use”) repeatedly leveled at poststructuralist theory: “Rather than direct 
discussion of the world in itself,” the linguistic turn adopts the “robotic 
post- Kantian gesture” of viewing language as “the condition of access to the 
world.”22 Yet Harman remains a “closet” correlationist against his stated 
intentions insofar as he imagines objects as withdrawing from relation with 
one another. For how else can he claim to expand Kantian fi nitude except 
by taking human- world fi nitude as the prototype for inter- object with-
drawal? To erase the distinction between differences of degree and differ-
ences of kind is to imply that inanimate things phenomenalize one another. 
Whatever one might conclude about the proposition that inanimate objects 
“perceive” one another, suffi ce it to say that the theorization of inter- object 
intentionality presupposes a prior conception of human intentionality. Fur-
ther evidence of this retreat from the antirelational thesis can be found in 
Harman’s declaration that intentionality is Husserl’s “greatest contribution 
to philosophy.”23 Such praise cannot be reconciled with Harman’s rejection 
of the transcendental reduction on the basis of its alleged idealism because 
the reduction conditions precisely the move from the natural to the phe-
nomenological, intentional attitude that Harman endorses.
If OOO “knows” that relationality is inescapable, then why does it over-
dramatize the alleged independent, nonrelational reality of objects? Jane 
Bennett suggests that the stakes of OOO lie both in “the pleasure of 
iconoclasm” and in its implied ethico- political commitments.24 That the 
former takes center stage in OOO, however, is confi rmed by the looseness 
with which OOO invokes ethical and political terms. Whereas a consider-
able number of posthumanist theorists are animated by a political or ethi-
cal imperative to interrogate the human /animal hierarchy on the basis of 
which the lives of nonhuman animals are deemed trivial and disposable, 
OOO claims to restrict its concern to the ontological realm. Yet a crypto- 
political and ethical stance pervades OOO, surfacing frequently in 
inchoate demands for “justice” and “democracy” to combat the human 
“prejudice” of correlationism. According to Bogost, for instance, animal 
studies is “not posthumanist enough” because its zoocentrism disregards 
plants, fungi, and bacteria.25 Harman similarly declares that “no philoso-
phy does justice to the world unless it treats all relations as equally rela-
tions.”26 Rather than articulate the ethical stakes of OOO, however, he 
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tacitly appeals to readers primed to view all hierarchies as intrinsically 
pernicious, as if the human /object hierarchy demanded a response equal in 
urgency to the fi ght against speciesism, racism, sexism, and other social 
ills. OOO thus does not tolerate any hierarchy of hierarchies. It not only 
treats all hierarchies as equal, but confl ates them with difference as such, as 
if unknowingly employing a caricature of deconstruction. As Derrida 
insists in The Animal That Therefore I Am, the general singular “Animal” 
effaces “the infi nite space that separates the lizard from the dog, the proto-
zoon from the dolphin, the shark from the lamb, the parrot from the 
chimpanzee, the camel from the eagle, the squirrel from the tiger, the 
elephant from the cat, the ant from the silkworm, or the hedgehog from 
the echidna.”27 To erase the distinction between humans, animals, and 
things is to supplant a hierarchy with a specious homogeneity, as if the 
general singular “Object” has come to supplant “Animal” as the catchall 
category in which everything becomes interchangeable with everything 
else. That we know that a hedgehog is not the same as an echidna, however, 
belies any pretention to a noncorrelationist perspective, which at bottom 
appeals to nothing more than an impossible view from nowhere.
OOO thus relies on a form of philosophical bait- and- switch that deploys 
a liberal pluralist language of justice, equality, and inclusivity only to 
denude these terms of their ethico- political import. This tactic is nowhere 
more evident than in Levi Bryant’s The Democracy of Objects. We quickly 
learn that this title does not refl ect any “political thesis to the effect that all 
objects ought to be treated equally or that all objects ought to participate 
in human affairs. The democracy of objects is the ontological thesis that all 
objects, as Ian Bogost has so nicely put it, equally exist while they do not 
exist equally.”28 This characterization begs the question as to the purpose 
of employing a political concept only to deny its political valence. As Peter 
Gratton observes, moreover, Bryant’s claim that OOO does not exclude 
humans, but only renders them objects among objects “risks an object- 
oriented political correctness,” such that (paraphrasing Arendt) if “every-
thing is due justice and respect, then nothing is.”29 Bogost likewise invokes 
parity in a nonpolitical sense when he states that his conception of object 
equality holds only that objects are irreducibly different from one another: 
“The funeral pyre is not the same as the aardvark; the porceletta shell is not 
equivalent to the rugby ball.”30 Yet if that is the case, then surely we must 
conclude that, stripped of any political and ethical commitments, Bogost’s 
maxim that Bryant cites so admiringly says nothing more than many differ-
ent objects exist.
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While OOO does not explicitly advance an object- oriented ethics, it 
nevertheless shares with Emmanuel Levinas a conception of the absolute 
designed to sidestep the quasi- transcendental ego. Refusing to see the 
other as an alter ego insofar as this formulation presupposes the primacy of 
my ego, of an “I” who subordinates otherness to itself, Levinas insists that 
the other is absolutely other to the same.31 He thus rejects the Husserlian 
view that the self remains the indeclinable zero point of any relation to 
alterity. Harman explicitly acknowledges an affi nity with Levinas’s desire 
“to go beyond relationality altogether.”32 As Derrida argues in his critique 
of Levinas in “Violence and Metaphysics,” however, the refusal to recog-
nize the ego’s quasi- transcendentality by locating the ego “entirely in the 
world and not, as ego, the origin of the world” is “the very gesture of all 
violence. . . . The nonrelation of the same to the other . . . is pure vio-
lence.”33 To absolve the other of any relation to ipseity is to utterly evacu-
ate it. Other must mean other than me, and no amount of openness to 
alterity can surmount this relational violence. The point is not that OOO 
ultimately does violence to objects in the same manner that the assertion of 
the other ego’s absolute alterity inadvertently commits violence. Rather, 
OOO’s insistence on the human’s nonrelation to objects—their radical 
independence from us—presupposes precisely the relationality it aims to 
escape.
Bennett suggests that the implicit ethical commitments of OOO are 
also manifest in its critique of human hubris.34 Bryant, for instance, con-
tends that renouncing human subjects as “monarchs” among beings will 
lead to “a genuinely post- humanist, realist ontology.”35 Harman similarly 
observes: “However interesting we humans may be to ourselves, we are 
apparently in no way central to the cosmic drama, marooned as we are on 
an average sized planet near a mediocre sun, and confi ned to a tiny portion 
of the history of the universe. All these apparent facts are sacrifi ced in the 
name of superior rigor, by Kant’s Copernican philosophy and its succes-
sors.”36 Setting aside for the moment the question of whether Kantian 
fi nitude ought to be understood as “sacrifi cing” the ostensible fact of 
human mediocrity and triviality, we would do well to scrutinize how this 
critique expels the human only to usher it in through the backdoor. The 
desire to sacrifi ce narcissism altogether, to negate self- interest in the name 
of the allegedly nonrelational, sovereign agency of things, can only rein-
scribe human sovereignty. As we have seen previously, the sovereign is by 
defi nition all alone, absolute and absolved from any relation, even though 
this pure form of sovereignty never exists in fact, even though sovereignty 
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is always already shared. As soon as sovereignty gives reasons to justify its 
absolute force, sovereignty fractures from within. That the nonrelational is 
only another name for sovereignty suggests that the purported sovereignty 
of things is but the photographic negative of an auto- affective desire for 
sovereignty that has been disavowed and projected onto things themselves. 
OOO knows what Viney knows in “The Dumb Witness”: the voice that 
keeps silent retains its sovereignty. The paraleptic, “silent” sovereignty of 
OOO incessantly talks about not talking about humans, thus ironically 
fostering an ultrahumanism that bolsters human dominance. Whereas 
Viney employs silence as a mode of resistance to slavery—an institution 
that authorizes her ontological and juridical oscillation between animal 
and thing— OOO uses silence to consolidate human power in the name of 
“real” things.37 This “strongest” of all posthumanist theories ultimately 
discloses itself as the “weakest”—that is, the most conventionally human-
ist—not despite but because of the authority it grants itself to exceed the 
human, an authority that thereby remains paradoxically enslaved to ipseity, 
to what Derrida describes as the “I can” that conditions freedom as such.38 
As Michael Naas notes, “every form of sovereignty” is “a phantasm, and 
every phantasm a phantasm of sovereignty.”39 That the phantasm of human 
sovereignty does not “exist beyond its appearance” ensures that “it is per-
petually resurrected because of this nonexistence.”40 This ceaseless resur-
rection must be matched with a ceaseless deconstruction that is no match, 
as it were, for the phantasm it seeks to oppose. It must be a nonreactive 
weak force that recognizes its own phantasmatic power. The critique of 
sovereign power must avoid becoming a counter- sovereignty; it must cul-
tivate an agency that is no more indemnifi ed against its own ruin than any 
other power.
The full and fi nal displacement of human exceptionalism is not a pre-
sentable, achievable outcome: not a done- and- dusted “deconstruction.” 
The project of decentering the human belongs to the urgency of the here 
and now even as it remains eternally incomplete. By contrast, OOO seeks 
to leave all other theories in the dust as it impatiently races ahead toward a 
“non- sovereignty” that turns out to be more sovereign than ever, despite 
rebranding itself as a tiny ontology, a motto whose marketing potential 
Bogost foresees as arising from its simplicity: “The embroiderable short-
hand for tiny ontology might read simply, is. . . . Theories of being tend to 
be grandiose, but they need not be, because being is simple. Simple enough 
that it could be rendered via screen print on a trucker’s cap.”41 This hipster 
nanosovereignty is asymptotically related to a hyperbolic sovereignty that 
relentlessly ups the ante, that reaches for a sovereignty beyond sovereignty 
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by claiming to outstrip all others.42 Nanosovereignty declares its diminu-
tive status, its apparent modesty, all the more to conceal the grandiosity of 
its bid to surpass correlationism, to transcend the aporia of Kantian fi ni-
tude by insisting on the absolute sovereignty of things. OOO thus grants 
objects a power to withdraw absolutely both from one other and from the 
human—a sovereign capacity that is not ours to give.
The Next Big Thing
While OOO’s nonrelational melancholy disavows the loss of an unmedi-
ated relation to the world, it also betrays many of the characteristics that 
Freud associates with mania, a condition whose histrionics and triumpha-
lism are symptomatologically opposed to melancholia but that neverthe-
less, he maintains, belongs to the same malady: “In melancholia the ego has 
succumbed to the complex whereas in mania it has mastered it or pushed it 
aside. . . . The manic subject plainly demonstrates his liberation from the 
object which was the cause of his suffering” by hunting “like a ravenously 
hungry man for new object- cathexes.”43 In an effort to manage the loss of 
the thing- in- itself, OOO grasps indiscriminately at new objects whose 
equal ontological status is declared by obeying an entirely arbitrary, unmo-
tivated classifi catory procedure.44 Harman suggests that philosophy ought 
to recover “its original character as Eros” by adopting an “erotic model” as 
“the basic aspiration of object- oriented philosophy: the only way, in the 
present philosophical climate, to do justice to the love of wisdom that makes 
no claim to be an actual wisdom.”45 OOO makes no claim to produce wis-
dom because “the real is something that cannot be known, only loved.”46 
Yet beneath this professed love of objects subsists an utter indifference to 
them. As Christopher Norris remarks, “there is not much point in continu-
ally reeling off great lists of wildly assorted objects if the upshot is merely 
to remark on their extreme diversity, or irreducible thinginess, without (as 
it seems) much interest in just what makes them the way they are.”47 Indeed, 
to love every object equally is to love no object, save for the Kantian thing- 
in- itself, which is the only object to which OOO can openly declare its 
love, the object that Big Bad Kant, the “common enemy” of speculative 
realism, has refused us.48 Whereas Freud observes that in mania “what the 
ego has surmounted and what it is triumphing over remain hidden from 
it,” here it seems that the object is hiding in plain sight on the pages of 
every book and article written by an object- oriented ontologist or a specu-
lative realist.49 Freud suggests that the manic subject “must have got over 
the loss of the object (or its mourning over the loss, or perhaps the object 
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itself ),” which releases an abundance of psychic energy “available for 
numerous applications and possibilities of discharge.”50 Yet if the voracious 
appetite for new objects characteristic of mania belongs to the same com-
plex as melancholia, then it remains doubtful that this enthusiasm can be 
read as heralding the relinquishment of the object.
OOO exhibits its hunger for novelty not only by expressing boredom 
and impatience with correlationism, but also by euphorically declaring its 
own innovative promise. Psychoanalyst Adam Phillips has suggested that 
boredom shares with melancholia a sense of unnamable loss; boredom 
amounts to a “defense against waiting” that results in two contradictory 
attitudes: “There is something I desire, and there is nothing I desire. . . . In 
boredom there is the lure of a possible object of desire, and the lure of the 
escape from desire, of its meaninglessness.”51 OOO’s indifferent litanizing 
suggests a comparable split attitude: “I desire every object; I desire no 
object in particular.” This conception of boredom as a desire for all and no 
objects also sheds light on OOO itself as an object of theoretical attention. 
As Derrida observes, the establishment of new theoretical paradigms is 
often characterized by a preoccupation with novelty that says “shove off” 
[pousse- toi de là que je m’y mette] to previous theories according to a tactic 
that “reveals too much impatience, juvenile jubilation, or mechanical 
eagerness.”52 Consider the elation that Morton evinces when he describes 
OOO as a “cool fl avor [that] fi zzes with the future—the bliss of new think-
ing.”53 Later when he asks whether “reality . . . shame[s] ‘linguistic turn’ 
self- absorption with a gigantic, massively distributed raspberry,” he dis-
plays precisely the impatience that Derrida describes.54 Similarly, Bryant 
declares that “object- oriented ontologists have grown weary of a debate 
that has gone on for over two centuries, believe that the possible variations 
of these positions have exhausted themselves, and want to move on to talk-
ing about other things,” as if fatigue is all the justifi cation one needs for 
pronouncing correlationism’s demise.55
As I noted in the introduction, this exhaustion and impatience corre-
lates with increased publication pressures and decreased academic employ-
ment. Given the corporate culture of modern universities, their obsession 
with market positioning and incessant rebranding, is it any surprise that 
some academics would follow suit? Harman undoubtedly seeks to position 
his brand when he heralds OOO as “the next big thing,” as if to reify OOO 
into a merchandisable logo, one that should be embraced (allegedly) “not 
for the sake of earning social capital and a with- it image, but because any 
theoretical content eventually reaches a point where it is no longer liber-
ating.” He continues, “From time to time something new is needed to 
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awaken us from various dogmatic slumbers. Properly pursued, the search 
for ‘the next big thing’ is not a form of hip posturing or capitalist com-
modifi cation, but of hope.”56 How is its proper pursuit to be defi ned? Why 
does the search for novelty equate with hopefulness? That the purported 
liberatory power of any theory is not the measure of its descriptive truth or 
untruth, its relevance or irrelevance, suggests that this assertion of corre-
lationism’s sell- by date accedes precisely to the hip posturing that Harman 
disavows. Exasperated with feeling “trapped in the correlational circle,” 
Harman attaches to OOO as a fetishized object, one whose trinity of Os 
fi ttingly emblematize both hollowness and hermetic closure, as if OOO 
ultimately wraps itself around its own empty center, “correlating” only 
with itself.57 If everything is an object in the world of OOO, and no object 
is more worthy than any other, then how ought we to respond to a theo-
retical approach that shamelessly presents itself as the next big thing? Is 
this not simply “a shape to fi ll a lack,” to borrow from William Faulkner, 
a stopgap measure that revolves back to itself through the self- same 
movement that enjoins the rest of us to get over ourselves and affi rm the 
lives of things?58
Rather than seek to puncture the alleged correlational circle, to tran-
scend its limits by insisting on the horizontal immanency of human, ani-
mal, and thing, perhaps we might engage an alternative reading of the 
iconographic O around which this decentering mission incessantly circles. 
The horizontal arrangement of these Os inscribes a series of separate but 
adjacent spheres, implying a constellation of fully independent worlds. 
Notwithstanding the melancholic detachment that this nonrelationality 
implies, however, this series might be reinscribed as a chain of overlapping 
Os, like intersecting, immanently transcendent planetary orbits, interlaced 
yet irreducibly distant. These Os would be reminiscent of Friday’s “tightly 
packed together” rows of the letter o, whose graphic sphericity neverthe-
less implies a certain proximity of subjective worlds, touching one another 
without ever becoming fully identical.59
We Are All Ptolemaists
Although Meillassoux’s rhetoric is far more tempered than that of his 
OOO followers, his argument is not entirely devoid of histrionics. After 
all, his philosophical project alleges that the “Kantian catastrophe” has 
deceived philosophers into accepting the fi nitude of human knowledge.60 
Meillassoux thus audaciously seeks to set philosophy straight, to reorient 
it away from the wrong turn of “transcendental idealism,” to take the path 
18955-Peterson_MonkeyTrouble.indd   79 7/24/17   5:22 PM
80 The Gravity of Melancholia
of the “speculative materialism” toward which philosophy should have 
turned over two centuries ago.61 For Meillassoux, “ancestrality,” defi ned 
as “any reality anterior to the emergence of the human species,” belies the 
Kantian insistence that “cognition reaches appearances only, leaving the 
thing in itself as something actual for itself but uncognized by us.”62 
According to Meillassoux, the correlationist cannot accept the “ultimate 
meaning” of a statement such as “Event Y occurred x number of years 
before the emergence of humans.”63 This ultimate meaning, which he 
explicitly equates to a literal one, cannot be deepened by the ostensibly 
more “originary” phenomenological interpretation of the correlationist 
who, though contesting neither the occurrence of the event nor its pri-
ority, “will simply add—perhaps only to himself, but add it he will—
something like a simple codicil, always the same one, which he will 
discretely [sic] append to the end of the phrase: event Y occurred x number 
of years before the commencement of humans—for humans.”64 Although 
Meillassoux names Heidegger and Husserl as inheritors and exacerbators 
of Kant’s disastrous critical turn, for the most part “correlationist” is 
broadly invoked, allowing the stigma to be worn by virtually anyone who 
reads the ancestral statement otherwise than purely literally. This rhetori-
cal strategy permits him to claim that the correlationist views the logical 
priority of givenness, the scientifi c statement’s “deeper, more originary” 
meaning for the human, as “truly correct.”65 For instance, the correlation-
ist allegedly “cease[s] to believe that the accretion of the earth straightfor-
wardly preceded in time the emergence of humanity.”66 Yet does the 
correlationist in fact subscribe to such a zero- sum game of literality versus 
fi gurality: of us versus for us? Husserl, for instance, critiqued the modern 
scientifi c tendency to reduce reality to objective description, but he never-
theless did not view science and phenomenology as mutually exclusive. 
He thus saw no contradiction in placing Galileo “at the top of the list of 
the greatest discoverers of modern times,” even while charging him with 
substituting a pure geometry of ideal shapes (the perfect circle, the per-
fect triangle, etc.) for our prescientifi c world of lived experience, the life-
world that gave rise to the practice of imperfect geometric measurement 
(land surveying, building construction, and astronomy). The effort to 
exhaustively mathematize nature fails to inquire back into the lifeworld, 
which is the condition of possibility for geometrical idealization.67 The 
reduction of reality to geometric ideality thus risks estranging and alien-
ating us from the lifeworld. To be sure, Husserl characterizes the lifeworld 
as “the only real world,” but this does not map so easily onto Meillassoux’s 
claim that the correlationist views phenomenological givenness as “truly 
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correct” in an absolutist sense. Indeed, Husserl adopts a conciliatory 
approach that Meillassoux chastises precisely for not being absolutist 
enough. Hence, the alleged intransigence in asserting givenness for us as 
truly correct is diffi cult to square with the inconsistency of which Meillas-
soux also accuses the correlationist: “A consistent correlationist should 
stop ‘compromising’ with science and stop believing that she can recon-
cile the two levels of meaning without undermining the content of the 
scientifi c statement she claims to be dealing with. There is no possible 
compromise between the correlation and the arche- fossil: once one has 
acknowledged one, one has thereby disqualifi ed the other.”68
On the one hand, the correlationist is rebuked for believing in the deeper 
meaning of the ancestral statement, which is to say for not truly believing its 
literal truth; on the other hand, the correlationist is scorned for not holding 
fast enough to this nonbelief, for believing that he can compromise between 
belief and nonbelief. Yet if compromise is the correlationist’s default posi-
tion—that is, if the correlationist is inconsistent by not subscribing to cor-
relationism/noncorrelationism as a zero- sum game, then Meillassoux can 
only attribute to the correlationist a belief in the phenomenological atti-
tude’s true correctness by inconsistently characterizing the correlationist as 
being at once too consistent and too inconsistent, too dogmatic yet not 
dogmatic enough. By Meillassoux’s own admission, correlationists do not 
speak of the phenomenological attitude as the truly correct interpretation 
(they are far too compromising). Hence, the portrayal of correlationists as 
dogmatically asserting their perspective as deeper, more originary, and 
truer refl ects the position that Meillassoux wants correlationists to hold, a 
position that constitutes nothing less than the specular image of his own 
uncompromising dogmatism: either you are with the correlationists or you 
are against them.
This stubborn insistence on literal reading, however, proves diffi cult to 
sustain when Meillassoux shifts his focus to the Copernican revolution, 
whose meaning he locates not in the scientifi c fact of heliocentrism, but in 
what this fact says about scientifi c reality’s indifference to human observa-
tion: “The Galilean- Copernican revolution has no other meaning than that of 
the paradoxical unveiling of thought’s capacity to think what there is 
whether thought exists or not [ my emphasis].”69 Meillassoux thus privi-
leges an interpretation of the Copernican turn that is said to be more 
fundamental, a meaning more originary and deeper than most scientists 
and lay people would typically be inclined to consider when the name 
Copernicus is mentioned, despite having fl atly dismissed any level of 
meaning other than a fl at one. If the Copernican revolution truly meant 
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only that “what is mathematizable cannot be reduced to a correlate of 
thought,” then we would be forced to accept the rather bizarre conclusion 
that the Copernican revolution no longer means that the earth revolves 
around the sun.70 It thus turns out that the “true” meaning that Meillassoux 
assigns to the Copernican revolution depends on him adding a correlation-
ist codicil: scientifi c truth cannot be reduced to a correlate of thought—for 
Meillassoux.
While he emphasizes the “deeper” discovery of the world’s radical indif-
ference to human existence that Copernicus ostensibly brings to light, he 
nevertheless falls back on the more literal fact of astronomical displace-
ment when he suggests that Kant’s revolution is Ptolemaic because it 
asserts “not that the observer whom we thought was motionless is in fact 
orbiting around the observed sun, but on the contrary, that the subject is 
central to the process of knowledge.”71 As this passage clearly demon-
strates, the accusation of Kant’s Ptolemaism relies on two related but dif-
ferent analogies: (1) Kant is Ptolemaic because he inscribes the human as 
the locus of epistemological access onto a universe whose indifference to 
human thought is thoroughly demonstrated by the total mathematization 
of celestial movement; (2) Kant is Ptolemaic because he reinscribes the 
epistemological centrality of the human as a direct reaction against the 
cosmological decentering wrought by Copernicus. The fi rst analogy 
stresses the irreducibility of mathematical truth, the second, the discovery 
of heliocentrism itself; Kant disavows the astronomical observer’s orbit by 
installing the transcendental subject as an immovable center. Heliocen-
trism shares the same evidentiary purpose—to refute correlationism—as 
do ancestral statements regarding the age of the universe, the accretion of 
Earth, the origin of life, and the origin of human life. Yet heliocentrism 
bears a rhetorical signifi cance quite unlike these other scientifi c truths. 
The literality of cosmological decentering is invoked in order to indicate a 
fi gurative recentering of the human as a subject of knowledge. Ancestral 
statements do not supply Meillassoux with the same rhetorical coup de grace 
against Kantianism. Indeed, they are said to signify only literally. Yet it is 
precisely the fi gurative sense of geocentrism that gives his critique of Kant 
such rhetorical force. It paints Kant as regressive and reactionary, as if to 
imply a hidden rapprochement between an outmoded view of the physical 
world and the critical turn.
This equation of Kantian epistemology with a fi gurative geocentrism is 
also problematic from a historical perspective because it presumes that the 
center was viewed in the pre- Copernican world as an unequivocally desir-
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able position when the reverse is actually true. Meillassoux is not unaware 
of this fact, though it is curiously buried in one of his footnotes: “The end 
of Ptolemaic astronomy does not mean that humanity felt itself humiliated 
because it could no longer think of itself as occupying the centre of the 
world. In actuality, the centrality of the Earth was then considered to be a 
shameful rather than a glorious position in the cosmos—a kind of sublu-
nary rubbish dump.”72 He goes on to cite historian Rémi Brague, who 
provides a wealth of evidence contravening Freud’s famous claim that 
Copernicus infl icted human narcissism with a “wounding blow.”73 Mai-
monides, for instance, expressed a commonly held medieval view when he 
wrote that “whenever the bodies are near the center, they grow dimmer 
and their substance coarser, and their motion becomes more diffi cult, 
while their light and transparency disappear because of their distance from 
the noble, luminous, transparent, moving, subtle, and simple body—I 
mean heaven.”74 Readers of Dante will likewise recall that the Divine Com-
edy locates hell at the center of the earth: “In the world of sense we can 
perceive / That evermore the circles are diviner / As they are from the cen-
tre more remote.”75 These premodern assessments of Earth’s insignifi cance 
resonate with Harman’s remark that we live “on an average sized planet 
near a mediocre sun,” yet in so doing they underscore that the recognition 
of earthly, human mediocrity is hardly a novel insight. Moreover, if the 
center of the universe was deemed a shameful position prior to Coperni-
cus, then how can Kant be construed as reacting against Earth’s displace-
ment? It makes little sense to charge Kant with enacting a Ptolemaic 
counterrevolution if Copernicus did not oust the human from its privileged 
position within the universe. Dennis Danielson argues that this cliché 
developed in the seventeenth century once the sun was established as the 
center and this centrality became associated with specialness: “We anach-
ronistically read the physical center’s post- Copernican excellence back 
into the pre- Copernican world picture—and so turn it upside down” 
(1033). Galileo, for instance, regarded heliocentrism as a promotion rather 
than a demotion: “As to the earth, we are trying to make it more noble and 
more perfect insofar as we strive to make it similar to the heavenly bodies 
and in a sense to place it in heaven, from which your philosophers have 
banished it.”76 This double movement of demotion /promotion reaches its 
apex in the self- congratulatory tenor of speculative realism, which divides 
the world into two species of beings, correlationists and noncorrelationists: 
the latter “blessed” with an exceptional capacity to recognize the human’s 
nonexceptionality.
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The Orbital “I”
That Meillassoux fi nds himself suspended between the literal and fi gurative 
meanings of geocentrism is altogether unsurprising giving that the histori-
cal event of Copernicanism involves precisely the problem of a turn that 
turns on any effort to ground its meaning either literally or fi guratively. The 
Copernican turn is not simply one historical revolution among others. 
Unlike sundry political upheavals, the Copernican event quite literally 
involves a turn: the revolution of the earth around the sun. This revolution 
is denoted by the title of Copernicus’s sixteenth- century treatise, On the 
Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres. Prior to its recognition as a revolutionary, 
transformative shift in scientifi c history, the Copernican revolution named 
precisely the historical moment when the human turned its gaze away from 
celestial objects and revolved back toward itself precisely in order to dis-
place our previous belief in Earth’s nonorbiting, immovable, centrality. As 
Kant remarked in the preface to the second edition of the Critique, helio-
centrism “would have remained forever undiscovered if Copernicus had not 
ventured, in a manner contradictory to the senses yet true, to seek for the 
observed movements not in the objects of the heavens but in their 
observer.”77 While Kant employs the word “revolution” to construct an 
analogy between Copernican science and the critical turn in philosophy, he 
also uses the term according to its astronomical sense, as when he writes 
that Copernicus “made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest.”78 As 
Hannah Arendt notes, “revolution” began to assume a political valence in 
the seventeenth century that associated it with the restoration of a previ-
ously established order.79 The term revolution acquired its modern associa-
tion with novelty during the course of the French and American revolutions 
in which the latent astronomical connotation of turning back yielded to a 
sense of irresistibility, an impulse itself inherited from the astronomical 
notion that the stars follow a preordained path. The principle of irresist-
ibility was thus transplanted from the heavens to the earthly realm as char-
acteristic of the unstoppable momentum of political transformation.80
Alleging that Kant instigated a Ptolemaic counterrevolution, Meillas-
soux is clearly employing a modern conception of revolution as transfor-
mation. While the phrase “Copernican revolution” may have served 
philosophers for two centuries as a convenient shorthand to describe the 
critical turn, it does not do justice to a philosophical reorientation that 
occurred at a historical moment when the term revolution was only just 
beginning to acquire its modern sense, a period in which the distinction 
between revolution and counterrevolution was utterly in fl ux. This is not to 
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suggest that modernity has fully stabilized the meaning of revolution, in 
which case the knowing subject’s centrality could also be fully grounded. 
On the contrary, correlationism unsettles precisely the distinction between 
periphery and center, turn and return, novelty and restoration. The so- 
called correlational subject is thus better characterized as an orbital “I” 
who perceives the world from the groundless ground of an earth that feels 
stationary even as it moves. As Husserl puts it, the earth is the “originary 
ark” that “makes possible in the fi rst place the sense of all motion and all 
rest as mode of one motion. But its rest is not a mode of motion.”81 Husserl 
is not simply rehearsing the scientifi c truism that we are unable to perceive 
directly the earth’s rotation and orbit because we are anchored to its move-
ment. On the contrary, the originary ark functions as a fi gure for the 
quasi- transcendental ego’s “stationary” status. Just as we experience the 
earth as a ground- body for our perception of other astronomical bodies, 
the ego is not merely one “planet” among others, but is the primordial 
homeland for our relation to otherness: “The earth itself does not move 
and does not rest; only in relation to it are movement and rest given as 
having their sense of movement and rest.”82 Drawing from the double 
meaning of orbit as both a stable anatomical center of visual perception 
(i.e., the eye socket) and a fi gure of astronomical movement, the orbital “I” 
affi rms an insuperable “Ptolemaism” as the condition of possibility for 
Copernicanism.
Although we may perceive the center as a place of security and safety, it 
also represents a particularly vulnerable position to occupy, the point from 
which one cannot take any distance. As Husserl remarks, “I do not move 
away; I stand still or go; thus my fl esh is the center and the bodies at rest 
and moving are around me, and I have a ground that does not move.”83 
The perils of immobility are manifest in Melancholia when Leo says to 
Justine, “Dad says there’s nothing to do then [if the planets collide], 
nowhere to hide.” The wire apparatus that Leo constructs earlier in the 
fi lm in order to measure the distance and size of the approaching planet 
serves to remind Claire of the vulnerability of being inescapably fi xed. 
Similar to the “magic cave,” a tepee- like frame of sticks that Justine tells 
Leo will protect them from Melancholia’s impact, Leo’s apparatus is a 
decidedly low- tech instrument: nothing more than a wire ring attached to 
a stick. When held up to the sky, the device permits the viewer to ascertain 
Melancholia’s movement toward and away from Earth as the planet’s 
perimeter shifts inside and outside the circular frame. Initially comforted 
when she observes the planet decreasing in size, Claire suddenly panics 
when its perimeter expands beyond the edges of the wire, indicating that 
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the planet is moving closer to Earth. Unlike a telescope—which allows 
one to manipulate size and distance, thus giving the illusion not simply of 
bringing the object closer to the viewer but also of the spectator moving 
closer to the object, as if being launched into space—this anti- telescope 
dooms Claire to a helpless immobility. The center names a space of appar-
ent exception that paradoxically makes itself vulnerable to annihilation 
precisely by being what it is: that is, by being the nondisplaceable ground 
zero for its own deracination.
Bearing the World
While Meillassoux focuses largely on the problem of anteriority in relation 
to the temporal discrepancy between thinking and a world indifferent to 
human thought, he briefl y notes that this hiatus also concerns “statements 
about possible events that are ulterior to the extinction of the human spe-
cies.”84 Such ulteriority is a central concern in Melancholia when Claire and 
Justine ponder the impending arrival of the eponymous rogue planet. As 
they discuss the possibility that the planet might collide with Earth, despite 
scientifi c calculations to the contrary, they adopt contrasting attitudes 
toward the prospect of annihilation:
JUSTINE: The Earth is evil. We don’t need to grieve for it.
CLAIRE: What?
JUSTINE: Nobody will miss it.
CLAIRE: But where would Leo grow up? 
JUSTINE: All I know is, life on Earth is evil.
CLAIRE: There may be life somewhere else.
JUSTINE: But there isn’t.
Justine’s assertion that no one will grieve the loss of planet Earth derives 
from two related, yet not entirely identical beliefs: “the Earth is evil” and 
“life on Earth is evil.” That “no one will miss it” is quite literally true from 
a noncorrelationist perspective because the destruction of Earth would 
entail the absolute erasure of any witness who could grieve its loss. When 
Claire responds fi rst by asking where Leo would grow up and then by pon-
dering whether life might exist elsewhere in the universe, she commits the 
correlationist “sin” of imagining the ulteriority of life for her. Meillassoux 
would no doubt take Claire to task for her “Ptolemaic” reinscription of 
herself at the center of a world that would no longer exist. Claire’s thoughts 
of total destruction do indeed orbit back toward the world that she imag-
ines as no longer existing, but this revolution in thought, this turning back 
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while turning away, simply describes the ordinary Ptolemaic- Copernicanism 
(or Copernican- Ptolemaism) fundamental to being an intentional subject. 
The sun does not literally rise and set for us; the sun is not signifi cantly 
closer to us in the summer than in the winter (Earth’s orbit is only slightly 
elliptical). Schoolchildren are disabused of these correlationist mispercep-
tions early on. That we cannot directly perceive our celestial orbit anymore 
than we can witness anterior or ulterior events does not mean, however, 
that we are obliged to dispense with fi gurative language altogether. The 
question is thus not Ptolemaism versus non- Ptolemaism. There is no one 
Ptolemaism. There are only Ptolemaisms with stronger and weaker gravita-
tional pulls. And what gravitational pull could be stronger than the one 
emitted by a philosopher who insists on a literality that arrests meaning at 
its alleged core? What could be more Ptolemaic than a fi xation with fi xity 
that seeks to stay metaphor’s vehicular drive to bear meaning from one 
place to another, to moor meaning to an ultimate center around which orbit 
a number of supplementary fi gurative effects, like so many satellites of sig-
nifi cation?
If Meillassoux’s linguistic Ptolemaism requires that language not get car-
ried away, that it remain tethered to an ultimate, literal ground that forever 
revolves on its own axis, then what are we to make of Justine and Claire’s 
Ptolemaisms in terms of their respective strengths and weaknesses? Jus-
tine’s gravitational attraction would seem to be the weaker one insofar as it 
exhibits a degree of hospitality toward an unknowable future quite unlike 
the increased anxiety and stress that Claire experiences as the planet draws 
nigh. In the fi lm’s Wagnerian overture, for instance, Melancholia’s rival 
gravitational and electromagnetic infl uences cause St. Elmo’s fi re to radi-
ate upward from Justine’s fi ngertips. Justine gazes at this luminous phe-
nomenon with calm fascination, as if Earth’s gravitational waning lightens 
the ponderous effects of her psychological depression. She displays similar 
serenity when she stands with her arms extended, Christlike, while white 
butterfl ies fl oat upward toward the heavens, implying a shared pleasure in 
a liberating buoyancy that welcomes Melancholia literally with out-
stretched arms (Figure 4). This image anticipates a scene of comparable 
self- abandonment that occurs later in the fi lm when Justine lies naked on a 
riverbank at night, allowing herself to bathe in the light of Melancholia, 
which has become something like Earth’s second moon. Justine stares 
intensely at the luminous blue planet in a manner that recalls an earlier 
scene when the wedding revelers launch a number of helium lanterns 
into the night sky. Justine leans forward to observe the lanterns’ ascen-
sion through John’s telescope. The shot cuts to her telescopic perspective 
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of these man- made celestial objects, before she pulls back from the tele-
scope, her eyes closed. The scene once again cuts to a shot of the heavens, 
but this time the lanterns are replaced with her mind’s eye view of a suc-
cession of breathtaking supernovae. As with the butterfl ies and the St. 
Elmo’s fi re, her attraction to the lanterns and other celestial objects implies 
an affi nity with their rootlessness and errancy.
That Justine abandons herself to a looming planet that appears to be 
gaseous further suggests that she eschews the reassurance provided by 
Earth’s terra fi rma. While all the gas planets in our solar system are sur-
rounded by rings, however, Melancholia noticeably lacks this characteris-
tic. Together with its blue color, the absence of rings gives Melancholia an 
appearance that resembles a larger version of Earth. Does Justine look 
away only to see Earth’s face staring back at her? What if this other world 
amounts to another version of the same, an alter geo? What would it mean 
if Justine remains earthbound despite her perceptual mobility, that is, if her 
regard turns out to be far less errant, and thus far less akin to the planet 
toward which she gazes? That Melancholia is said to have been “hiding 
behind the sun” underscores that von Trier is drawing from the familiar 
science fi ction trope of the counter- earth. In Mike Cahill’s Another Earth 
(2011), for example, a planet utterly identical to Earth suddenly appears in 
the sky.85 When Dr. Joan Tallis of SETI (Search for Extraterrestrial Intel-
ligence) attempts to contact “Earth 2” during a live television broadcast, 
she is shocked to hear her own voice echoed back to her by a denizen of the 
other planet who bears her name and reveals identical biographical details. 
This doppelganger effect itself mirrors Andrei Tarkovsky’s Solaris (1972), 
in which the eponymous planet is revealed to constitute a parallel Earth.86 
As Dr. Snaut declares, “we want to extend the Earth to the borders of the 
Figure 4. Justine welcoming Melancholia.
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cosmos. We don’t know what to do with other worlds. We don’t need other 
worlds. We need a mirror.”87 Is this not precisely what Husserl means 
when he tells us that we can travel to the moon while never being able to 
leave our ur- Earth behind? We might consider the moon as a kind of sec-
ond Earth, but which Earth, he asks, would function as the ground body, 
the zero point of comparison to the other? The ur- Earth as originary 
ground could be the moon, if one were to have been born there. Yet the 
planet Earth as quasi- transcendental geo does not move. This monogeolo-
gism of the other—the trip to the moon or Justine’s interplanetary gaze—
means that there is always more than one Earth/there is never more than 
one Earth.
That Justine appears more hospitable toward alterity than her sister 
thus does not mean that the former escapes epistemological centrism alto-
gether. When she asserts that “life is only on Earth,” for instance, and 
defends her claim on the basis of a clairvoyant ability to “knows things,” 
this rejection of the possibility of extraterrestrial life nevertheless implies 
that such beings, were they to have existed, would have answered to Claire’s 
demand for a world dependent on being given for some perceiving intel-
ligence. This intuition thus betrays a correlationist perspective notwith-
standing her insistence on the absence of life elsewhere in the universe. By 
contrast, Meillassoux is concerned with the “temporal discrepancy between 
thinking and being” that emerges once one begins to think the absence of 
any witness, terrestrial or extraterrestrial, that could exist in the wake of 
Earth’s destruction.88 Extraterrestrial witnesses would be no less vulnerable 
to future extinction than earthly beings; thus, the problem of ulteriority 
would remain relevant for Meillassoux. Yet this thought of ulteriority can 
still not elude correlationism insofar as it can think its nonexistence only 
from the perspective of a would- be survivor. When Claire imagines Leo as 
having survived annihilation, her disavowal only hyperbolizes an irreduc-
ible Ptolemaic thinking inherent in apperception as such. As Peggy Kamuf 
puts it, “the end of all life . . . is precisely what we cannot think except in a 
mode and as a vestige of survival beyond the annihilation that will there-
fore not have been total.”89 Survival is irreducible because the “imagina-
tion of disaster,” in Susan Sontag’s phrase, cannot transgress the boundary 
between life and death, thus compelling us to project ourselves onto the 
scene of our utter absence.90
Psychical Ptolemaism unsurprisingly tugs most strongly when faced 
with the approach of a rogue planet that weakens the gravitational pull of 
the earth before obliterating it altogether. In addition to verbally express-
ing her fear and alarm, Claire is the only character who becomes breathless 
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when the planet approaches, a fact that John attributes to the planet’s “tak-
ing part of our atmosphere.” Later when Justine and Leo are collecting 
sticks from the nearby woods to construct their “magic cave,” the camera 
pans down toward Justine’s boots, under which worms and other insects 
are seen rising to the surface. While the overture suggests that the insects 
enjoy Justine’s weightlessness, here they seem confused and disoriented by 
the competing electromagnetic and gravitational impulses, as if attempting 
to fl ee the soil in search of safety, just as Claire vainly attempts to escape 
Earth’s destruction by fl eeing in a golf cart to a nearby village. Claire’s 
anxiety is unsurprising given that Melancholia heralds not simply the end 
of her world but the end of the world because it threatens to eradicate the 
material foundation for any future telluric life. The overture stresses this 
fragile footing when it depicts Claire in slow motion carrying Leo across 
the golf course, returning from her failed escape. This decelerated move-
ment gives the impression of weightlessness, as if gravity no longer holds 
sway over Claire, each of her steps leaving deeper imprints in the softening 
soil as we see a fl ag marking the nineteenth hole unfurl in the background 
(Figure 5). The weightlessness, footprints, and the fl ag all evoke the indel-
ible image of the Apollo 11 moonwalk. Whereas NASA footage showing 
the American fl ag seemingly blowing in the wind is cited by conspiracy 
theorists as evidence that the mission was a hoax, von Trier plays his own 
prank on the viewer by referencing a nonexistent, nineteenth hole that also 
happens to be a euphemism for the watering hole where one celebrates 
after a game (Figure 6). When the real- time version of this scene later 
depicts a volley of hail descending upon Claire, it resembles not only the 
beans whose triviality she earlier dismissed, but also innumerable golf balls, 
those man- made projectiles to which large ice pellets are often likened. As 
von Trier observes, “There’s something oddly melancholy about golf 
courses. They go on forever and, if you take away all the golfers . . . they’re 
amazingly cultivated landscapes. I always loved golf courses and grave-
yards.”91 Blurring the distinction between the natural and the unnatural, 
these golf/ice balls fall onto the surface of an artifi cial green whose cosmic 
vastness harbors an inordinate number of black holes. Down is up and up 
is down on this Carrollesque earth- cum- outer- space, an infi nite expanse 
soon to be emptied of all humanity.92
No longer able to rely on the previously dependable and predictable 
laws of the universe, Claire fi nds herself faced with the pressing dilemma 
not only of how to bear both herself and her child upon a planet that is 
literally disappearing beneath them, but also of how to bear this world that 
also bears her. Claire is both carried and carrying. Presumably the cosmos 
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Figure 6. Apollo 11 moonwalk.
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will continue to exist in the wake of Earth’s destruction, a universe entirely 
independent and “indifferent” to her, but for the moment she is still obliged 
to carry the world as a horizon of perception in anticipation of its utter 
absence. She has only one world, yet it is not hers. The world has always 
existed for her; it has never existed (solely) for her. This is the performative 
contradiction that binds her to carry the world even while she is anticipat-
ing its disappearance. As Derrida puts it:
To carry now no longer has the meaning of “to comprise” [comporter], 
to include, to comprehend in the self, but rather to carry oneself for bear 
oneself toward [se porter vers] the infi nite inappropriability of the other, 
toward the encounter with its absolute transcendence in the very 
inside of me, that is to say, in me outside of me. And I only am, I can 
only be, I must only be starting from this strange, dislocated bearing 
of the infi nitely other in me. I must carry the other, and carry you, 
the other must carry me . . . even there where the world is no longer 
between us or beneath our feet, no longer ensuring mediation or rein-
forcing a foundation for us.93
While Derrida is speaking here of the immanent transcendency of other 
beings, living or dead, this liminality belongs to our appresentational 
apprehension of alterity more generally. This directedness toward—perhaps 
both fearful and welcoming—is neither a condition of zero gravity nor a 
black hole whose event horizon marks the point of no return, the border 
beyond which otherness is utterly absorbed. Like an astronaut orbiting 
Earth, atlassing a panoramic view that is perspectivally inexhaustible, we 
stand on moving ground, bearing ourselves toward a world both in and 
without us, a world that persists minus our presence but is always thought 
from the zero point of a melancholic gravity that must be more than naught.
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In the 1855 preface to Leaves of Grass, Walt Whitman writes that the 
“equable” poet “judges not as the judge judges but as the sun falling round 
a helpless thing.”2 Illuminating everything without exception, solar judg-
ment appears to beget a capacious and magnanimous ethico- political rela-
tion, an illimitable and indiscriminate hospitality that embraces the 
vulnerable and powerless. According to Jane Bennett, “to go solar, to 
accept all with equanimity, is to elide the particular hierarchy of values and 
the particular regime of perception dominant in the culture.”3 Citing 
Bergson’s observation that perception is inherently “subtractive,” a proce-
dure for screening out external stimuli to which the subject is indifferent, 
Bennett suggests that Whitman provides us with an otherwise nonsubtrac-
tive, wholly receptive bearing of and toward the world.4 On this account, 
solarity is remarkably similar to the plane of immanence championed by 
object- oriented ontology. Just as OOO promotes a fl at ontology that 
eschews the hierarchical, fractional distribution of subjective intentional-
ity, the sun orients itself toward all things in equal measure.
Solarity fi nds some precedent in both ecopoetical and queer approaches 
to Whitman. Jimmie Killingsworth, for instance, argues that Whitman 
c h a p t e r  4
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The Limits of Hospitality
It is by constructing itself on the basis of the vertical 
comparison with animality that the cosmopolitical horizon 
opens up and its horizontal contract is constituted.
—PETER SZENDY, Kant in the Land of Extraterrestrials1
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ascertains “the things of nature” in an indirect, nonacquisitive manner, one 
that affi rms the limits of human language to represent otherness.5 Simi-
larly attuned to the problem of alterity, Peter Coviello maintains that the 
“embarrassingly immodest . . . confi dence with which the poet casts him-
self in often improbable roles” runs counterpoint to a sustained concern 
with sympathetic identifi cation.6 Michael Warner also acknowledges that 
Whitman “thematizes a modern phenomenology of self everywhere: ‘I 
celebrate myself, and sing myself.’ ” Yet Warner justifi ably takes issue with 
readers who reduce Whitman’s poetic “I” to such declarations of liberal 
selfhood, arguing that Whitman ultimately engenders “the pragmatics of 
selfi ng a mess.”7 In this regard, the absorption of otherness into the self is 
never fully accomplished. In “To a Stranger,” for instance, the speaker 
addresses someone both anonymous yet known: “You grew up with me, 
were a boy with me or a girl with me.”8 It remains uncertain whether the 
poem describes a moment of uncanny misrecognition in which the speaker 
encounters an other who reminds him of someone previously known or 
whether the ostensible stranger literally belongs to the poet’s past. Whether 
familiar or strange, this alterity yields to a quintessential Whitmanian 
merger: “I ate with you and slept with you, your body has become not 
yours/only nor left my body mine only.”9 On closer inspection, however, 
this merging does not describe a dialectical synthesis that incorporates 
alterity: the other’s body neither fully belongs to this other nor to the “I” 
who describes its incomplete arrogation.
As both Warner and Coviello demonstrate, the disarray of self- constitution 
can be registered only if we dwell with the poetic imbrication of self and 
other. This nondialectical chiasmus weakens the propensity of the poetic 
voice to overfl ow its own boundaries and absorb everything into itself. 
D. H. Lawrence famously lampooned this absorptive power for its appar-
ent monomaniacal pomposity:
All that false exuberance. All those lists of things boiled in one 
pudding- cloth! No, no!
I don’t want all those things inside me, thank you.
“I reject nothing,” says Walt.
If that is so, one must be a pipe open at both ends, so everything runs 
through.
. . .
“I embrace ALL,” says Whitman. “I weave all things into myself.”
Do you really! There can’t be much left of you when you’ve done. 
When you’ve cooked the awful pudding of One Identity.
. . .
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As soon as Walt knew a thing, he assumed a One Identity with it. . . .
. . .
This merging, en masse, One Identity, Myself monomania was a 
carry- over from the old Love idea.10
Lawrence employs reductio ad absurdum to show that there is both too 
much and too little of Whitman in his poetry. The latter’s seeming self- 
abandonment merely conceals its arrogance. Of course, the exuberance 
that Lawrence himself exhibits here risks imitating the self- glorifi cation 
that he wishes to mock. Similar to Lawrence, Doris Sommer argues that 
equality is “synonymous with identity” for Whitman, who assumes a self 
“at the center of a universe that repeats him endlessly.”11 Undoubtedly a 
certain grandness of purpose is not altogether foreign to Whitman. In Song 
of Myself, he declares: “I know this orbit of mine cannot be swept by a car-
penter’s / compass.”12 Several verses later he inscribes his name and identity 
directly into the poem: “Walt Whitman, an American, one of the roughs, 
a kosmos.”13 A world unto himself, Whitman nevertheless assures us that 
he is “no stander above men and women or apart from / them.” Yet several 
lines before he characterizes the poet in the 1855 preface as one who sus-
pends judgment, the speaker stations himself “high up out of reach,” where 
“he stands turning a concentrated light . . . he turns the pivot with his fi n-
ger . . . he baffl es the swiftest runners as he stands and easily overtakes and 
envelopes them.”14 The poet as sun shines down upon all. Not even the 
fastest runners can escape its advancing reach. Nonjudgmental judgment 
might appear to equate to a form of incalculable hospitality, an openness 
“To You. Whoever you are.”15 Yet what if a judge’s calculable discernment 
is precisely what is needed to reckon with an utterly incalculable, perhaps 
even oppressive, solarity? Can we fi nally distinguish between a capacious 
and a rapacious solarity? Does a nonjudgmental judgment fi nally amount 
to a total absence of judgment without which everything would be help-
lessly exposed, willy- nilly, to the sun’s scorching rays? Consider that the 
“swiftest runners” might be read as fl eeing the sun precisely because it has 
“baffl ed” them: that is, confused and obstructed their path. Are they also 
helpless things, vulnerable and powerless objects of a light that relentlessly 
pursues them? If at fi rst glint solar judgment appears to register only mag-
nanimous receptivity, might it not also cast a long shadow of violence that 
obscures as much as it illuminates?
Focused on the luminosity of objects, Bennett positions herself squarely 
within the Platonic tradition that equates the sun with the good beyond 
being, the condition of possibility for sight, the “child of the good,” which 
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is to say knowledge and truth.16 Solarity thus contrasts with OOO’s theory 
of object withdrawal discussed in chapter 3. OOO seeks to evade the light 
in a manner that recalls the Levinasian claim that Western metaphysics 
enacts a phenomenological violence that utterly absorbs alterity: “Light is 
that through which something is other than myself, but already as if it 
came from me. The illuminated object is something one encounters, but 
from the very fact that it is illuminated one encounters it as if it came from 
us. It does not have a fundamental strangeness. Its transcendence is 
wrapped in immanence.”17 Intentionality manifests a structure of imma-
nence in the sense that the exterior world is reduced to the solipsistic ego. 
The illumination of objects for the subject depends on a visual economy 
that collapses the “interval of space” that would sustain the other’s tran-
scendence.18 Levinas goes so far as to claim that “solipsism is neither an 
aberration nor a sophism; it is the very structure of reason.”19 He counters 
this solipsism by posing the possibility of a transcendence or exteriority 
that would escape the reduction of otherness to the same.
To put it all too telegraphically, light is good for Bennett, bad for Levinas 
and OOO. Yet must we subscribe to such a Manichean dualism between 
good and bad, light and dark? Consider the reading of Levinas that Der-
rida advances in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Although he agrees with 
Levinas that the heliological metaphor constitutes one of the guiding lights 
of Western philosophy, he nevertheless interrogates his presumption that 
phenomenology can be utterly evaded. Derrida asks: “What language will 
ever escape it [the solar metaphor]? How, for example, will the metaphysics 
of the face as the epiphany of the other free itself of light? Light perhaps has 
no opposite; if it does, it is certainly not night. If all languages combat 
within it, modifying only the same metaphor and choosing the best light, 
Borges . . . is correct again: ‘Perhaps universal history is but the history of 
the diverse intonations of several metaphors.’ ”20
OOO’s stress on the withdrawal of objects into the shadowy recesses of 
their mutual interaction may appear to be the inverse of Bennett’s solarity. 
Indeed, Bennett does not characterize solarity as anti- Kantian or anticor-
relational, seeing “no need to choose between objects or their relations.”21 
OOO’s ceaseless assembling of objects at random aims to privilege objects 
above their relations, as if their apparent dissimilarity alone were suffi cient 
to certify the absolute alterity of objects as they relate to each other and to 
us. Yet whether shadowy or luminous, objects remain phenomena for both 
Bennett and OOO. The latter wants to make appear the disappearance of 
things, to phenomenalize objects as avoiding phenomenalization. Yet this 
escape is untenable precisely in light of the object’s withdrawal. It presup-
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poses, in other words, the phenomenality it aims to escape precisely by 
illuminating the object’s opacity. How might we choose the best light as 
Derrida suggests? Might it be something like a lunar light, an indirect 
luminescence that belongs neither to the violence of day nor the violence 
of night? Might a certain lunar judgment remain refractory to the either/
or of appearance and disappearance, presence and absence?
Solarity seems to offer a welcome antidote to the nonrelational extrava-
gances of OOO. Yet even though Bennett wants to avoid constructing a 
false opposition between relations and things, she nevertheless gives scant 
attention to the human /object relation. Indeed, her reading of Whitman 
ironically betrays its own subtractive agency by bracketing the poetic “I” 
who licenses its ample hospitality. In order to abide the imbrication 
between this “I” and its others, both human and nonhuman, we must 
eschew the overcorrective elision of antehumanism on which Bennett’s 
leap toward alterity depends. A more capacious reading of Whitman 
requires that we reckon with rather than bracket such unabashed state-
ments as “I know perfectly well my own egotism.”22 We must assess such 
hubristic enunciations alongside their less boastful counterparts in order to 
expose a poetic voice that is equal parts intramundane and “transcenden-
tal.” In “Song of Myself,” for instance, the speaker asserts: “Apart from the 
pulling and hauling stands what I am. . . . Both in and out of the game and 
watching and wondering at it.”23 To be both in and out of the game is to 
inhabit a space of immanent transcendency in relation to the poet’s litanies 
of countless human and nonhuman others. This immanent transcendency is 
synonymous neither with the sublative merging for which Lawrence chas-
tises Whitman nor the unconditional hospitality that Bennett promotes.
Solarity’s Eclipse
The distinctive cataloguing practice that pervades Whitman, his “dog-
gedly horizontal lists,” bear striking similarities to the litanies that pervade 
the writings of OOO theorists.24 Ian Bogost stretches such litanizing to 
farcical extremes by posting an index on his blog of every reference to 
Mexican food from his book Alien Phenomenology, as well as by applying his 
programming skills to creating a “Latour Litanizer,” a gadget that allows 
visitors to his website to generate at the click of a button a random list of 
objects derived from Wikipedia.25 Whitman’s catalogs are certainly diverse, 
but they are distinct from the litanizer insofar as they do not constitute an 
unplanned or artless “bare lists of words” (in the Emersonian phrase that 
allegedly inspired Whitman).26 On the contrary, their apparent incongruity 
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disguises an overarching organizational unity. As Bennett observes, Whit-
man’s catalogs also list in the sense that they incline or lean toward various 
objects in a manner that is far from indifferent and unmotivated.27 Con-
sider the following example from “The Sleepers”:
The homeward bound and the outward bound,
The beautiful lost swimmer, the ennuyé, the onanist, the female
that loves unrequited, the money- maker,
The actor and actress, those through with their parts and those 
waiting to commence,
The affectionate boy, the husband and wife, the voter, the nominee
that is chosen and the nominee that has fail’d,
The great already known, and the great anytime after to- day,
The stammerer, the sick, the perfect- form- d, the homely,
The criminal that stood in the box, the judge that sat and sen-
tenced him, the fl uent lawyers, the jury, the audience,
The laugher and weeper, the dancer, the midnight widow, the red
squaw,
The consumptive, the erysipalite, the idiot, he that is wrong’d,
The antipodes, and every one between this and them in the dark,
I swear they are averaged now— one is no better than the other,
The night and sleep have liken’d them and restored them.28
Employing a periodic sentence whose main clause (“I swear they are 
averaged now”) appears after a string of subordinate ones, Whitman 
inscribes difference in sameness according to a pattern that Betsy Erkkila 
identifi es with America’s unoffi cial motto: e pluribus unum (“out of many 
one”).29 Sleep fi gures as a democratizing force, but its leveling effect does 
not precipitate the withdrawal of objects into absolute darkness. In an 
essay called “A Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads,” Whitman writes 
that “the actual living light is always curiously from elsewhere—follows 
unaccountable sources, and is lunar and relative at the best.”30 The phe-
nomenalization of objects is indirect—withdrawn as Harman would 
say—but not absolutely so. Luminosity is also relational. While “The 
Sleepers” employs night as an equalizing fi gure, “new beings appear” 
nevertheless as the nomadic speaker “pierce[s] the darkness,” drifting 
among a constellation of different sleepers.31 Their appearance is 
refracted through the speaker’s lunar judgment that selects some objects 
rather than others, a judgment that does not say “yes” to everything, but 
necessarily discriminates.
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This partiality of Whitman’s catalogs, their listing or leaning toward, 
also manifests in the following verse from “Song of Myself,” ironically 
perhaps given its portrayal of spontaneous human and nonhuman agency:
The blab of the pave, tires of carts, sluff of boot- soles, talk of the 
promenaders,
The heavy omnibus, the driver with his interrogating thumb, the 
clank of the shod horses on the granite fl oor,
The snow- sleighs, clinking, shouted jokes, pelts of snow- balls,
The hurrahs for popular favorites, the fury of rous’d mobs,
The fl ap of the curtain’d litter, a sick man inside borne to the 
hospital,
The meeting of enemies, the sudden oath, the blows and fall,
The excited crowd, the policeman with his star quickly working 
his passage to the centre of the crowd,
The impassive stones that receive and return so many echoes,
What groans of over- fed or half- starv’d who fall sunstruck or in 
fi ts,
What exclamations of women taken suddenly who hurry home and 
give birth to babes,
What living and buried speech is always vibrating here, what howls
restrain’d by decorum,
Arrests of criminals, slights, adulterous offers made, acceptances,
rejections with convex lips,
I mind them or the show or resonance of them—I come and I 
depart.32
Referring archaically in this context to a stretcher, the “curtain’d litter” 
literally conveys a sick man as well as fi guratively bears the litanies that 
litter Whitman’s verse, language that rends the curtain dividing human 
from nonhuman.33 This bustling city scene of commingling human and 
object sounds achieves coherence not only through the “I” who surveys 
the scene, but also through the acoustic rhythms of the nonhuman blabs, 
clinks, clanks, pelts, and fl aps that punctuate the verse. These sounds are 
collated with human hurrahs, shouts, groans, and howls: all striking exam-
ples of spontaneous, impulsive, perhaps even “bestial” speech, far removed 
from the humanist vision of a reasoning, intentional subject. That the “I” 
who “mind[s]” these things does not so much directly cognize them as feel 
their “resonance” stresses an aural and pulsative receptivity distinct from 
the appropriative mastery of visual surveillance.
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Bennett plausibly reads Whitman’s reference to “living and buried 
speech” as rendering things “vocal material actants.”34 Whitman does 
seem to call on us to hear things “speak” in “Song of Myself,” but elsewhere 
objects are far less voluble. In the preface he pronounces the “beauty and 
dignity” of “dumb real objects,” and in “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry” objects 
are likewise portrayed as “dumb, beautiful ministers. . . . We use you, and 
do not cast you aside—we plant you perma- / nently within us, / We fathom 
you not—we love you—there is perfection in you also.”35 That humans do 
not plumb the depths of objects implies a nonappropriative relation to 
them, yet their silent ministration to humans nevertheless appears more 
passive than active. In the passage Bennett discusses, moreover, the voices 
of objects are amplifi ed largely on account of her deliberate silencing of 
human actors, who are replaced with several long strings of ellipses:
The blab of the pave, tires of carts, sluff of boot- soles, . . .
. . . the clank of the shod horses on the granite fl oor,
The snow- sleighs, clinking, . . .
. . . the fury of rous’d mobs,
The fl ap of the curtain’d litter, . . .
........................................................
The impassive stones that receive and return so many echoes,
................................................................................................
What living and buried speech is always vibrating here . . .36
Except for the presumably human mob’s “fury,” Bennett quite literally 
encourages us to see “men and / women as dreams or dots,” which is pre-
cisely how the poet in “By Blue Ontario’s Shore” says the equable poet 
should not see them.37 The reduction of humans to a typographic mark of 
omission conditions the humanization of things. To be fair, Bennett quotes 
this passage again later in the essay with most of the human actors restored. 
Yet she still omits the “howls restrain’d by decorum,” which most nearly 
refers to “exclamations of women taken suddenly who hurry home and 
give birth to babes / What living and buried speech is always vibrating 
here.” While Whitman frequently draws upon the trope of maternity in a 
manner that risks reducing the role of women to a procreative function, 
here the speaker disinters the pain of childbirth hidden by romanticized 
norms of motherhood.38 This is not to deny the broader implications that 
Bennett draws from the catalogue’s depiction of thingly agency, but only 
to question the necessity of adopting a Manichean approach whereby the 
illumination of objects seems to depend on the concealment of humans—
in this case, women—whose literal silencing Whitman invites us to hear. 
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If agency is truly “distributive,” then how are we to hear this dispersion if 
some of its voices are actively muted?39
Yet the problem here is not simply that women are silenced in favor of 
objects. In chapter 2 I argued that the opposition between speech and 
silence presumes that “giving voice” is an undeniable ethico- political good. 
As with the principle of solarity, this insistence on the positive value of 
voice is deeply Platonic insofar as it equates speech with self- presencing 
truth. As Andrew Cole has argued:
[New vitalists and speculative realists] all work hard not to project the 
human into the heart of things, [but] in their attempt to respect the 
indifference of objects in themselves, they do so anyway by dint of the 
ancient Logos principle by which things call out to us and speak their 
being. . . . I do not see that speculative realists, or vitalists, are aware of 
the complicated philosophical history that underlies their project to 
“make things speak.” Despite their attempts to question Derrida’s crit-
icism of ontotheology, this aspect of Logocentrism 101 has not been 
addressed.40
Bruno Latour’s conception of nonhuman “actants,” which in no small way 
has infl uenced the contemporary “object turn,” is a notable example of this 
logocentrism. Latour writes:
Once built, the wall of bricks does not utter a word—even though the 
group of workmen goes on talking and graffi ti may proliferate on its 
surface. Once they have been fi lled in, the printed questionnaires 
remain in the archives forever unconnected with human intentions 
until they are made alive again by some historian. Objects, by the very 
nature of their connections with humans, quickly shift from being 
mediators to being intermediaries, counting for one or nothing, no 
matter how internally complicated they might be. This is why specifi c 
tricks have to be invented to make them talk.41
This desire to hear objects speak is no less guided by the principle of lan-
guage as gift than is Susan’s effort to restore Friday’s voice in Foe, or Lestel’s 
conception of accréditation by virtue of which humans who teach apes ASL 
are said to grant nonhumans language. Latour’s vouloir dire, his wanting- to- 
say, pursues a similar auto- affective logic insofar as it echoes these demands 
to hear one’s voice reverberated in the responsive speech of others.
As for the human agents that populate Whitman’s lists, Bennett avowedly 
seeks to “elide or treat [them] as secondary” so that we might heed the voice 
of objects.42 This strategic elision allows us “to buy time for the things 
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outside to make their mark.”43 Solarity is thus portrayed as a temporary 
tactic:
The poet must be able, periodically, to skip a beat in the regular pulse 
of this discriminatory perception.44
Solar moments are necessarily fragile and fl eeting.45
The self who becomes judgment without becoming the judge sus-
pends for a time the sociomoral categories through which s/he usually 
differentiates his/her responses to things.46
For all the references to time, however, solarity’s suspension of judg-
ment is strikingly atemporal. This exclusion of time is evident from Ben-
nett’s initial discussion of Bergson, whose notion of perception hinges on 
memory: “With the immediate and present data of our senses we mingle a 
thousand details out of our past experience. In most cases these memories 
supplant our actual perceptions, of which we then retain only a few hints, 
thus using them merely as ‘signs’ that recall to us former images.”47 Per-
ception is subtractive for Bergson because “past images . . . constantly 
mingle with our perception of the present and may even take its place.” He 
goes so far as to suggest that perception, understood as an instantaneous 
intuition of the external world, “is a small matter compared to what mem-
ory adds to it.”48 While Bennett briefl y acknowledges the role that memory 
plays for Bergson, she quickly dismisses it in favor of Whitman’s allegedly 
atemporal solarity, which “commends to us a practice of judgment unac-
companied by this image/memory.”49 To bracket memory, however, is to 
advance a notion of “pure perception” that “exists in theory rather than 
fact.”50 Pure perception functions as a heuristic tool for Bergson that elu-
cidates the durational breadth of even the most rapidly occurring percep-
tion. Only the elimination of memory would permit us to “touch the 
reality of the object in an immediate intuition.”51 In the fi nal analysis, 
solarity amounts to a mode of pure perception whose elimination of 
memory promises direct access to things in themselves. Solar moments are 
not “fragile and fl eeing.”52 They are not even moments, that is, nonjudg-
mental instants wholly divorced from the past and the future. Solarity’s 
exclusion of time recalls Husserl’s dream of pure, auto- affective presence: 
the augenblick of interior monologue that excludes both time and space. 
Solarity seems to imagine something like an utterly pure hetero- affection, 
a punctual moment of total openness to alterity, divisible from the reten-
tional past and the protentional future thanks to which perception is always 
partial and subtractive.53 That solarity’s “open- armed . . . impersonal” 
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judgment depends on a nonsubtractive pure perception means that it is not 
“a diffi cult skill to master” simply because it does not qualify as a skill, 
which is to say a capacity for indiscriminate hospitality that humans can 
develop and perfect.54 Solarity is eclipsed by time from the start.
Solar Violence
While Erkkila stresses the democratic commitments voiced by Whitman’s 
catalogs, she also cautions that their horizontality “could operate paradoxi-
cally as a kind of formal tyranny, muting the fact of inequality, race confl ict, 
and radical difference within a rhetorical economy of many and one.”55 As 
the famous “Black Lucifer” passage in “Sleepers” demonstrates, the textual 
insistence on sympathetic unity cannot silence the violent historical reality 
of slavery:
I am a hell- name and a curse :
Black Lucifer was not dead ;
Or if he was I am his sorrowful, terrible heir ;
I am the God of revolt—deathless, sorrowful, vast ; whoever 
oppresses me
I will either destroy him or he shall release me.
Damn him, how he does defi le me !
Hoppler of his own sons ; breeder of children and trader of them—
Selling his daughters and the breast that fed his young.
Informer against my brother and sister and taking pay for their blood.
He laughed when I looked from my iron necklace after the 
steamboat that carried
  away my woman.56
The poet assumes the voice of a slave who rebukes the master for trading 
children whom he reproduces with his female slaves. Whitman removed 
both the reference to Lucifer’s blackness and the allusion to miscegenation 
in the original 1855 edition of Leaves of Grass. In the 1881 edition he 
deleted the Lucifer section altogether. Scholars such as Ed Folsom and 
Isaac Gewirtz have detailed Whitman’s ambivalent attitudes toward black 
Americans. Whitman was antislavery, but he did not advocate equal rights 
or citizenship once slavery had been abolished. In the 1850s he supported 
black colonization, asking “is not America for the Whites? And is it not 
better so?”57 In the wake of the Civil War, he warned of “the dangers of 
universal suffrage,” and employed familiar racist tropes in describing blacks 
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as “but little above the beasts,” possessing “as much intellect . . . as so many 
baboons.”58 Perhaps the most damaging contradiction to the many asser-
tions of monistic sympathy that suffuse Leaves of Grass lies in an unpub-
lished manuscript fragment, undated but most likely written late in his life: 
“I do not wish to say one word and will not say one word against the 
blacks—but the blacks can never be to me what the whites are [.] Below all 
political relations, even the deepest, are still deeper, personal, physiologi-
cal and emotional ones, the whites are my brothers & I love them.”59 As a 
rejoinder to such admissions of white racial solidarity and blatant racial 
stereotyping, Gewirtz rewrites a line from “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry” as “I 
am with [some of ] you.”60 In so doing, he fl outs the established interpre-
tive convention that distinguishes the “I” of a poem from its author. Whit-
man undoubtedly sought to impress his name and image on the reader by 
identifying himself as the speaker of Leaves of Grass, as well as by publishing 
the fi rst edition with a portrait of himself in lieu of his name. The engrav-
ing of the author in laborer’s clothing thus reinscribed the identity vacated 
by the absent signature. Is the persona named “Whitman” in the poem 
identical with his historical namesake, or does the former remain irreduc-
ible to the latter?
Even were one to regard Whitman’s racist statements as separable from 
the poetic “I,” however, we are still left with the paradox of a voice that 
declares equality by fi at. Do not such sovereign proclamations risk under-
mining the poetry’s professed democratic ideals in a manner similar to 
OOO’s “democracy of objects”? As I argued in chapter 3, OOO’s “strong” 
posthumanism risks becoming the “weakest” posthumanism, which is to 
say the most conventionally humanist, precisely because it claims too much 
for itself. The clamorous claims of object independence presume the 
human’s power to overthrow itself, thus reinstating the sovereign subject it 
would dethrone. Yet Whitman’s self- conscious performance of sovereign 
power lends itself to an ironic reading that contrasts sharply with object- 
oriented ontology. After all, Whitman’s “I” knows its own egotism. Should 
we take at face value a poet who declares “I will effuse egotism and show it 
underlying all, and I will be the bard of personality”? Is it precisely this 
ironic element that Lawrence missed when he chided Whitman’s arro-
gance? Far from “preaching egotism,” Whitman explained to his friend 
Horace Traubel that the “I” of his poetry designates:
personal force: it is personal force that I respect—that I look for. It 
may be conceit, vanity, egotism—but it is also personal force. . . . It is 
of the fi rst necessity in my life that this personal prowess should be 
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brought prominently forward—should be thrown unreservedly into 
our work. If I said “I, Walt Whitman” in my poems and the text 
meant only what it literally said, then the situation would be sad 
indeed—would be very serious: but the Walt Whitman who belongs 
in the Leaves is not a circumscribed Walt Whitman but just as well a 
Horace Traubel as any one else—personalized moral, spiritual, force 
of whatever kind, for whatever day; it is force, force, personal force, 
we are after.61
Despite the sixfold repetition of the word personal, this force is remarkably 
depersonalized, inhabitable by anyone who assumes the position of the 
poetic “I,” which means that this position is precisely nowhere in particu-
lar, personal only by virtue of the I’s contingent self- enunciation, and thus 
radically impersonal and anonymous.
The force of this (im)personality expresses what Derrida characterized 
in his early essay, “Structure Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences,” as the “contradictorily coherent” identifi cation of a center that 
“governs the structure” but does not fully belong to it: “Coherence in 
contradiction expresses the force of a desire.”62 The metaphysical disavowal 
of the center’s structurality is identical to the logic of sovereignty that Der-
rida would theorize many years later in Rogues. The sovereign governs 
from the center of a structure to which he does not belong, totally inside/
outside, totally “alone” and exceptional. In order to maintain this contra-
dictory position, pure sovereignty must remain utterly silent. As soon as 
this silence is broken, as soon as sovereignty gives reasons to justify its 
exceptionality, sovereignty becomes shareable. Its “center” is elsewhere. 
Sovereignty is no longer sovereignty. Yet the dispersal of the “I” in Whit-
man is distinct from metaphysical sovereignty insofar as Whitman is far 
from silent about it. He is all too ready to declare its performative contin-
gency: “Do I contradict myself ? / Very well then I contradict myself, / (I 
am large, I contain multitudes.).”63 The contradictory coherence of Whit-
man’s declarations goes to the fundamental antinomy that Derrida identi-
fi es at the center of democracy itself: the aporetic knot formed by a freedom 
that secures the sovereign self at the “center” of a political structure of 
equality shared by many other selves. Drawing from Aristotle’s canonical 
theory of politics, Derrida underscores how democracy wavers between an 
infi nite, incalculable freedom on the one hand, and a delimited, calculable 
equality on the other.64 Absolute, unfettered freedom would be antidemo-
cratic insofar as it would disallow the political conditions that safeguard 
freedom’s equal distribution. Every citizen is a potential rogue whose 
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otherwise unbridled sovereignty is restrained by the principle of equality. 
Rather than abide the unconditional sovereignty of each citizen, democ-
racy requires, at least in principle, that everyone be equally free, thus cir-
cumscribing liberty from the start.
Whitman’s democratic desire might seem more in line with the mock 
Latin e unibus pluram (out of one, many) than e pluribus unum.65 Yet sover-
eignty and democracy do not fi nd themselves suspended between mutually 
exclusive demands: an incalculable freedom facing off against a calculable 
equality. Rather, they are suspended within, by, and from themselves. Sov-
ereignty is internal to democracy, and vice versa. Insofar as everyone is 
equally free, equality is never purely calculable and freedom is never purely 
incalculable. Derrida draws from medical vocabulary to account for how 
democracy is affl icted with an “autoimmune” confl ict between uncondi-
tional freedom and conditional equality, a coupling by virtue of which 
freedom and equality always bequeath both conditional and unconditional 
traits in whatever concrete forms they assume.66 This internal division by 
virtue of which the many is always one and the one always many accounts 
for why Whitman expresses his democratic desire as a “personal force,” the 
kratos (- cracy, “force”) of a singular subject whose power is nevertheless 
dispersed among numerous others.
Whitman’s poetic voice often seeks to expand the boundaries of democ-
racy beyond the “we” that tacitly defi nes itself as white and male, most 
notoriously in the Declaration of Independence and the United States 
Constitution. Yet an expanded democracy is not and cannot ever be wholly 
inclusive. The question of who or what belongs to democracy is infi nitely 
reassessable because there are no natural limits that determine its borders 
once and for all. Democracy is founded on both explicit and implicit dis-
criminatory judgments regarding who or what are to be included. Derrida 
remarks, for example, that the extension of voting rights to immigrants is 
not necessarily more democratic: “One will never actually be able to ‘prove’ 
that there is more democracy in granting or in refusing the right to vote to 
immigrants, notably those who live and work in the national territory. . . . 
One electoral law is thus always at the same time more and less democratic 
than another.”67 Later he asks, “how far is democracy to be extended, the 
people of democracy, and the ‘each “one” ’ of democracy? To the dead, to 
animals, to trees and rocks?”68 Despite appearances, Derrida is not pro-
claiming the advent of a cosmocracy that would include everything; rather, 
the interrogative form of this ostensibly inclusive gesture stresses that the 
problem of democracy’s limit must remain a question. We might believe 
that we are being “more democratic” when we include trees and rocks, but 
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this irreducible belief cannot be converted into a defi nitive calculation that 
would evidence our perfectible march toward absolute inclusivity. What 
about bacteria and viruses? Artifi cial intelligence? The point is not that we 
should include everything, but that the inclusion of whomever or whatever 
cannot be construed as “more democratic” except by conceiving democ-
racy as a totality—except, that is, by conceiving democracy undemocrati-
cally. The calculation of “more” and “less” corresponds to a container 
model of democracy. To speak of political measures and decisions as more 
or less democratic implies an all- inclusive ideal against which this or that 
other can be added or subtracted.
The impossible advent of full inclusivity leads Derrida to conclude that 
democracy always remains to come. This deferred democracy does not cor-
respond to a regulative idea: an aspirational yet unachievable state of per-
petual peace and inclusivity toward which we nevertheless ought to aim. 
Nor does this deferral constitute an alibi, a “right to defer.” On the con-
trary: “[T]he to- come of democracy is also, although without presence, 
the hic et nunc of urgency, of the injunction as absolute urgency. Even 
when democracy makes one wait or makes one wait for it.”69 We are ethi-
cally obliged to promote an imperfect democracy even though it never 
fully presents itself.
Whitman’s incessant poetic listing undeniably lists (desires) democracy. 
It yearns for a shared, all- inclusive world that awaits only the elimination 
of sociopolitical hierarchies. Although his litanies are not composed of 
random, unrelated objects, they nevertheless share with OOO a teleologi-
cal desire to level all hierarchies and antagonisms. In contrast with Der-
rida’s democracy to come, Whitman’s democracy “arrives” by force of his 
sovereign enunciations. In “Thou Mother with Thy Equal Brood,” for 
instance, America is fi gured as the “ship of democracy” whose freight bears 
“Earth’s résumé entire.”70 America is the “living present brain, heir of the 
dead, the Old/world brain,” a world of “superber birth” nurtured in the 
womb by Europe and Asia, those “antecedent nations” that beget America 
as its fi nest offspring.71 The speaker concedes that the ship is “not to fair- 
sail unintermitted always, / The storm shall dash thy face, the murk of war 
and worse than / war shall cover thee all over.”72 In addition to foreseeing 
the rough seas ahead, the speaker also acknowledges that one can only limn 
the future of American democracy:
Thou wonder world yet undefi ned, unform’d, neither do I defi ne 
thee,
How can I pierce the impenetrable blank of the future?
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I feel thy ominous greatness evil as well as good. . . .
.....................................................................................
But I do not undertake to defi ne thee, hardly to comprehend thee,
I but thee name, thee prophesy, as now,
I merely thee ejaculate!73
Whitman fi ttingly couples the insemination of American democracy with 
metaphors of containment. From the nation’s “teeming womb” emerge 
“giant babes [the states] in ceaseless procession.” America is “the globe of 
globes,” an “orb” that “the FUTURE only holds.”74 This spherical con-
ception of democracy fi gures America as the living “heir of the dead, the 
Old / World brain,” which incubates the new world until its birth.75 Cru-
cially, this matrix is inverted once America is born: nourished in the womb 
of the old world, the new world henceforth becomes “the globe of globes” 
that fully incorporates the past into its present, ideal form.76
Although the poem affi rms the vulnerability of democratic progress, 
this problem is quickly cast overboard. Come what misfortunes may, 
America will “surmount them all.”77 Citing America’s artistic, educational, 
spiritual, and moral superiority, the speaker declares, “These! these in 
thee, (certain to come,) to- day I prophesy.”78 In contrast with the dissemi-
nated, unguaranteed future of the democracy to come, the content of 
Whitman’s future America is predetermined: the poet prematurely “ejacu-
lates” a democracy “certain to come.”
The “ship of democracy” thus names a vessel whose unwavering desire 
is vulnerable only to external forces, fi gured as a “livid cancer” that threat-
ens with its “hideous claws, clinging upon thy breasts, seeking to strike 
thee deep within.”79 We might be tempted to read this malignancy in 
terms of Whitman’s exceptionalist ideology, which encloses democracy 
within a “global” America that excludes the rest of the world. America is 
said to eclipse all other nations because it is the unique “fruit of all the Old 
ripening.”80 Alternatively, we might attribute this cancer to Whitman’s 
racism or the sociopolitical inequalities of nineteenth- century America 
more generally. Yet to focus only on these threats from without is to dis-
avow the autoimmunitary struggle between freedom and equality internal 
to democracy as such. Infi nitely perfectible and infi nitely corruptible, 
democracy is deferred not simply due to accidental, “contaminating” forces 
such as American exceptionalism or racism. Even were Whitman to have 
cast a wider net and have recognized the contributions of other nations to 
his democratic ideal, even were he not to have expressed racist views, his 
conception of democracy would remain no less teleological, no less com-
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mitted to a democratic desire that knows itself, a desire seemingly undi-
vided in its aim to transcend inequality altogether. As Martin Hägglund 
shows in his analysis of the Derridean à venir, the arrival of absolute justice 
or a perfect democracy would annul the temporal fl ux on which the sur-
vival of democracy depends. Democracy must make itself available to 
change and transformation. It would cease being democratic as soon as it 
completely resolved its internal confl icts. The full and fi nal instantiation of 
democracy is undesirable because it would ultimately threaten democracy 
precisely by impeding the mutability and variability on which it thrives. 
The “perfect” democracy would be the worst democracy: a democracy that 
negates itself by insulating itself.
The Cosmocracy to Come
The perfect democracy may be undesirable, yet the impulse to achieve 
its realization remains no less robust, especially in light of what I described 
in the introduction as the whataboutism of contemporary posthumanist 
thought. Given this ampersand effect, this ceaseless inclusion of more and 
more to which contemporary theory commits itself, does it still make sense 
to talk about democracy if this word no longer limits itself to human demos? 
In Plant Thinking, for instance, Michael Marder advocates a “vegetal democ-
racy” that would be “open not only to Homo sapiens but to all species with-
out exception.”81 Not content to stop at plants, the theoretical turn toward 
inanimate things wants to navigate the compass even farther. The title of 
an essay by Timothy Morton sums it up: “Here Comes Everything: The 
Promise of Object- Oriented Ontology.”82 This promise is similar to 
Marder’s “phytocentrism to come,” which draws upon the decentered 
nature of plants (their lack of a central nervous system) in order to expand 
the sphere of vitality to include all life. Phytocentrism’s paradoxical acen-
trism stands as a synecdoche for the growth capacity shared by every living 
species. As with the proclamation “here comes everything,” which does 
not simply describe but also performatively solicits the advent of its predi-
cate, phytocentrism obeys a conventional messianic logic by explicitly 
envisioning its success.83 The Derridean à venir, by contrast, garners its 
strength precisely from its weakness; its lack of assurance makes its prom-
ise more robust than any declaration of infi nite hospitality insofar as decon-
struction says “yes” to a future that remains vulnerable to both chance and 
threat.84
That Derrida ponders what it might mean to extend democracy to the 
dead as well as the living, the inanimate as well as the animate, underscores 
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that the à venir already invites the cosmocracy to come insofar as the kratos 
is severed from its essential relation to the demos. As he makes clear in an 
interview with Michael Sprinker, Derrida is not exclusively attached to the 
term democracy. He accepts its legacy on account of its exposure to the 
future, its promise of an open- ended negotiation between equality and 
freedom, but he also acknowledges:
Perhaps the term democracy is not a good term. For now it’s the best 
term I’ve found. But, for example, one day I gave a lecture at Johns 
Hopkins on these things and a student said to me, “What you call 
democracy is what Hannah Arendt calls republic in order to place it in 
opposition to democracy.” Why not? I am only employing the term 
democracy in a sentence or a discourse that determines certain things. 
I think that in the discursive context that dominates politics today, the 
choice of the term that appears in the majority of sentences in this dis-
course is a good choice—it’s the least lousy possible. As a term, how-
ever, it’s not sacred. I can, some day or another, say, “No, it’s not the 
right term. The situation allows or demands that we use another term 
in other sentences.” For now, it’s the best term for me. And choosing 
this term is obviously a political choice. It’s a political action.85
If accepting the paleonym democracy in order to renew its promise consti-
tutes a political choice, then adopting the neopaleonym cosmocracy is no less 
politically strategic. Is this term less “lousy” than democracy, which limits its 
scope to presumably human demos? When Derrida contemplates a poten-
tially inhuman political force, he does not specifi cally advocate on behalf of 
the insentient and the inanimate. He opens the door to rocks and trees, in 
other words, but it seems only slightly ajar. Can we speak of petrological 
life? This query does not require an immediate, urgent response so much 
as it welcomes a porous cosmocracy to come that eschews democracy’s 
petrifi ed forms.
Distinct from unconditional hospitality, cosmocracy renews the prom-
ise of an infi nitely expansive inclusivity by neither declaring nor ensuring 
its achievement. Its porosity is also its aporosity. That unconditional hos-
pitality is a principal rather than a practice, however, does not mean that it 
can be dismissed altogether. “Unconditional hospitality is impossible,” as 
Michael Naas puts it, but “it is the only hospitality that can give any mean-
ing to the concept of hospitality itself and, thus, the only possible hospital-
ity, the only one worthy of this name.”86 On the other hand, unconditional 
hospitality can never quite live up to its name because its practice is cir-
cumscribed by a negotiation that takes place between a fi nite number of 
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hosts and guests. Geoffrey Bennington frames this aporia as follows: “The 
one hospitality (the unconditional one) is worthy of the name because it 
just is itself, coincides with what the name names; the other (the condi-
tional and conditioned) is worthy of the name in the sense that it is done in 
the name of the other, unconditional hospitality. . . . An act of hospitality is 
worthy of the name not because it simply coincides with its name but 
because it is done in the name of what it never quite is.”87 Bennington notes 
that this sense of falling short is very close to the Kantian regulative idea 
even though it cannot ultimately be reduced to it. How are we to keep alive 
the promise of the cosmocracy to come if not by striving toward some 
infi nitely receding horizon? If this promise is not teleological, then it can-
not, by the same token, be absolutely antiteleological. Every promise pre-
supposes some aim, even if its content remains devoid of univocal meaning.
That the à venir is neither teleological nor antiteleological seems con-
fi rmed by the almost confessional tone that Derrida briefl y adopts in 
Rogues: “The regulative Idea remains, for lack of anything better, if we can 
say ‘lack of anything better’ with regard to a regulative Idea, a last resort. 
Although such a last resort or fi nal recourse risks becoming an alibi, it 
retains a certain dignity. I cannot swear that I will not one day give in to 
it.”88 Even though the à venir is not a principle that guides us toward some 
impossible ideal, Derrida cannot reassure us that he will not get buoyed 
away by its aspirational drift. Much depends on how one reads “Je ne jure-
rais pas de ne jamais y céder.”89 Michael Naas and Pascale- Anne Brault 
translate this sentence as “I cannot swear that I will not one day give in to 
it.” Geoffrey Bennington renders it more literally as “I would not swear 
never to give in to it,” a translation that has the benefi t of retaining the 
temporal ambiguity of the original French.90 Has Derrida already yielded 
to the regulative idea? Does this describe not so much a resignation that 
could happen one day (in the future) as one that has already happened? 
Bennington also offers an alternative rendering whose temporality is even 
more diffi cult to pin down: “I would not swear that I never give in to it”: in 
general, on an ongoing basis, I cannot pledge that I have not been tempted 
to surrender to teleological yearnings.91
Lest any reader jump too quickly to the conclusion that this sentence 
amounts to a “gotcha moment” that utterly undermines Derrida’s efforts 
to separate the à venir from the regulative idea, it is crucial to reiterate that 
the à venir does not set itself in opposition to the Kantian idea even as it 
remains irreducible to it. The à venir is against the Kantian idea in a double 
sense: the former works against and along with the latter, touches (on) it, 
sympathetically perhaps, even as it comes up against and thwarts its aims. 
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If Derrida admits to falling short of rejecting the Kantian idea—which 
amounts to saying that he falls short of not falling short—this miscarriage 
needs to be understood as something other than failure in the usual sense: 
what does it mean to fail to fail, to miss by not missing, or rather, by nearly 
missing the target toward which one all along claimed not to be aiming? 
Such vertiginous formulations aim to reconceive falling short as something 
other than a privation. Far from conceding a seduction by teleology that 
has already occurred or might occur at some point in the future, Derrida 
expresses nothing less than the autoimmunitary betrayal by virtue of which 
the rejection of teleology is no less vulnerable to contradiction than its 
affi rmation.
This contradiction is legible on the very surface of the expressions 
democracy to come or cosmocracy to come, both of which depend on the prin-
ciple of “minimal linguistic transparency” discussed in chapter 1.92 Recall 
that for Derrida the intelligibility of any signifi er depends on a reduction 
to univocity that “must be recommenced indefi nitely, for language neither 
can nor should be maintained under the protection of univocity.”93 This 
reduction to univocity must be forever resumed because irreducible 
equivocity is the condition of possibility and impossibility for univocity, 
and vice versa. The doit of Derrida’s reduction to univocity is both quasi- 
transcendental and normative: the reduction must and should be recom-
menced indefi nitely because univocity cannot and should not protect itself 
from equivocity.94 As Leonard Lawlor puts it, “there is an irreducible 
inadequation between possibility and necessity.”95 The imperative of uni-
vocity attempts to put the brakes on an unstoppable equivocity. As Derrida 
observes, even Joyce’s radically equivocal prose depends on a minimal 
univocity whose failure demands its interminable renewal.
As an iterable term, democracy summons up a history of sedimented 
meanings whose intelligibility depends on it being at once absolutely trans-
latable and absolutely untranslatable, totally univocal and totally equivocal. 
This oscillation is the necessary condition of its promise. Democracy may 
lack a “proper form,” but it must and should be promised as a minimally 
transparent, iterable concept in order that it have any future at all.96 On the 
one hand, democracy is fundamentally “aporetic in its structure (force 
without force, incalculable singularity and calculable equality . . . indivisible 
sovereignty and divisible or shared sovereignty, an empty name, a despair-
ing messianicity or a messianicity in despair.” On the other hand, one can 
despair of this messianicity, one can lament the hopeless advent of the à 
venir, only on account of having fi rst supplied this “empty name” with 
some intelligible meaning, some provisional sense that permits us to reac-
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tivate the names democracy, equality, hospitality and so on. This reactiva-
tion would differ from its Husserlian understanding, which Derrida glosses 
as reawakening a “primordial sense” that has been buried underneath sedi-
mented tradition.97 Derrida reactivates reactivation in a manner that abides 
the accumulated historical residue whose effacement Husserl holds onto 
as a horizon of impossibility: a guiding, aspirational ideal of unattainable 
univocity.
Wanting Justice
What does this simultaneous translatability and untranslatability reveal 
about the desire for the cosmocracy to come, this “empty name” that nev-
ertheless harbors some promise, one that neither yields to the Kantian idea 
nor frontally opposes it? To address this question, I want to revisit the 
claim advanced by Hägglund that the struggle for a more just and inclusive 
world is not governed by a desire for absolute plenitude. According to 
Hägglund:
Every call for justice must affi rm the coming of time, which opens the 
chance of justice and the threat of injustice in the same stroke. The 
desire for justice has thus never been a desire for absolute justice. 
The desire for justice is always a desire for the survival of fi nite sin-
gularities, which violates the survival of other fi nite singularities. 
Every ideal of justice is therefore inscribed in what Derrida calls an 
“economy of violence.” To be sure, struggles for justice are often per-
petrated in the name of absolute justice, but these claims can always 
be shown to be incoherent and hypocritical. There is no call for jus-
tice that does not call for the exclusion of others which means that 
every call for justice can be challenged and criticized. The point of 
this argument is not to discredit calls for justice but to recognize that 
these calls are always already inscribed in an economy of violence.98
Hägglund wants to provide a “systematic account” of desire in Derrida that 
neither he nor his commentators have explored, a unifying logic that alleg-
edly subtends his conception of the à venir.99 In developing this account, 
Hägglund employs a conception of undesirability that oscillates between 
description and prescription. Absolute justice is undesirable in a prescrip-
tive or normative sense because it would result in an unwanted outcome: 
the erasure of the antinomy between freedom and equality whose survival 
depends on the chance of perfectibility and the threat of corruptibility. If 
democracy is sustained by an irremediable autoimmunitary confl ict between 
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freedom and equality, then the “perfect” democracy would require the 
complete erasure of alterity: a Robinsonian isolation whereby “equality” 
would be fully reconciled with an unconditional, sovereign freedom. 
Although Derrida does not explicitly state that the perfect democracy is 
undesirable in a normative sense, the deleterious effects that would follow 
from the arrival of a democracy “cured” of its autoimmunity support the 
claim that the twofold chance and threat to which we must remain open 
implies a distinction between the desirable and the undesirable.
Shifting to a descriptive level, however, Hägglund wants to claim that 
absolute justice is undesire- able in the sense that we are unable to desire it: 
“The desire for fullness has never been operative in a political struggle or 
anything else.”100 The age- old admonishment to be careful what you wish 
for is utterly gratuitous because Hägglund believes no one really desires 
political plenitude. He is certainly correct that the fi ght for pure justice 
“can always be shown to be incoherent and hypocritical,” but why can we 
not desire absolute justice simply because this yearning is self- refuting?101 
It does not follow from the principle of democracy’s intrinsic mutability 
that “one cannot desire a state of being that is exempt from time” simply 
because this desire is contradictory.102 Since when is desire not divided, 
incoherent, and contradictory?103 One of the most basic lessons of psycho-
analytic theory is that desire is forever mobile and shifting, never entirely 
certain of its object. That Hägglund is not unaware of this fundamental 
psychoanalytic insight is made clear when he claims that the desire for 
democracy “is essentially corruptible and inherently violent.”104 This cor-
ruptibility of desire, however, proves the exact opposite of what he pre-
sumes. Far from unveiling the true sense of the desire for justice, far from 
exposing its “proper” object, the corruptibility of desire renders untenable 
any desire to distinguish real from false desires. Notwithstanding asser-
tions to the contrary, this false distinction between true and false desires 
cannot but “discredit calls for justice” because it refuses to credit the desire 
for perfect justice as a desire at all.105 Hägglund thus seizes upon Derrida’s 
association of democracy with mutability and openness, susceptibility and 
vulnerability, but this commandeering of democracy’s ship ironically pro-
tects it from straying off course. Despite claiming to promote a “hyper-
political logic that spells out that nothing is unscathed or unquestionable,” 
he exempts desire from corruptibility and autoimmunity, which is to say 
that he exempts it from temporality altogether.106
One can only translate the untranslatable sense of the desire for democ-
racy into an absolute transparency by force of a sovereign desire to unveil 
the truth of desire: “To desire democracy is by defi nition to desire some-
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thing temporal, since democracy must remain open to its own alteration in 
order to be democratic [ my emphasis].”107 This effort to pin down the 
meaning of the desire for democracy is far removed from the minimal 
transparency or univocity on whose necessity Derrida insists. Although 
the intelligibility of the desire for democracy depends on it “allotting its 
share to univocity,” this minimal transparency neither can nor should be 
protected from desire’s irreducible equivocity. Desire is by defi nition inde-
fi nable. The aim of desire, its proper object, is always à venir. To identify 
its aim here and now is to grant language a referential function fundamen-
tally at odds with différance. The desire for desire’s referential truth dis-
avows the iterability of the sign, its structurally intrinsic alterity that 
depends precisely on the coming of time whose twofold chance and threat 
Hägglund otherwise wants to affi rm.108
The delimitation of the desire for democracy is undemocratic not sim-
ply because a sovereign agent appoints himself the arbiter of true and false 
desires, but more fundamentally because this “proper” defi nition disavows 
desire’s improperness, its inherent dispossession. That desire is “the desire 
of the other,” as Kojève and Lacan have taught us, means that it never fully 
belongs to us.109 Mediated through the desires of others, “our” desire is 
fundamentally expropriated. Desire is never sovereign for the same reason 
that sovereignty is never sovereign: both are always already divided by 
alterity. No one indeed has ever desired absolute justice, but not because 
the predicate of this desire is fully determinable. No one has ever desired 
absolute justice— or desired anything else for that matter—because desire 
has always belonged to no one.
The drive to unveil the alleged descriptive undesirability of uncondi-
tional justice thus overlooks a far more radical undesirability. When Lacan 
and Kojève claim that we desire desire, they fi gure desire as the object of a 
desiring subject. This capacity for desire is said to elevate humans above 
animals, whose aims are allegedly reducible to self- preservation. While 
Kojève employs the term desire to characterize both human and animal 
intentionality, Lacan less charitably distinguishes human desire from ani-
mal “need.”110 Animals lack desire just as they lack language. Yet desire is 
not merely one object of desire among others. Humans no more “have” 
desire than they do language. Lack is the condition of desire, but desire 
also names what we lack. Desire is a privation rather than a possession. 
Desire is an impouvoir, a nonpower or not- being- able.111 This impouvoir is 
not the same as powerlessness. It corresponds to a certain weakness and 
vulnerability, an exposure to forces beyond ourselves to which we yield, for 
better or worse.112 As Derek Attridge puts it, desire is an arrivant: it comes 
18955-Peterson_MonkeyTrouble.indd   115 7/24/17   5:22 PM
116 Listing Toward Cosmocracy
from elsewhere, from the alterity of conscious and unconscious invest-
ments whose ownness is permanently displaced.113 Desire is not an ability 
or capacity that belongs to an agential subject. An originary undesirability 
is the condition of impossibility of desire as such. Desire is undesirable.
The Scandal of Desire
The cosmocracy to come is both hic et nunc and infi nitely deferred. Prom-
ised in the name of what never fully arrives, cosmocracy is worthy of the 
name only insofar as it remains unworthy of the name. Whereas the antite-
leological desire for a continuously perfectible and corruptible justice to 
come confi dently asserts its incorruptibility, its capacity not to surrender 
to any teleological yearnings, the weak nonteleological desire for the cos-
mocracy to come is far less self- assured and confi dent, far less eager to 
pledge its unswerving desire never to fall short of falling short.
Whitman’s desire to broaden democracy beyond the human warrants 
redescribing this impulse as cosmocratic. While this desire is just as resil-
ient as Hägglund’s antiteleological counterpart, occasionally Whitman 
loses his swagger and concedes cosmocracy’s fragility and vulnerability. 
Leaves of Grass employs a central botanical metaphor of singular leaves 
composing a common, democratic ground. Yet this harmony is not always 
welcomed by the poetic voice. In “This Compost,” for instance, the speaker 
withdraws from the earth because he is repulsed by the thought that corpses 
are buried within it:
O how can it be that the ground itself does not sicken?
How can you be alive you growths of spring?
How can you furnish health you blood of herbs, roots, orchards, 
grain?
Are they not continually putting distemper’d corpses within you?
Is not every continent work’d over and over with sour dead?114
Here the speaker eschews earthly union in a manner that ironically recalls 
Lawrence’s repudiation of Whitman: “I don’t want all those things inside 
me, thank you.” Whitman seems to reject the “foul liquid and meat” of 
the dead just as Lawrence does the “awful pudding of One Identity.”115 
While critics following Lawrence’s lead have often admonished Whit-
man for promoting an “ ‘imperial self,’ an ego spreading outward,” 
Killings worth suggests that a different Whitman appears in these verses, 
“a poet of limits.”116 How are we to understand these borders? Are they 
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reducible to the xenophobia that we have seen elsewhere in Whitman? 
To be sure, something of the cosmocratic promise remains once the speaker 
recognizes:
Perhaps every mite has once form’d part of a sick person—yet 
behold!
The grass of spring covers the prairies,
The bean bursts noiselessly through the mould in the garden,
The delicate spear of the onion pierces upward,
The apple- buds cluster together on the apple- branches,
The resurrection of the wheat appears with pale visage out of its 
graves.117
These lines seem to revitalize botanical merger, yet the speaker never 
entirely recovers from his initial xenophobia: “Now I am terrifi ed at the 
Earth, it is that calm and patient, / It grows such sweet things out of such 
corruptions.”118 The speaker’s expressed fear of “every spear of grass”—
which is to say every singular other who/that threatens to pierce “the 
imperial self ”—can also be read as conveying a more literal terror in 
the face of what Killingsworth calls earth’s “thingishness.”119 Insofar as the 
earth continues to rotate with or without us, its inhuman indifference is an 
unwelcome reminder of human mortality. The earth “turns harmless and 
stainless on its axis, with such endless/successions of diseas’d corpses, / It 
distills such exquisite winds out of such infused fetor, / It renews with such 
unwitting looks its prodigal, annual, sumptu- /ous crops, / It gives such 
divine materials to men, and accepts such leavings/from them at last.”120 
Barring a collision with a rogue planet such as Melancholia, the earth will 
survive the death of each fi nite singularity, at least according to the poet’s 
vision of the world’s “stainless,” eternal rotation.121
Yet perhaps the earth also terrifi es the poet precisely because its eternal 
survival, its continuous turn, is no more guaranteed than that of democ-
racy, which, as Derrida frequently insists, is defi ned by:
[a] rotary motion . . . that turns on itself around a fi xed axis. . . . It 
seems diffi cult to think the desire for or the naming of any democratic 
space without what is called in Latin a rota . . . without the rotary 
motion of some quasi- circular return or rotation toward the self, 
toward the origin itself, toward and upon the self of the origin, when-
ever it is a question, for example, of sovereign self- determination, of 
the autonomy of the self, of the ipse, namely, of the one- self that gives 
itself its own law.122
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In addition to this turn toward the self as origin, democracy’s circularity 
also turns on a lack of proper meaning that operates like “a disengaged 
clutch, freewheeling. . . . And so it is defi ned only by turns, by tropes, by 
tropism.”123 Moreover, this tropism is likewise inscribed in the turn qua 
alternation between freedom and equality, an oscillation that does not sim-
ply mark a torsion between the unconditional and the conditional, but also 
the turning of these concepts within and against themselves.
Whitman similarly fi gures cosmocracy in terms of the irresistible revo-
lution of the earth, a desire whose “true” meaning cannot be arrested: a 
perpetual tropism that defi es any Ptolemaic effort to center the meaning of 
desire, to prevent the desire for absolute justice from turning on or against 
itself. One can thus draw an axis directly from the desire to eliminate injus-
tice all the way through to the sovereign self- determination to eliminate 
the desire to eliminate all injustice. To claim that a perfectly just world is 
undesirable because it would result in an atemporal, inalterable state is to 
say that we cannot want it because it will terminate the rotational move-
ment on which democracy, as it were, rests. Absolute justice is thus retained 
as a regulative idea, only now its purpose is overturned: its portended 
injustice is meant to regulate us into not wanting it precisely because it has 
been found wanting. Yet it can only be found wanting by claiming to have 
unearthed its true meaning at the expense of leaving unturned its other 
tropic leavings.
One may pledge never to yield to teleology, but this desire not to be 
ensnared is no less corruptible than the most explicit affi rmation of absolute 
justice itself. A promise that protects itself from corruptibility is no promise 
at all. Corruptibility has no opposite: no incorruptible side that would 
reveal the truth of the desire that animates every promise. The “perfect” 
egalitarian ethico- political condition may amount to a solipsistic nightmare 
in which freedom and equality coincide only on account of eliminating all 
others. That no desire is utterly transparent to itself, however, means that 
we cannot completely rule out the possibility that this seemingly undesir-
able state nevertheless names one possible desire among others.
Although we will never be in a position to know that we have included 
everything, it does not follow that we cannot want the impossible. It no 
more falls to us to determine the truth of our desires then it would to the 
“sovereign” human to adjudicate cosmocracy’s achievement. This judgment 
would ironically close things off by granting the human the power to calcu-
late the fi nal sum of those deemed worthy of ethical consideration. The 
necessary porosity of cosmocratic borders resonates to some extent with 
Matthew Calarco’s notion of an “agnostic ethics,” a Levinasian inspired 
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openness to the question of who or what has a face.124 This agnosticism is 
not based on “the positive claim that all things or all life forms do count.”125 
On the contrary, he maintains that the question of ethical consideration 
ought to remain “wide open.”126 Calarco’s conception of openness, how-
ever, tends to mute the role of decision and calculation in ethics: “We are 
obliged to proceed from the possibility that anything might take on a face. 
And we are further obliged to hold this possibility permanently open” 
because the scope of ethical concern “cannot be determined with any fi nal-
ity.”127 The borders that demarcate the sphere of ethical concern may not 
be fully decidable, but this indetermination cannot and should not warrant 
avoiding decisions or refusing to invoke specifi c criteria as a condition of 
moral consideration—however contestable and revisable such criteria 
always remain. We must “decide” the undecidable, which means that ethi-
cal agnosticism is contaminated from the start. Calarco seems to concede as 
much when he remarks that his decision to focus on animals risks under-
mining universal ethical respect. He is right to resist the tendency of ana-
lytic philosophers to invoke criteria that “cleanly demarcate those beings 
who belong to the community of moral patients from those beings who do 
not [ my emphasis].”128 Yet this lack of clean demarcation cannot be the 
basis for abandoning criteria altogether. The criterion of sentience, for 
example, tacitly subtends Calarco’s attention to animal suffering. The ines-
capable impurity of ethical agnosticism entails that we are “bound to make 
mistakes” when we exclude some beings from moral consideration, even 
though Calarco explicitly suggests that agnosticism can assist us in avoiding 
them.129 Only an impossible, unconditional agnosticism could avoid mis-
takes altogether. We must strive to preserve the possibility that anything 
might have a face, even though we continually “decide” that some beings 
and entities do not according to a range of criteria that calculate the incal-
culable. Have not both omnivores and vegetarians already said “no” to 
plants by eating them? Do I know that plants do not have a face? No. But I 
am reasonably confi dent in my belief that they do not, certain enough that 
my (irreducible) belief rightly passes for knowledge.
The question of belief returns us to what I characterized in chapter 1 as 
the co- insinuation of the as if and the as such—the phantasm and its cor-
responding “truth.” That mistakes are inevitable means that this book has 
proceeded as if its chosen literary texts and fi lms are more germane to the 
question of the human’s place within posthumanism than others might 
have been. In contrast to the cold calculations of the litanizer, my textual 
selections refl ect a leap of faith whose lack of assurances affi rms discrimi-
natory, “arbitrary” decisions as the condition of hospitality as such. As I 
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noted previously, this arbitrariness should not be equated with pure chance, 
but rather with judgments that arbitrate according to beliefs whose verac-
ity remains continuously debatable. The weak posthumanism of these 
decisions does not hesitate with regard to the human’s urgent decentering. 
It does not convey a desire (at least a conscious one) to safeguard the human 
from its deconstruction. On the contrary, its weakness refl ects an ironic 
power that aims to defl ate the ultrahumanism of those posthumans who 
“know” too much about the human. They are ultimately too little of faith 
precisely because they credit the human’s capacity for self- abandonment as 
if it amounted to the truth of posthuman capaciousness as such.
Capaciousness is capability itself. There is no making room for the non-
human without a human giving itself the capacity to play host at the “cos-
mic party” to which everything is allegedly now invited.130 I began by 
considering how posthumanist theories of immanence circumnavigate the 
human only to run aground on their scandalous desire to evade the scandal 
of the human. Are we now any further from the shores of the human than 
when we embarked? What will have been the measure of our success or 
failure? Has the human been erased “like a face drawn in the sand at the 
edge of the sea”?131 Or does its successful effacement remain no more 
determinable than the origin of the footprint whose trace disturbs Cru-
soe’s solitude? Surely we hope that we have landed on the archipelago of a 
lesser or weaker humanism even if we remain linked to the island of human 
narcissism from whence we came.
Posthumanist immanence boards the ship of cosmocracy hoping to sail 
unhindered through the aporia of the human, the nonpassage that in Greek 
is often associated with inaccessible waterways and seas.132 Yet the desire to 
steer around the desire for an entirely equitable, nonhierarchical world is 
no less encumbered. It seeks to make land according to its “logic” of desire, 
which is to say its logos of desire, precisely by making fast desire’s irrevo-
cably unmoorable aims. We must therefore not conclude that no one has 
ever heard the posthumanist siren song, that its seduction amounts to little 
more than a false consciousness that awaits us to fathom its true, submerged 
desire. While some posthumanist theories demand the imminent arrival of 
an immanent, untroubled ethico- political condition, others posit it as belat-
edly achievable once the human is fully decentered. This deferred dream 
thereby seeks to make the future present by “knowing” its destination in 
advance. It may seem that this long- sought perfect justice lies leagues apart 
from the desire to repudiate this yearning altogether, yet both desires are 
no more impervious to time’s roll and pitch than is the promise of justice 
itself. Whereas the ship of democracy requires a helmsman with a “good 
18955-Peterson_MonkeyTrouble.indd   120 7/24/17   5:22 PM
Listing Toward Cosmocracy 121
strong hand and wary eye” to steer it toward its foreseeable and inevitable 
landing, the ship of cosmocracy sails toward justice in a manner that can-
not protect it from the elements.133 This ship can never perfectly ballast 
the competing demands that issue from countless others—human or ani-
mal, organic or inorganic—beings and entities who call on us to see the 
cosmocratic vista anew. They implore us not only to reexamine who or 
what we ought to embrace, but also to limn the fading horizon that sepa-
rates whom from what. Navigating the rough waters on which we both 
steady and list, we must tack our ship directly into the erratic winds by 
whose force justice sinks or swims—ceaselessly borne back toward the 
cosmocracy always to come.
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 50. Zahavi, “Empathy,” 289.
 51. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 212.
 52. Ibid., 51, 2, 52.
 53. Ibid., 52.
 54. Derrida, “Eating Well,” 285.
 55. Lestel, “How Chimpanzees Have Domesticated Humans,” 12–15. 
On the topic of how these experiments produce talking apes, see Chrulew, 
“Philosophical Ethology of Dominique Lestel,” 17– 44.
 56. Lestel, L’animal singulier, 120; my translation.
 57. Lestel, “How Chimpanzees Have Domesticated Humans,” 14.
 58. Pollick and de Waal, “Ape Gestures and Language Evolution,” 
8184 –8189.
 59. Lestel, L’animal singulier, 119; my translation.
 60. Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 2.
 61. Ibid., 25.
 62. Lacan, Psychoses, 167. A recent article published in Nature reconfi rms 
von Frisch’s theory. See Riley et al., “Flight Paths of Honeybees,” 205–207.
 63. de Man “Autobiography as De- Facement,” 70.
 64. Pepperberg, Alex Studies, 41.
 65. Ibid., 44.
 66. Pepperberg, Alex and Me.
 67. Terrace et al., “Can an Ape Create a Sentence?,” 900.
 68. Smith, “Thinking Bird or Just Another Birdbrain?”
 69. Derrida, Rogues, 7.
 70. Pepperberg, Alex Studies, 41.
 71. Ibid.
 72. Ibid., 44.
 73. Ibid.
 74. Lestel, “Mirror Effects,” 55.
 75. Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, 105.
 76. Ibid., 103.
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 77. Derrida, Animal, 37.
 78. T. S. Eliot, Old Possum’s Book of Practical Cats, 2.
 79. Massumi, What Animals Teach Us About Politics, 8.
 80. Ibid., 8, 45.
 81. Ibid., 26, 8. 
 82. Ibid., 2, 8. 
 83. Ibid., 8.
 84. Ibid., 50.
 85. Ibid., 77.
 86. Ibid., 3. Derrida, Beast and the Sovereign, 2:74.
 87. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, 152.
 88. Derrida, Beast and the Sovereign, 2:35.
 89. Lestel, L’animal singulier, 139; my translation.
2. sovereign silence: the desire for answering speech
 1. Kafka, “Silence of the Sirens,” 128.
 2. I discuss these racist representations in the introduction to my Bestial 
Traces, 1–7.
 3. Coetzee, Foe, 147.
 4. Ibid., 80.
 5. MacLeod, “ ‘Do we of necessity become puppets in the story?’ Or 
Narrating the World,” 1–18.
 6. Attridge, “Oppressive Silence,” 226.
 7. Ibid., 152.
 8. Ibid., 153.
 9. See Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, 296–299.
 10. Coetzee, Foe, 152.
 11. Ibid., 154.
 12. Ibid., 152.
 13. Ibid., 141.
 14. Ibid., 142.
 15. Ibid., 157.
 16. Ibid., 8.
 17. Ibid., 59.
 18. Ibid., 118.
 19. Quayson, Aesthetic Nervousness, 164.
 20. Ibid., 150, 149.
 21. Kalpana Rahita Seshadri argues similarly that we should avoid 
reducing silence either to an effect of repression or to a “pristine state” exte-
rior to language. See her HumAnimal, 33.
 22. Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 2, 23.
 23. Ibid.
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 24. Ibid., 39, 40.
 25. Ibid., 1.
 26. Ibid., 25.
 27. Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1:191.
 28. Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon, 42.
 29. We need only replace the word bodies with words in Coetzee’s phrase 
to grasp this impossible idiomaticity: This is a place where words are their own 
signs. How could words be their own signs? How could any word belong fully 
to itself ? How could it sign anything except on the condition that it exist in 
relation to other signs whose alterity deprives it of its ownness?
 30. Ibid., 88.
 31. Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 22.
 32. Derrida refers explicitly to Husserl’s notion of analogical appresen-
tation in a number of texts in addition to Violence and Metaphysics and Voice 
and Phenomenon. See “Rams,” 135–164; and Gift of Death.
 33. Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon, 65.
 34. Derrida does not employ the concept of “citationality” in Voice and 
Phenomenon, but his discussion of Husserl anticipates the circulation of this 
term in later texts such as “Signature Event Context.” See Derrida, “Signa-
ture Event Context,” 307–330.
 35. Ibid., 69.
 36. Ibid.
 37. Coetzee, Doubling the Point, 248.
 38. Ibid.
 39. Ibid., 248, 249.
 40. Parry, “Speech and Silence,” 154, 158.
 41. Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 64.
 42. Ibid., 65.
 43. Coetzee, Foe, 157.
 44. This opacity of meaning is further muddied by the puzzling dream 
logic that confl ates the individual events that brought Cruso, Friday, and 
Susan to the island. In one of his confl icting stories, Cruso claims that he and 
Friday were the sole survivors of a shipwreck. Although Susan was cast adrift 
in a rowboat along with her dead captain when the crew of their ship muti-
nied, the fi nal section of the novel imagines Susan, Friday, and the captain 
entombed within the same wreckage.
 45. Coetzee, Foe, 22.
 46. Ibid., 69.
 47. Ibid., 98, 119.
 48. Ibid., 146.
 49. Ibid., 198.
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 50. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, 213.
 51. Coetzee, Foe, 56.
 52. Brown, “In the ‘folds of our own discourse,’ ” 186.
 53. Coetzee, Foe, 61.
 54. Foucault, History of Sexuality, 1:101.
 55. Brown, “In the ‘folds of our own discourse,’ ” 189.
 56. Chesnutt, Conjure Woman.
 57. Ibid., 163, 166.
 58. Ibid., 160.
 59. Ibid., 170, 169.
 60. Ibid., 172.
 61. Derrida, Beast and the Sovereign, 1:32.
 62. Derrida, Rogues, 100.
 63. I say “almost always” not to imply that an individual act of slave 
resistance can overturn racial hierarchies altogether. Yet if a slave were to 
commit an extreme act of resistance, such as killing the master, she can rea-
sonably be said to have gained the upper hand, at least fl eetingly. Moreover, 
the impossible purity of sovereignty as such, should not be collapsed onto the 
experience of slavery in which the master’s authority is felt as if it were 
absolute.
 64. Sundquist, To Wake the Nations, 390.
 65. Chesnutt, Conjure Woman, 171.
 66. Ibid., 162, 160.
 67. Sundquist, To Wake the Nations, 392.
 68. Chesnutt, Conjure Woman, 162.
 69. Washington, Up from Slavery, 5.
 70. Ibid. Washington goes on to explain that “this news was usually got-
ten from the coloured man who was sent to the post- offi ce for the mail. In 
our case the post- offi ce was about three miles from the plantation, and the 
mail came once or twice a week. The man who was sent to the offi ce would 
linger about the place long enough to get the drift of the conversation from 
the group of white people who naturally congregated there, after receiving 
their mail, to discuss the latest news. The mail- carrier on his way back to our 
master’s house would as naturally retail the news that he had secured among 
the slaves, and in this way they often heard of important events before the 
white people at the ‘big house,’ as the master’s house was called.”
 71. Bone, Down Home, 83.
 72. Ibid., 172.
 73. “The Dumb Witness” was accepted for publication in 1897, but 
ultimately was not published during Chesnutt’s lifetime. A modifi ed version 
was incorporated into Chesnutt’s novel, The Colonel’s Dream (1905). For more 
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on the complicated publication history of Chesnutt’s story, see Richard 
Broadhead’s introduction to The Conjure Woman and Other Conjure Tales, 18.
 74. Coetzee, Foe, 38.
 75. Derrida, Beast and the Sovereign, 2:9.
 76. Ibid., 8.
 77. Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon, 56.
 78. Coetzee, Foe, 30.
 79. This “yes” is related to Derrida’s notion of the arrivant, which 
 signifi es whoever or whatever arrives (ce qui arrive). Even if we say “no” to 
this arrivant because it threatens injury or harm, this negation nevertheless 
presupposes a prior “yes,” an originary vulnerability and exposure to a 
world with others. See Derrida, Aporias, 33–34; and Derrida, “A Number 
of Yes,” 231–240.
3. the gravity of melancholia: 
a critique of speculative realism
 1. Derrida, “Circumfession,” 134.
 2. Melancholia, directed by Lars von Trier (Zentropa, 2011), theatrical 
release, and Gravity, directed by Alfonso Cuarón (Warner Bros., 2013), the-
atrical release.
 3. Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” 245.
 4. Harman, “Well- Wrought Broken Hammer,” 187.
 5. Meillassoux, After Finitude, 119.
 6. Bryant, Democracy of Objects, 246.
 7. Cuarón and Cuarón, Gravity.
 8. Bryant, Democracy of Objects, 32.
 9. Meillassoux, After Finitude, 128.
 10. Harman, Quadruple Object, 5.
 11. Ibid., 3.
 12. Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 21.
 13. Bryant, Democracy of Objects, 22; Husserl, Ideas 1, 35.
 14. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 30, 120.
 15. Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences, 185.
 16. Harman, “Well- Wrought Broken Hammer,” 185.
 17. Ibid.
 18. Harman, Quadruple Object, 46.
 19. Ibid., 45.
 20. Ibid.
 21. Spinoza, “Letter 58,” 909.
 22. Harman, “Aesthetics as First Philosophy.”
 23. Ibid.
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 24. Bennett, “Systems and Things,” 226.
 25. Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 8.
 26. Harman, Quadruple Object, 46.
 27. Derrida, Animal, 34.
 28. Bryant, Democracy of Objects, 19.
 29. Gratton, Speculative Realism, 119.
 30. Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 11.
 31. Levinas, Totality and Infi nity.
 32. Harman, “Aesthetics as First Philosophy.”
 33. Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 125.
 34. Bennett, “Systems and Things,” 230.
 35. Bryant, Democracy of Objects, 40.
 36. Harman, Quadruple Object, 63.
 37. See my “Slavery’s Bestiary: Joel Chandler Harris’s Uncle Remus Tales,” 
in Bestial Traces, 50–73.
 38. Derrida, Rogues, 11.
 39. Ibid., 195.
 40. Ibid., 199.
 41. Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 22, 21.
 42. As Derrida argues, “absolute power can be fi gured by the grandeur 
of the grandest but also by smallness, arch- smallness, the absolute diminution 
of the smallest. . . . The political power that is today trying to make its sover-
eignty prevail thanks to its economic and techno- scientifi c resources (I was 
mentioning last time the satellites of worldwide surveillance, whose informa-
tion is sometimes bought by the United Slates) does so through the refi ne-
ment of what are now called nanotechnologies” (Beast and the Sovereign, 
1:257–258).
 43. Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” 254, 255.
 44. While I subscribe to Derrida’s view that mourning and melancholia 
are not absolutely distinct—that is, the death of the other engenders an irre-
mediable loss of the world, thereby forcing us to “carry the world of the 
other . . . after the end of the world”—some forms of melancholia are clearly 
more livable than others, more open to a future that says “yes” to mourning 
even if this affi rmation must remain equivocal. Mourning may be intermina-
ble, but a mourning that says “yes” to loss without any pang of regret would 
be, in the fi nal analysis, indistinguishable from the disavowal of loss that con-
ditions melancholia in the fi rst place. See Derrida, “Rams,” 140. 
 45. Harman, Third Table, 15.
 46. Ibid., 12.
 47. Norris, Philosophy Outside- In, 195.
 48. Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 4.
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 49. Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” 254.
 50. Ibid., 255, 254.
 51. Phillips, On Kissing, 76.
 52. Derrida, “Some Statements and Truisms,” 73.
 53. Morton, “Here Comes Everything,” 163.
 54. Ibid., 170.
 55. Bryant, Democracy of Objects, 29.
 56. Harman, “Well- Wrought Broken Hammer,” 200.
 57. Ibid., 185.
 58. Faulkner, As I Lay Dying, 160.
 59. Coetzee, Foe, 152.
 60. Meillassoux, After Finitude, 124.
 61. Ibid., 121.
 62. Ibid., 10; Kant, “Preface to the Second Edition,” 112.
 63. Meillassoux, After Finitude, 14, 13.
 64. Ibid. The original French states that the correlationist codicil is 
 “discretèment [discreetly] placé en bout de phrase.” The English translation 
introduces the incorrect “discretely.” See Meillassoux, Après la fi nitude, 30.
 65. Ibid., 15. 
 66. Ibid.
 67. Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences, 53, 48. See also Zahavi, Husserl’s 
Phenomenology, 128. Zahavi observes that Husserl criticizes “certain elements 
in the infl ated self- understanding of science” rather than reject science 
altogether.
 68. Meillassoux, After Finitude, 17.
 69. Ibid., 115, 116.
 70. Ibid., 117.
 71. Ibid., 118.
 72. Ibid., 136.
 73. Freud, “Fixation to Traumas,” 285.
 74. Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, 192, cited in Brague, “Geocen-
trism as a Humiliation for Man,” 198.
 75. Dante, Divine Comedy, 185.
 76. Galileo Galilei, Galileo on the World Systems, 90.
 77. Kant, “Preface to the Second Edition,” 113.
 78. Ibid., 110.
 79. Arendt, On Revolution, 42.
 80. Ibid., 45. Arendt suggests that this shift in sense from restoration to 
transformation explains why no less a revolutionary than Thomas Paine could 
characterize the French and American revolutions as “counterrevolutions” (in 
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a positive sense) that declared the inalienable political rights of all men by vir-
tue of birth yet denied by centuries of tyranny.
 81. Husserl, “Foundational Investigations,” 130.
 82. Ibid., 118.
 83. Ibid., 123.
 84. Meillassoux, After Finitude, 112.
 85. Another Earth, directed by Mike Cahill (Fox Searchlight Pictures, 
2011), DVD.
 86. Solaris, directed by Andrei Tarkovsky (Criterion Collection, 2011), 
DVD.
 87. The fi gure of the counter- earth can be traced to the origins of sci-
ence fi ction cinema in the iconic scene from Georges Méliès’s Le Voyage dans 
la Lune (1902), in which a bullet- shaped space capsule carrying earthly inhab-
itants strikes the eye of the moon’s anthropomorphized face. Humans project 
their own image as far away as the moon, whose vision must be immediately 
rendered half blind, as if to proscribe in advance the possibility of any cosmic 
reverse shot, thus preserving the unidirectional gaze. For an analysis of this 
scene from Méliès’s fi lm in terms of what this interplanetary shot /reverse 
shot implies for even the most intimate of intraterrestrial gazes between self 
and other, see Szendy, Kant in the Land of Extraterrestrials, 129–133.
 88. Meillassoux, After Finitude, 112.
 89. Kamuf, “Competent Fictions,” 9.
 90. Sontag, “Imagination of Disaster.”
 91. Carlsen, “The Only Redeeming Factor is the World Ending.”
 92. I previously discussed this scene and several others from von Trier’s 
fi lm in an analysis that interrogated the false choice between literal and alle-
gorical interpretation. See my “Magic Cave of Allegory,” 400– 422.
 93. Derrida, “Rams,” 161.
4. listing toward cosmocracy: 
the limits of hospitality
 1. Szendy, Kant in the Land of Extraterrestrials, 145.
 2. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 715.
 3. Bennett, “The Solar Judgment of Walt Whitman,” 138.
 4. Ibid., 131.
 5. Killingsworth, Walt Whitman and the Earth, 23.
 6. Coviello, Intimacy in America, 135.
 7. Warner, “Whitman Drunk,” 40.
 8. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 127.
 9. Ibid.
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 10. Lawrence, “Whitman,” 15, 16, 23.
 11. Sommer, “Supplying Demand,” 52.
 12. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 48.
 13. Ibid., 52. 1855 edition.
 14. Ibid., 715; ellipses in the original.
 15. Ibid., 233.
 16. Plato, Republic, 215.
 17. Levinas, Time and the Other, 64.
 18. Ibid.
 19. Ibid., 65.
 20. Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 92.
 21. Bennett, “Systems and Things,” 227.
 22. Ibid., 77.
 23. Ibid., 32.
 24. Bennett, “The Solar Judgment of Walt Whitman,” 136.
 25. Bogost, “Tacos, Enchiladas, Burritos, Chiles, &c.”; Bogost, “Latour 
Litanizer.”
 26. In “The Poet,” Emerson wrote that “bare lists of words are found 
suggestive, to an imaginative and excited mind” (334). The objects cataloged 
by OOO are deliberately chosen for their apparent incongruity, which is to 
say that they are chosen precisely to give the impression of not having been 
chosen, of having been selected at random, as if attesting to a form of non-
judgmental, “solar” judgment.
 27. Bennett, “Of Material Sympathies,” 249.
 28. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 431.
 29. Erkkila, Whitman the Political Poet, 81–91.
 30. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 565.
 31. Ibid., 425.
 32. Ibid., 36.
 33. Previously signifying a human or animal bed as well as nonhuman 
offspring, litter assumed an expanded sense in the nineteenth century due to 
its association with straw and animal waste, leading to its modern equation 
with disorder and debris.
 34. Bennett, “The Solar Judgment of Walt Whitman,” 134.
 35. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 716, 165.
 36. Bennett, “The Solar Judgment of Walt Whitman,” 134.
 37. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 348.
 38. For more on Whitman’s complex relation to feminism, see Pollak, 
“In Loftiest Spheres,” 172–193.
 39. Bennett, “The Solar Judgment of Walt Whitman,” 140.
 40. Cole, “Call of Things,” 106, 112.
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 41. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 79.
 42. Bennett, “The Solar Judgment of Walt Whitman,” 137.
 43. Ibid., 142.
 44. Ibid., 133.
 45. Ibid., 138.
 46. Ibid., 142.
 47. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 33.
 48. Ibid., 66.
 49. Bennett, “The Solar Judgment of Walt Whitman,” 132.
 50. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 34.
 51. Ibid., 75.
 52. Bennett, “The Solar Judgment of Walt Whitman,” 138.
 53. Peter Gratton argues persuasively that speculative realists, in particu-
lar Meillassoux and Harman, exclude temporality and thereby reinscribe the 
metaphysics of presence. If virtually everything is an object for Harman, then 
how, Gratton asks, can we account for an object such as music since it depends 
precisely on time? See Gratton, “Post- Deconstructive Realism,” 84–90.
 54. Ibid., 133.
 55. Erkkila, Whitman the Political Poet, 102.
 56. Whitman, Notes and Fragments, 19.
 57. Cited in Folsom, “Lucifer and Ethiopia,” 76.
 58. Ibid., 78, 83, 81.
 59. Whitman, Notebooks and Unpublished Prose Manuscripts, 2160.
 60. Gewirtz, “I Am With [Some of ] You,” 11.
 61. Traubel, With Walt Whitman in Camden, 2:535.
 62. Derrida, “Structure Sign and Play,” 279.
 63. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 88.
 64. Derrida, Rogues, 48.
 65. Wallace, “E Unibus Pluram,” 151–194.
 66. Derrida, Rogues, 36.
 67. Ibid.
 68. Ibid., 54.
 69. Ibid., 29.
 70. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 457.
 71. Ibid., 458.
 72. Ibid., 460.
 73. Ibid., 458.
 74. Ibid., 458.
 75. Ibid., 457.
 76. Ibid., 461. This identifi cation of America with novelty and futurity 
in opposition to European morbidity is one of the quintessential gestures of 
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American exceptionalism. The myth of “virgin land,” for instance, not only 
licensed the extermination of native peoples, but equated Europe with tem-
porality and America with timeless space, thus exempting the latter from “the 
human experience of birth, death, and rebirth” (Noble, Death of a Nation, xl). 
In this regard, the “living present” of Whitman’s new world, a present that 
contains both the past and the future, echoes George Berkeley’s “Verses on 
the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America” (1728), which simi-
larly characterizes America as “time’s noblest offspring,” a progeny that 
escapes European “decay” (234).
 77. Ibid.
 78. Ibid., 459.
 79. Ibid., 460.
 80. Ibid., 457.
 81. Marder, Plant- Thinking, 51.
 82. Morton, “Here Comes Everything,” 163.
 83. Marder, “For a Phytocentrism to Come,” 249.
 84. For an expanded critique of Marder, see my “Races.”
 85. Derrida, “Politics and Friendship,” 181.
 86. Naas, Derrida from Now On, 22.
 87. Bennington, “In Dignity,” 7.
 88. Derrida, Rogues, 83.
 89. Derrida, Voyous, 122, cited in Bennington, “In Dignity,” 12.
 90. Bennington, “In Dignity,” 12.
 91. Ibid., 13.
 92. Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, 105.
 93. Ibid., 102.
 94. “Cette réduction doit être indéfi niment recommencée, car le langage 
ne peut ni ne doit se maintenir sous la protection de l’univocité” (Derrida, 
“Introduction,” in Husserl, L’origine de la géometrie, 104).
 95. Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl, 122.
 96. Derrida, Rogues, 74.
 97. Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, 28.
 98. Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 169.
 99. Ibid., 32.
 100. Ibid., 202.
 101. Ibid., 170.
 102. Ibid.
 103. In a critique of Hägglund, Naas asks, “Isn’t it possible to desire and 
yet not desire something? Might it not make more sense to talk about an apo-
ria or denegation of desire rather than a so- called or purported desire that 
dissimulates a real one?” (“An Atheism,” 61).
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 104. Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 204.
 105. Ibid., 169.
 106. Ibid., 203.
 107. Ibid.
 108. See Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” 324.
 109. Lacan, “Direction of the Treatment,” 250–310; Kojève, Introduction 
to the Reading of Hegel.
 110. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 6; Lacan, “Direction of 
the Treatment,” 282.
 111. Derrida, Animal, 28.
 112. For an analysis of this undesirability in relation to Coetzee’s Disgrace, 
see my “Ashamed of Shame” in Bestial Traces, 113–146.
 113. Attridge, “Age of Bronze,” 98–121.
 114. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 368.
 115. Ibid.
 116. Killingsworth, Walt Whitman and the Earth, 11.
 117. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 368.
 118. Ibid., 369.
 119. Ibid.; Killingsworth, Walt Whitman and the Earth, 19.
 120. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 369
 121. Ibid.
 122. Derrida, Rogues, 10.
 123. Ibid., 37.
 124. Calarco, “Toward an Agnostic Animal Ethics,” 78.
 125. Ibid., 81.
 126. Ibid.
 127. Ibid., 79, 80.
 128. Ibid., 77.
 129. Ibid., 80.
 130. Fleming and O’Carroll, “Paganism.”
 131. Foucault, Order of Things, 422.
 132. An Intermediate Greek- English Lexicon, s.v. “ἀπορία” (aporia), 
accessed May 15, 2016, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu /hopper.
 133. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 458.
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